MANNERS IN THE HOMERIC EPIC

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BY

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PREFACE

The ways in which Homer's heroes relate to one another have led Dihle ('Antike Höflichkeit und Christliche Demut,' p. 181) to speak of their 'correct demeanor.' This phrase presupposes that Homer knew fixed social rules, that the epic heroes abide by them, and that they thus provide good examples for all of us to follow. Fränkel (*Dichtung und Philosophie,* p. 92) escalates the praise: 'The human of the Iliad has refined manners.' Such general remarks raise questions: According to whose standards? And what about the way Diomedes shouts after Aphrodite, and Achilleus tells Odysseus and Aias to shut up and leave?

Fränkel continues, '[Homeric Man] does not feel restricted by the social rules, but ennobled by them, for they accord him dignity. He controls etiquette with a virtuosity that proves he is its ruler, not its slave. This becomes most apparent in the elegance of the speeches and the diplomatic finesse he can achieve.' These general impressions call for scrutiny.

Straßburger ('Der Soziologische Aspect der homerischen Epen,' p. 112) contends, 'Nearly all confrontations of the heroes are courtly in the composure and selfdiscipline emanating from external and internal manners alike.' And Snell (*Dichtung und Gesellschaft,* pp. 45-46) observes that 'all of public life is closely connected with rigid conventional rites and forms, with what we tend to call 'external' practices—mistakenly so, for the discrepancy between internal content and external form, between disposition and gesture, has not yet erupted.'

These statements present suppositions as certainties; in the following pages I consider some aspects of manners in the epics at greater depth. I examine Homer's conceptions of propriety, good manners, and courtesy, and discuss the way he puts them to use. I deal with the question of 'internal' manners, the extent to which ethics influence the way Homeric heroes treat one another in specific situations, and the way their internal and external manners are related.

It is in this sense that I understand Fränkel's statement 'An analysis of Homeric manners is an urgent want' (p. 92, n. 20). Many publications have described Homeric custom in regard to

hospitality, dinners, funerals, greetings and leavetakings, vocative expressions, and the like. Though such studies barely touch on the matter with which this book deals, they are basic to any survey of 'good manners'. Only W. Luther, in *Wahrheit und Lüge*, takes an occasional step further by searching for the reasons that impel an individual to follow or fail to follow a certain custom.[1]

I explore these motives and, in general, the social and psychological backgrounds of Homeric manners, in an attempt to find to what extent the propositions of Dihle, Fränkel, Straßburger, and Snell are true and to develop a more differentiated picture of etiquette in Homer's time.

This book is a revision and translation of a doctoral dissertation, *Omgangsvormen in het Homerische Epos*, written in Dutch, directed by Professor Dr. W. J. Verdenius, and presented to the University of Utrecht in April 1975. I am deeply grateful to Professor Verdenius for his inspiring guidance and encouragement throughout the writing of this English version; to Professor G. J. de Vries for his helpful criticism, reflected in his article 'Phaeacian Manners', to Dr. Mary Boynton, who supervised my correction of English usage in Chapter I; to Dr. James Tyler and Matt Neuburg, who helped me correct Chapters II and IV; and to Mrs. Barbara H. Salazar for correcting Chapter II and Part B. Since I did not always follow their advice, I am responsible for any errors that remain.

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[1] For instance, pp. 20 (ρ 15) and 30 (χ 467); likewise, Reinhard, *Herkommen und Höflichkeit*, pp. 270-71 (the πρεσβεία).

PART A

CHAPTER ONE

APOLOGIES

The epics present apologies in four categorically different forms:

1) the emphatic attestation of one's regret, bearing traits of an official formula; the declaration accompanied by a promise—or actual offering—of a conciliatory present;
2) a less emphasized, semi-official form with the bearing of a short expression such as "sorry";
3) self-accusations;
4) the explanation of one's own conduct as a substitute for a formal apology.

I

A representative of the first mentioned type occurs in Book θ; [1] Odysseus shows reluctance to participate in the Phaiacians' sporting contests, which prompts the Phaiacian Euryalos to abuse him. He utters his opinion that Odysseus is no hero, but a sailor in pursuit of commercial gain. Euryalos repeats for emphasis that Odysseus does not look like an athlete. (θ 159-64) Odysseus protests energetically. He calls Euryalos 'reckless' [2] (166) and his mind 'worthless' (177), then joins in the games. Only after Odysseus proves to be victorious, king Alkinoos sides with him: 'No man would properly find fault with your excellence, if he knew in his heart how to speak sensibly'. Since Euryalos does not seem to have understood the hint, Alkinoos adds an unmistakable order for Euryalos; Εὐρύαλος δέ ἑ αὐτὸν ἀρεσσάσθω ἐπέεσσι | καὶ δώρῳ.[3] Upon this, finally, he takes action and presents Odysseus with a sword (406) accompanied by the words: ἔπος δ' εἴ πέρ τι

[1] Greek capital letters refer to books of the Iliad; lower case letters to those of the Odyssey.

[2] θ 239/40; English translations of the Greek text are quotations from: Robert Fitzgerald, *The Iliad*; *Homer*, resp., Richmond Lattimore, *The Odyssey of Homer*, unless otherwise stated.

[3] θ 396/7; Alkinoos declines to address Euryalos directly; for the discreet show of superiority accompanying the preference for indirect allocution, see Part B, pp. 173-77; cf., however, G. J. de Vries, *Phaeacian Manners*, Mnemosyne IV 30 (1977), p. 118.

βέβακται | δεινόν, 'may the stormwinds catch it away and carry it off'.

This is the most circumstantial form of apologies that we encounter in the epics. The speaker recapitulates his offence and expresses his wish for its deletion. Further, he offers a present; in this case, it is a sword of solid bronze with handle and nails of silver in a cut-out ivory scabbard. (403-05) Within the range of the epics, this looks like a routine present. It does not necessarily strike one as more base or more royal than any other gift offered in the epics. But, of course, whenever the poet troubled to mention or describe gifts, they had to be lavish enough to be worthy of description, if only for the sake of an unproblematic relation between the bard and his audience. Thus, in the epics, the givers of presents were always generous, but this does not imply that members of the societies that Homer describes were never miserly. Nor does it imply that the Homeric society would regard valuable objects as the only acceptable gift-items.[4] In brief, although Euryalos' reconciliation-gift does not call for any particular attention among the presents mentioned in the epics, his gesture is great.

The wish that the winds may grasp up and remove any big word uttered, is quite emphatic. The image of winds as annihilating agents for the impact of remarks may be common enough for stereotypical use; the same idea is expressed in the form μεταμώνια (e.g. Δ 363).[5] But, as a whole, Euryalos' choice of words is no fixed formula. His apology is particular; it combines the ritual solemnity a formula can convey, with the courtesy of investing energy in finding a specific wording to suit the situation.

The introduction ἔπος δ' εἴ πέρ τι βέβακται | δεινόν has caused some disagreement. Mireaux understands this clause as Euryalos'

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[4] However, cf. Snell, *Dichtung und Gesellschaft*, p. 45, 'Sobald jemand 'Freund' wird, kann er seine Freundschaft nicht sosehr durch Austausch von Meinungen und Gefühlen bewähren, vielmehr muß er es ... durch Tausch von Geschenken tun. [Es] sind nicht etwa kleine Dinge, die ihren Wert erhalten, weil sie Zeichen herzlicher Zuneigung sind, sondern wertvolle Stücke, die man als Schätze vorzeigen kann'.

[5] Luther, *Wahrheit und Lüge*, p. 114, takes μεταμώνια in the sense of 'nichtig', 'ungeschehen'. On p. 112, he discusses the expression ἀνεμώλια βάζειν, e.g. at δ 837 = λ 464, referring to 'windiges, unzutreffendes Geschwätz'; for his interpretation of ἀνεμώλιον at φ 474, he uses the expression 'kraft- und wirkungslos wie der Wind'. One can be in disagreement with this view.

rejection of guilt: 'Il plaide non coupable'.[6] Naegelsbach, to the contrary, takes the word εἴ in the meaning of 'now that', 'since [I did this]'.[7] The commentary of Walter Leaf at A 61, the passage that Nägelsbach had in view specifically, is more moderate. To his opinion, εἰ with indicative (of the future in this case) 'assumes as a vivid probability'.

Some single constituent features of this clause in Euryalos' speech can be taken in such a sense as to support Mireaux' view. If βέβακται is a form of the passive voice, Euryalos' avoidance of mentioning the agent of the offending action, that is: himself, can point to an attempt to be unduly protective of himself. In that event, he can both be regarded as a dexterous lawyer to his own cause, and incur criticism for failing to present himself explicitly as the offender. Also, the expression ἔπος τι δεινόν can, at oral recitation, be made to sound as though Euryalos arrogantly denies understanding what ἔπος king Alkinoos is 'fuzzing' about. Not unlike the English word "some", the deemphasized τι—form can express various kinds of understatement. Lastly, δεινόν can be rendered in many different ways to suit different occasions. Lattimore uses at this point the expression 'improper'. Nevertheless, whenever the word is used in the epics, it does not confine itself within the range of what is detrimental to the commonly desirable, but of what is *potentially* detrimental when it appears to exceed the human limitations of energy and understanding. In other words, when Euryalos qualifies the ἔπος as δεινόν, he does not pronounce the ἔπος guilty. There is a good point in his avoidance to derogate the ἔπος. For the Phaiacians, the insult's impact has been that Odysseus has changed without delay his attitude of unwillingness to join in the contest, into the—desired—opposite. His sudden *impetus* as a reaction to the insult has helped him to accomplish something amazing. The Phaiacians are treated to a grand surprise, and obtain a good reason, provided by the guest himself, to respect and admire him. Odysseus has gained a position of high honor. It would not be just for Euryalos to condemn himself or his ἔπος after it has proved to contain at least the good element that has helped to generate a beneficial action.

On the other hand, not pronouncing oneself guilty is not equiva-

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[6] É. Mireaux, *La vie quotidienne au temps d'Homère*, Paris 1954, p. 186.

[7] C. F. von Nägelsbach, *Anmerkungen zur Ilias*, Nürnberg [2]1850, p. 21: 'sintemal nunmehr' and pp. 278-80.

lent to pronouncing oneself innocent. Mireaux interprets the word εἴ as 'if (at all)' to suit his opinion 'Il plaide non coupable'. While holding a contrasting view in taking εἴ in the affirmative sense of 'now that ...', 'since', Naegelsbach overlooks the hints implied in the use of the word τι: Euryalos claims not to have complete insight in the essence of the insult. 'Since' is too affirmative to fit in the context.

All in all, it seems wisest to use the commentary of Walter Leaf at A 61 as a base for the interpretation of Euryalos' statement. First, although βέβακται is not in the future tense like the predicate used at A 61, it is, likewise, in the indicative mood. Second, at θ 408, the addition of περ reinforces εἴ in its basic function of pointing to a possible truth; εἴ πέρ points to a probability so vivid that it is just short of the speaker's calling it the objective truth.

Thus, Euryalos draws the affair, especially the insult, out of the range of innocence, guilt, and remorse into which Odysseus, king Alkinoos and public opinion appeared to have pushed it. He puts it back into the range of taking, or refusing to take, responsibility for one's actions. He makes a public statement and pays his penalty in a splendidly unforced, agreeing, gift-giving manner. The circumstance that he presents Osysseus with a sword rather than with an item that would in the first place be a merchant's tool, may be purely accidental, but can also indicate his change of mind as to the contents of his offending remark. At any rate, his choice is not indicatory of his convictions as to his guilt or innocence, either.

That Euryalos does not mention himself explicitly as the offending agent might imply that he overdoes his eagerness for reconciliation slightly, summarily taking responsibility for all harm done to Odysseus by the Phaiacians, himself or anyone else. The poet does not mention anything like a Euryalos-party ganging up on Odysseus before the game, but Euryalos did have his sympathizers. The fact that Odysseus' protest at θ 166-185 had remained ineffectual suggests that public opinion was in support of Euryalos. King Alkinoos did not even start acting on behalf of his insulted guest until after Odysseus had given unmistakable, non-verbal proof that Euryalos' attitude had been inappropriate.

This means that the Phaiacians had no objections to the lack of courtesy in Euryalos' un-asked for, negative reaction to a guest's behavior. They objected merely to the low quality of its relation

to the truth as it turned out to be. This is apt to place the Phaiacians in a questionable light as to their manners, but it also appears that the truth, or whatever an any given moment was considered to be the truth, was held to be more important than anything else, including good manners. According to its effect, the insult proved to be a *hortatio*, how ever much fallen out of proportions by the undue amount of contempt shown towards a guest.

Such a *hortatio* fitted the poet's purpose of entertaining his audience. It was certainly more conducive to that purpose, when Odysseus would first bring proof by his deeds that appearances had been misleading Euryalos and the Phaiacians. The poet provided the audience with a vivid action-story, before he allowed the discourtesy of abusing a guest to result in the offering of an apology.

If the clause εἴ . . . βέβακται can be taken in this sense, it suits the splendor of the situation, the generosity and solemnity of this apology as a whole. It also fits in with two circumstances. First, shortly before, Euryalos had given promise to his king to make up for his mistake. (θ 401-05) Consequently, a moment later, when he starts wording his apology, he is confident that to apologize is the right thing to do. Otherwise he could have argued with King Alkinoos. Nowhere in the epic is it suggested that Euryalos would be too bashful to protest. His unimpaired self-confidence, specifically his confidence in the justice of his offering an apology, renders it impossible that his words at θ 408-09 would have the bearing of an attempt to talk himself out of whatever guilt he had. Second, Euryalos adds good wishes for Odysseus' return to his home country. If his apology had been forced and merely formal, it would have been more natural to omit these wishes.

Odysseus accepts the apology unconditionally and without any further ado. In view of his vehement reactions in lines 166 and 177, this would have been an incongruous attitude after an apology given in half-heartedness. As a matter of fact, the manner in which Odysseus expresses his acceptance of the apology suits the pattern by which gratitude is expressed in the epics, as will be shown in chapter IV. The speaker (here, Odysseus) bestows a wish for divine blessing upon the other (θ 413), connecting it with an acknowledgement of what, exactly, the other has done to make him grateful ([Ξίφος] μοι δῶκας ἀρεσσάμενος ἐπέεσσιν. Lattimore translates: '[You] made amends to me with words spoken').

An ironic element in the situation is the fact that Euryalos offers Odysseus peace by means of offering a sword. By his answer, 'May you never miss this sword you have given me now', Odysseus returns the wish for peace beautifully. Odysseus' answer to Euryalos takes up a mere three lines. It is admittedly short, but by no means curt.[8]

A strong objection against this interpretation of θ 408-09 seems to be presented by a near-identical apology at Δ 362-63. There,

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[8] G. J. de Vries, *Phaeacian Manners*, p. 118.

Rose, *The Unfriendly Phaeacians*, describes the role of the Phaiacians in this matter and points to their gradual shift from wary watchfulness in their treatment of Odysseus to total acceptance and hospitable backing. At p. 397, he states about Alkinoos, 'Ineptitude as a leader ... and an ignorance of protocol ... are the traits which best explain his flawed hospitality'. De Vries justly criticizes Rose's overemphasizing unfriendliness, even hostility, as a part of the Phaiacians' national character and in their treatment of Odysseus.

It seems to me that, from the poet's point of view, the help Odysseus really needed was not only transportation from Scheria to Ithaka but, more essentially, proper preparation for the all-out battle between him and the suitors. Without it, the escort would only have helped bring about Odysseus' premature death at the hands of the suitors. Accordingly, his experiences on Scheria are to function in a manner comparable to a booster-shot at immunization. Although he draws conclusions which well deserve de Vries' criticism, Rose rightly observes 'a similarity between the Phaeacians and the suitors' (p. 391). Without this similarity, Odysseus' encounter with the Phaiacians, when the single newcomer faces the established, overwhelming majority, would not have been as effectively helpful as a 'last-minute' exercise for asserting himself against the suitors. The exercise needed is, mostly, a psychological one. His self-confidence needs all the boosting it can get, and gets it on the base of his own actions as the Phaiacians provoke these. His walk through a possibly hostile environment to Alkinoos' palace prepares him for his walk up to his house on Ithaka, when he incurs real hostility. His keeping his light under a bushel until the moment of Euryalos' challenge, then carrying the day after taking the people by surprise, encourages his decision to set up a similar pattern to follow at home. Also, his relating—upon Phaiacian insistence—his exploits of the past ten years in detail, all converging into the successful result of his survival so far, is to Odysseus a thorough survey of his assets as regards experience, strength of mind, luck and physical fitness. This survey establishes his own confidence along with that of the Phaiacians and the poet's audience, basic and prior to engaging, with a sound expectation of success, in the otherwise incredible act of killing nearly single-handed a large group of healthy people at one time. The Phaiacians' treatment of their guest is not altogether unfriendly, yet tough enough to suit the purpose well. The oncoming confrontation with the suitors calls for effective preparation.

This leads to the question to what extent the Phaiacians can be assumed to be plainly human and in total unawareness of the conflict in store for Odysseus, unaware also of their role as Odysseus' coaches.

as well, the form into which a hortatio has been moulded, constitutes the offense for which the speaker apologizes.

Agamemnon goads Menestheus and Odysseus, who seem late in joining the battle. He gives them a reminder that, when the gathering concerns a dinner-frolic, they are always among the first to make their appearance, and he addresses Odysseus for this allocution with the words καὶ σὺ κακοῖσι δόλοισι κεκασμένε, κερδαλεόφρον. (Δ 339). The most aggressive expression in Odysseus' reaction is ἀνεμώλια βάζεις. (355) Unlike the Phaiacian, who—along with the rest of the people—needs to see Odysseus' action first, Agamemnon apologizes instantly after Odysseus' verbal protest, ταῦτα δ'ὄπισθεν ἀρεσσόμεθ', εἴ τι κακὸν νῦν | εἴρηται, τὰ δὲ πάντα θεοὶ μεταμώνια θεῖεν. To be sure, his promptness is no special accomplishment; unlike the Phaiacians, Agamemnon is already acquainted with Odysseus' valor.

As to εἴρηται, there is no possibility that the passive voice would suggest that witnesses on the scene were a supporting background to Agamemnon at his offense. Except the ones directly concerned, no one is present. This leaves two possibilities of understanding the function of the voice used. 1a) Agamemnon directs that part of the attention that would have been drawn to his own person, at the use of the active voice, to the κακὸν itself; the result of his action is emphasized, allowed to receive full, undivided attention, so that Agamemnon acknowledges his wrong generously. 1b) He means to do what he can to de-emphasize himself as the originator of the κακόν, which would make him a shrewd, but morally not very high-standing lawyer to his case. 2) Agamemnon wishes to allow for the inferential conclusion that also his opponent in the conflict is a speaker of κακόν. That would not be without some justice; Odysseus' first reaction (a.o. 'ανεμώλια βάζεις) is not exactly elegant or respectful. He reacts aggressively to Agamemnon's insult (although he does so even more in the case of his conflict with Euryalos). Agamemnon's use of the plural ἀρεσσόμεθα seems to point in that direction, as well. If that is so, then, what we have here is not so much an apology as a proposal toward reconciliation at which the speaker bases his words also on the insulting force of his opponent's reaction, and expects that the other will, in turn, show his readiness to reconcile by uttering a similar wish. After Δ 363, however, this does not happen. At θ 413-15, Odysseus gives an answer that consists in his acceptance of the apology

and the reconciliatory gift, an expression of gratitude and good wishes, but there is no apology on his part for having called Euryalos 'reckless' and 'worthless'. After Δ 363, there is no answer at all.

Odysseus' reticence is remarkable, even with the circumstance taken into account, that a battle is in progress which makes it seem better, indeed, that not much time be devoted to speeches. But when Odysseus' disposition is such that he will address the young Phaiacian in a kind manner, after the latter's apology, one might also expect him to be willing to close the incident with his warlord in a comparable situation using a few constructive or friendly words, provided the apology is as sincere, instead of leaving the scene without giving an answer. Odysseus does not make the impression of being entirely reconciled and of one mind with Agamemnon. The good intentions of the speaker at preferring τι κακὸν as a subject of the clause, to his own person, are only seemingly above suspicion on account of the parallel at θ 408. But formally, only the use of the plural ἀρεσσόμεθα offers a hold as to what has left Odysseus dissatisfied. However elaborate and even solemn a form of apologizing Agamemnon chooses, his use of the plural reveals not only at least a residue of aggressiveness but also the difference between his and Odysseus' point of view concerning the matter of guilt.

Agamemnon betrays his lack of full awareness of his wrong even more clearly immediately after this incident. Hardly disturbed, he resumes his offensive way of talking, this time to Diomedes, though in a somewhat less blunt form. He reminds him in detail of Tydeus' courage and concludes that Diomedes, his son, however, is less valiant and better versed at talking. (Δ 370-400) It is true that he takes the trouble to veil a crude insult like 'Diomedes, you are a woman' in several layers of circumstantiality, thereby doing a great deal of talking himself. Although the insult is too grave for Diomedes to forget,[9] he decides not to protest,[10] and

[9] Cf. I 34/35, where he says to Agamemnon, 'Before this you have held me up to scorn for lack of fighting spirit'. There is a possible link between, on the one hand, what Agamemnon has done to him and his own failure to protest and, on the other hand, the lack of moderation in his treatment of Aphrodite after wounding her in the battle.

[10] In his reaction to Kapaneus' son, who has spontaneously taken up the defense of Diomedes against Agamemnon, Diomedes explicitly declines to protest—οὐ γὰρ ἐγὼ νεμεσῶ ... (Δ 413-17).

no apology ensues. Van Erp comments, 'Agamemnon seems to weigh his words so little that only the reaction of the one whom he addresses [Odysseus] makes him comprehend what he really said.' [11] However, this appearance is deceptive. Had Agamemnon's awareness effectively been raised by Odysseus, and had his new awareness induced the apology, then, the same new level of awareness would have prevented his resuming his unfair behavior, this time toward Diomedes. He knows both times what he is doing. He follows 'jungle law' by receding only in front of the one who shows his teeth.

That Agamemnon insults the next person immediately after his apology for insulting the first one, reveals that the apology is not a product of awareness of his wrong. This throws a different light on his expression εἴ τι κακὸν . . . εἴρηται. The parallel with Euryalos' manner of apologizing at θ 408-09 is merely formal. The fact that Euryalos makes the spoken ἔπος δεινόν subject of the clause, and directs everyone's attention to the undiminished weight of his responsibility for it, puts his generosity beyond doubt. But when Agamemnon uses this construction, it may imply that he prefers not to identify the producer, or producers, of the 'meanness'. Agamemnon's apology is formally grand, but his sincerity, courtesy and generosity remain questionable.

The ambivalence contained in the use of the plural ἀρεσσόμεθα makes itself equally felt at Z 526. This proposal for a reconciliation refers to a disagreeable scene at Paris' house. Hektor has reproached Paris in Helen's presence with, among other things, the hard truth 'our troops are dying . . . The hue . . . of war . . . comes in like surf upon this town; [under these circumstances] σὺ δ'ἂν μαχέσαιο καὶ ἄλλῳ, | εἴ τινά που μεθιέντα ἴδοις στυγεροῦ πολέμοιο'. (Z 327-30)

Since Hektor's later apology may well refer to these very lines, it is necessary to determine their meaning. Fitzgerald translates, 'You'd be at odds with any other man you might see quitting your accursed war'. According to Beßlich, however, this remark is a direct incitement to join the battle, 'Er [Paris] solle sich an der Schlacht beteiligen . . ., d.h. nach seiner Niederlage gegen Menelaos (Γ 355 ff.) könne er sich ja andere Gegner auswählen.' [12] Beßlich assumes that with ἄλλῳ etc. not 'any other quitter' is meant, but a Greek hero, yet to be chosen, a successor of Menelaos for a duel

[11] *Agamemnon in Epos en Tragedie*, p. 33 (paraphrased).
[12] *Schweigen-Verschweigen-Übergehen*, p. 113.

with Paris. But this is unlikely. The transition σὺ δέ connects the remark with the former two lines; the circumstance that the troops are being slaughtered and the battle rages already right around the city is too grave an emergency for Hektor to suggest that Paris does not really have to fight with Menelaos all the time and might as well find someone else instead. The emergency situation, as Hektor describes it, does however provide the immediate, natural reason to attack a person on his obvious attitude of sitting back and not caring enough to help. The direct admonition to help follows immediately upon this remark and is set off from it by the word ἀλλά in ἀλλ' ἄνα.[13] Further, the form μεθιέντα with a following genitive confers the notion of 'sagging', 'ceasing'.[14] A suggestion from Hektor: 'You could—when not with Menelaos—fight with some other quitter'[15] is impossible. Since Menelaos is no quitter, the inference would be, 'go and have a duel with someone who is as sagging in his fighting spirits as you are'. Hektor's wish would then have been to watch two unwilling fighters pitched against each other in an apathetic duel to help solve the emergency situation. Lastly—this in anticipation on a point to be made below —, when Hektor offers his apology in the end, he uses the expression ἀρεσσόμεθα. This expression includes the announcement of a conciliatory gift-offering. The gift will be valuable, e.g. a horse or a sword with silver ornamentation. That presupposes a greater and more tangible insult from Hektor than mere reticence (Z 342). Hektor's silence can only be a sign of contempt when, in advance, he has blamed Paris harshly enough to hurt him seriously. His judgment οὐ μὲν καλά at line 326 could by itself have served to account for this, had not Hektor alleviated that remark with the very courteous allusion contained in χόλον τόνδε.[16] It is reinforced

[13] ἀλλά marks 'a transition from arguments for action to a statement of the action required' (Denniston, 14).

[14] Cf. LSJ s.v. II 3.

[15] Cf. Beßlich, *Schweigen-Verschweigen-Übergehen*, p. 113.

[16] Reinhard, *Herkommen und Höflichkeit*, p. 269, points out that Hektor does not say to Paris that he is a coward, but that he retired from battle in anger. It is Agamemnon's point of view, as well, that any reluctance to fight among the Achaians (Ξ 50) can only be based on anger. Both for the epical heroes and for the poet's audience, the importance of Achilleus' anger does not lie in the anger itself but in its tangible result—Achilleus' strike. The only truth about Paris to which Hektor's criticism οὐ μὲν καλά (326) can possibly refer is his abstaining from fighting. The use of the word χόλος suggests a comparison with the μῆνις of Achilleus; consequently, the word τόνδε is strongly emphasized, 'this abstaining (as compared to Achil-

as an attack, when Hektor's following remark is intended to point out to Paris that it is a healthy attitude to be at odds with people who act as he does. There remains no alternative but to understand σὺ δ'ἂν μαχέσαιο etc. as Fitzgerald renders it. The verb μάχομαι cannot be taken here in the common but narrow sense of fighting a war by physical means; it bears the wider sense of 'picking a fight with'.

Hektor's attack contains a self-justification: the rhetorical appeal to Paris to concede that his brother's behavior was normal. In consequence, Hektor's aggression can be stylized as a defensive attack. His μάχεσθαι consists, so far, only in calling Paris' attitude οὐ καλά and in describing his way of talking to Paris with that verb. Even Hektor's description of what Paris does to raise his objections is not direct, but only alluded to and implied in the dependent clause—Paris μεθιῇσι πολέμοιο, he is a withdrawer (cf. Δ 240).

The common heroic reply would be a reproach to Hektor for calling him 'not admirable', and a boasting remark about his fighting capabilities and his eagerness to fight. Paris' reaction seems typical of a coward. First, he states that Hektor is right; then, he rejects Hektor's benevolent offer to call his absence from battle a sign of embitterment (χόλος), and insists that his 'desire ... to taste grief to the full' kept him with Helen. In heroic terms, however, he has the courage—which a coward would not have had—to state explicitly that his opponent is right, and to reject the offer of rehabilitation on an untrue basis. Preferring to satisfy one's urge for grieving to helping to fight is not cowardice but ill-timed self-indulgence. Paris' presentation of his grief as a solid reason for his withdrawal renders him in Hektor's eyes both inconvincing, thus a liar, and insulting, inasmuch as he appears to expect Hektor to be weak enough to accept that theory.

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leus') has no nobility whatsoever to it'. Admittedly, the words μῆνις and χόλος cannot be translated by 'abstaining'; yet, any refusal or failure to fight is a military taboo, especially where Achilleus is concerned. There, the poet avoids undesirable expressions such as μεθιέναι πολέμοιο and, instead, uses the word describing the—noble—cause for his apparent inactivity. Hektor's courtesy lies in taking the same trouble for Paris without compelling need to do so. However, he does not seem to be altogether free in his choice of words—even at 329, where Hektor describes somewhat more literally his vision on what Paris is doing, he avoids complete directness by discussing Paris' lack of action as the policy of some other, imaginary agent. His wish to treat his brother in as friendly a manner as possible is evident, but the ultimate force at regulating Hektor's way of speaking seems to be the taboo.

Quite understandably, but nevertheless transgressing the limits of well-mannered response, Hektor reacts as to the ignominious remark of a weakling and does no longer grant him the honor of being spoken to directly. The remainder of what he has to say to Paris, he directs to Helen (Z 363, σύ γ'ὄρνυθι τοῦτον, ἐπειγέσθω δὲ καὶ αὐτός).

Later, after Paris—duly prepared for battle—has joined Hektor, and after he has offered what is commonly seen as an apology for his late arrival,[17] Hektor establishes their reconciliation by uttering the words τὰ δ'ὄπισθεν ἀρεσσόμεθα (Z 526). To understand this plural literally rather than as a majestic one is easier here than at Δ 362. Each of them has something to make up for, Paris at least for causing Hektor to go out of his way to remind him of his duties and for serving his brother off with an unconvincing reason for his withdrawal, Hektor for passing judgment on Paris and for his ensuing refusal to address him directly, in his own house and in front of Helen.

One principal difference between the offenses of Paris and Hektor is that Paris, at least while still at home, has not insulted anyone intentionally. Lack of care for his combatants can strike them only as an insult, but it is not an intended, premeditated one. Being the one who raised the conflict consciously, and maybe also because an appeased brother is likely to be a better helper in the common cause, Hektor takes the initiative to bring about reconciliation.

This pattern can be retraced at Δ 365. Both Agamemnon and Odysseus are at fault. By his taking the initiative toward reconciliation, Agamemnon seems to be aware of the practical necessity of peace among combatants for the sake of the common cause and seems to realize that, if he does not give in first, Odysseus certainly will not. Agamemnon's stake at the war is far higher than his. Besides, Odysseus did not consciously raise the conflict, only provoked it unintentionally by not rushing to battle promptly.

Hektor's apology is less formal than the other ones mentioned so far, especially on account of the omission of the apologetic formula—the wish that the winds may snatch away any word spoken in evil. However, he brings about a balance at lines 521 f. when he declares that he is wrong and has changed his mind; οὐκ ἄν τίς τοι ἀνήρ, ὃς ἐναίσιμος εἴη | ἔργον ἀτιμήσειε μάχης, ἐπεὶ

[17] For this apology, see pp. 27-30 of this chapter.

ἀλκιμός ἐσσι. This declaration occupies even the central place in Hektor's apology. In a comparable discourse, the controversy between Euryalos and Odysseus (θ 239-40), it is not the repentant offender who expresses this thought. Instead, it is the king of the Phaiacians who at this point seems to remember his duties as a host, at the same time revealing that he has changed his mind and has formerly been on Euryalos' side against his guest. Hektor's words are a self-accusation displaying a harshness against himself which one expects to encounter only when one person rebukes in all indignation someone else. One might compare a passage like Ξ 90-92, where Agamemnon wants to abandon the Trojan enterprise and Odysseus scolds him saying that no other leader of Agamemnon's rank ὅς τις ἐπίσταιτο ᾗσι φρεσὶν ἄρτια βάζειν would ever even mention such a thing.

Hektor may omit the phrase concerning the winds, but he does take care to bring forward the essential point; an official apology requires a non-verbal reconciliatory act, the offering or exchanging of gifts, represented at the purely oral apology by the promise ἀρεσσόμεθα. At θ 395-96, King Alkinoos declares ἀρεσσάσθαι ἐπεεσσι | καὶ δώρῳ. At this giving of satisfaction, it is deeds that count; words count only as a gesture. This is especially apparent at T 138, where Agamemnon expresses his wish for a reconciliation by saying ἂψ ἐθέλω 'αρέσαι, specifying, δόμεναί τ'ἀπερείσι' ἄποινα. Later on, Odysseus conveys the essence of this message in the following form to Achilleus, τὰ δὲ δῶρα . . . 'Αγαμέμνων | οἰσέτω (172-73) and, further, σε δαιτὶ ἀρεσάσθω (179). At establishing this reconciliatory act, perhaps the most important one in the happenings of the *Iliad*, Agamemnon manages to omit any outspoken apology. To be sure, his speech addressing Achilleus and the Achaians (T 78-144) is to be understood as an apology. But already at a summary analysis, the apologetic character appears to be rather superficial; after the introduction, he rejects his responsibility (86), mentions Zeus as the real author (87-89), emphasizes his lack of power (90), refers to Zeus again and, also, to Ate, attempts to reinforce his remarks by telling how Ate once misled Zeus, upon Hera's bidding (95-113), and the longer his discourse becomes, the stronger does the impression grow that this is not an apology but a series of foul excuses.[18] As a whole, however, it finds acceptance. As in book Δ,

[18] Cf. L. A. Post, *The Moral Pattern*, p. 113.

Agamemnon displays his control of good manners by the mere fact of his speech and in spite of its contents. He does not apologize explicitly, but he compensates for this with the length of his speech, he entertains the audience, in honor of Achilleus, with a story and, lastly, he does not economize on the reconciliatory gifts. He has taken care to have the entire scene take place in public. All Achaians are present, and in their eyes, as it turns out, the process was satisfactory. The indifferent reaction of one individual (T 147-48), be it even the one who is to be the primary recipient, does not undo the impact of Agamemnon's gesture. Achilleus reacts without grace, but he accepts the formalities for the settlement.[19]

In both books, Δ and T, Agamemnon's manners are more formal, but also less convincing than Hektor's at Z 521-26. Hektor behaves more generously and with more sincerity while apologizing. He displays the greater courtesy.

This does not mean that Agamemnon's approach offends against accepted etiquette. That would have happened only if he had not troubled to bring about reconciliation at all. Such cases do occur in the epic. Hektor does not apologize after having given Paris ill treatment at Γ 39-57, and after Paris, while accepting Hektor's point, has protested against the form in which it was presented. At P 142-68, likewise, someone is offended and protests, but no apology is offered. The situation is as follows, Hektor has retreated from the battle over the corpse of Sarpedon (M 657). Glaukos rebukes him, accuses him of cowardice (φύξηλιν, P 143) and tells him that his enemy Aias is a better warrior than he is (168). Hektor protests, ἐφάμην σε περὶ φρένας ἔμμεναι ἄλλων (namely the Lycians)... νῦν δέ σευ ὠνοσάμην πάγχυ φρένας. (171-3) Further, he explains that Zeus has forced his retreat. Without waiting for an apology first, he shows himself right away friendly again by calling Glaukos πέπον, and he invites him to check on his bravery on the base of the actions he is about to take. (179-82) Glaukos' failure to apologize can be explained as resulting from the exoneration in the last lines of Hektor's speech and by Hektor's immediate departure for action. Also, Hektor has still to show him whether he was right or wrong.[20] But there is no apology at any later occasion, either.

As the chief of a contingent of allies, Glaukos ranks socially

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[19] Post, p. 174; further, pp. 165 and 158/59 with n. 1.

[20] In his commentary on 186, Leaf suggests, as inspired by Hentze, that line 229 originally followed immediately upon 185.

lower than Hektor. This makes the absence of an apology all the more remarkable. At the controversy between Agamemnon and Odysseus, Agamemnon, the higher one in rank, offers his apologies to Odysseus with all due formality for the insult which Odysseus' lack of activity had provoked. At the quarrel between Hektor and Paris, higher ranking Hektor does the apologizing. Hektor and Agamemnon do not object to the risk of incurring contempt for their sign of readiness to give in to someone who ranks lower. Glaukos does not even need that kind of courage. If Agamemnon and Hektor, in their conflicts, felt the duty to be the first to apologize on the basis of being the first intentional offenders, Glaukos shares that duty.

The omission of an apology by Glaukos seems to be quite a self-understood matter; Hektor behaves at the lines 179-88 (πέπον, etc.) as though he does not expect an apology as anything due to him, at all. As a matter of fact, Zeus had forced Hektor to retreat, and Ἕκτορι ... ἀνάλκιδα φύζαν ἐνῶρσεν. (Π 644-58 [21]) Hektor mentions this to Glaukos, but this argument does not seem to be impressive enough to evoke an apology. Besides, no matter the true cause, from Π 656 on, Hektor does have this ἀνάλκιδα φύζαν or θυμόν. Glaukos' veiled *hortatio* has not yet helped Hektor enough for him to recover completely from that condition. The repeated expression πέπον and his urging Glaukos to stay and see what kind of a warrior he is, indicate a promise for better behavior as will normally be offered by a person shaken up by criticism which he admits to be just. In spite of his initial sharp reaction at 173, he does not seem to have regained his balance well enough to conduct a dispute with Glaukos with the consistency and overall conviction of, e.g., Odysseus at Δ 355.[22]

Moreover, aside from his ἄναλκις θυμός, Hektor needs Glaukos' good will more than Glaukos needs his. Hektor cannot well afford to lose his Lycian allies. From that point of view alone, his position in relation to Glaukos' is weaker than the position of Odysseus in relation to Agamemnon's. Agamemnon has allies to lose, not so Odysseus. Their higher rank implies the greater weakness,

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[21] For the variant θύμον ἐνῶρσεν, cf. Leaf's comm. on line 656.

[22] A. G. Keller, *Homeric Society* (London 1902), p. 313, commenting on the contrast between the Greek and the Trojan alliances, points out, 'the Trojan organization was ... weak; [the allies] were ever ready to withdraw, unless carefully humoured'.

resulting from their need to humor the ones in the lower positions. The same holds true in the controversy Hektor-Paris. Hektor's conciliatory way of treating Glaukos during the rest of his speech is quite to the point after he has called his confederate, on whom he partly depends, 'crazy' at line 173.

All that, however, does not release Glaukos from the duty to apologize for what is not an insult, if Hektor has really been temporarily ἀνάλκις, but at least hostile behavior, including a threat. By running off, Hektor does not give him a chance to do so immediately after his protesting defense. Thus, the first suitable moment could not be until after that day's actions, at nightfall. That moment finally arrives in Book Σ, after so many and such fierce actions in battle that they rendered ridiculous any formalities like apologies for past behavior. But the poet is not merely avoiding pettiness. Glaukos is not inclined to make up for his gesture of hostility, any more than Odysseus is, when he does not give it one thought to show conscientiousness about having called Euryalos in the *Odyssey* 'worthless' and 'reckless'. Without the practical purpose generated by the need for the other's goodwill, any remark from Glaukos to counterbalance his labeling of Hektor as εἶδος ἄριστε φύξηλις, (P 142 and 143) etc., would have required either more wisdom than Glaukos had, or a different standard of etiquette. Glaukos' change of mind appears merely from the poet's reticence about the enactment of his threat. Glaukos has insisted that he would round up the Lycians and defect with them (P 144-47 and 155). No word is spent on his dropping this plan on which he has elaborated for so many lines. If Glaukos and the Lycians had really left the scene, it would have been too important a matter to leave unmentioned. From that fact alone, one knows that they did not. Besides, with his answer (P 179-82), Hektor entices Glaukos to stay at least and watch the battle. The audience can conveniently assume that Glaukos does so, until Hektor exhorts him among many other people to proceed to action (216).

In his commentary on lines 216-18, Leaf considers it strange that the name of Glaukos is inserted without emphasis among the μυρία φῦλα . . . ἐπικούρων (220). But it does account for the inconspicuousness of Hektor's diplomatic approach at converting Glaukos' attitude of protest and rejection to the one of fighting right along as though nothing has happened. While the shift to a conciliatory attitude in Hektor's answer marks the beginning of

the process of turning the mountain into less than a molehill, line 216, with the inconspicuous placement of Glaukos' name between those of other allies, indicates the completion of the process. Glaukos no longer holds the special position he had taken up by offending Hektor; there is nothing problematic left in the relationship between him and the commander-in-chief. This is the spot where it becomes apparent that the poet wishes to treat the incident as closed without any intention to ever add an account of a formal apology or reconciliation-scene.

The apology at Ψ 587-95 terminates a conflict raised by Menelaos and provoked by Antilochos who, at the chariot race, had barred Menelaos' way while driving his chariot into a narrow passage, at the peril of their lives. While curbing his team to avoid an accident, Menelaos scolds Antilochos.[23] The race is over, and, after witnessing Antilochos' callousness at insisting on his prize (Ψ 543-54), Menelaos repeats the rebuke and challenges him to attest publicly that he has acted under a spell. Antilochos decides to apologize.

He offsets his youth against Menelaos' superiority, as the cause of his ὑπερβασίαι (Ψ 589). Further, he concedes that, while young people like himself may be faster at perception, their insight is usually poor (590). He accuses himself profusely. Then, he offers Menelaos the horse which was his prize and declares himself ready to add a second gift rather than fall out of favor with Menelaos (591-95) and incur the wrath of the gods.

The stereotypical reference to the winds is omitted, but that does not make this apology any less official and explicit. Winds can be regarded as capable of deleting words, but not of deleting deeds, and the one who apologizes in this passage is not he who raised the conflict intentionally by his remarks, but the one who provoked it by his deeds.

His self-accusation in the first four lines is mainly a self-defense along with an implied attack on Menelaos. He gives Menelaos a reminder that he is at least half a generation older and higher ranking. Implied is the accusation that Menelaos has forgotten his position. Antilochos hints at the difference between mature and young adults, and suggests that it is only fair when one expects

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[23] Ψ 439 ff. is discussed in ch. II, pp. 48-53.

him to commit ὑπερβασίαι, as long as he is a youth. With these same words, he accuses himself profusely, as said, denouncing himself as immature and his actions as ὑπερβασίαι, but the gifts which he offers are not meant to be a sign of agreement with Menelaos. He does not admit that he should not have done what he did. He has merely decided to duck for the pressure Menelaos exerts. He has not changed his mind like, e.g., Euryalos in θ; he has only taken on an attitude of explaining and pleading. The gift-offering has the purpose of avoiding the amount of trouble that Antilochos estimates to be too great for him to cope with, and he is frank enough to state as much (Ψ 595).

His willingness to give up the horse that he needed so badly (one does not borrow a second-rate team when one has access to better) and for which he had fought so hard, facing Achilleus and indirectly attacking Eumelos (Ψ 543-54), and his willingness to give a second gift, can easily be mistaken for an outburst of generosity. But Menelaos would have had a claim to the horse if Antilochos' conduct at the race had been correct. Antilochos realizes that Menelaos' claim includes the horse as his prize for the race, not as a gift from the offender, and that he has to offer something else besides to function as the specific conciliatory gift needed to appease his opponent.

Lastly, this case is different from most others, but comparable to the Odysseus-Euryalos scene in Book θ since the poet gives an account of the formal conclusion of the affair; in his last response, Menelaos accepts the apology; τοι λισσομένῳ ἐπιπείσομαι (609).[24]

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The apologies belonging to the second group are far less emphatic. They are not prompted by any unveiled protests of the offended ones, and their form can be described as a brief warning not to develop a feeling of rejection for the offender's action; μὴ χολωθῇς, or μὴ νεμέσα. Apologies in this form are offered in the situations that follow.

At K 138, Nestor awakens Odysseus in the middle of the night. To express his annoyance, Odysseus uses the 'why-did-you-do-it' code. He demands an explanation why Nestor roams over the terrain alone in the dark, implying the question why he disturbs

[24] Further details: Part B, pp. 143-44.

others unnecessarily (141). Nestor replies first to the feeling expressed, then to the question as to its face value. In other words, he gives the account asked for, introducing his answer with the words μὴ νεμέσα (145).

Shortly before, at K 88, a comparable encounter has taken place. Here, Nestor himself is the one who is suddenly awakened. He complains that Agamemnon appeared at his bedside in the dark, and without disclosure of his identity or any other voluntary explanation. Agamemnon does not apologize after this protest but, at least, he tells him who he is and why he came.

There are two possibilities; either, the poet presents Nestor's conduct at K 145 as plainly correct, the rules of etiquette dictating the use of an expression like μὴ νεμέσα on such occasions, and Agamemnon fails to behave properly at K 88 by omitting any formal apologetic gesture. Or, Agamemnon's attitude is in compliance with the code of etiquette, and Nestor's conduct at line 145 has to be understood as a display of special courtesy, how ever short and unemphatic his apology may be. This choice is not necessarily relevant. There are passages—to be discussed below—where people offer explanations of their conduct as substitutes for formal apologies, some of which bear similarities to Agamemnon's manner at K 88. The simple μὴ νεμέσα is probably not more than an introduction to such an explanation. As such it does not have the impact necessary to establish a considerable contrast to passages where it remains unsaid. With his μὴ νεμέσα, Nestor acknowledges, and thus shows his respect for, Odysseus' feelings of rejection. When Agamemnon does not show his respect in the same way, there is still no proof that he fails to respect Nestor's feelings.

Of more interest is the difference in conduct in these two passages, as it appears in nuances determined by the small dissimilarities in these two situations as the two different agents brings these about, themselves. At line 88, Agamemnon is without the relaxing presence of a companion; he is so absorbed by his worries and by his duty to wake people up—as agreed upon with Menelaos—that it does not seem to occur to him how unpleasant it must be for anyone to be suddenly awakened from his night's sleep in wartime by a figure unrecognizable in the dark, a possible enemy who approaches him. At K 145, Nestor in turn can appreciate Odysseus' situation all the better, since he himself has already gone through something similar only a few minutes ago. Right away, he handles

the situation better than Agamemnon by remaining at a distance and calling Odysseus from there (139). But Nestor has a better chance to behave with due discretion than Agamemnon has had, just before. Nestor has been sleeping outside of his tent (74), within easy reach of any uninvited visitor. Odysseus is inside of his tent, which automatically leads to the keeping of a certain distance between him and his callers, thus saving Nestor the odium of terrifying the other by a sudden appearance. Of the two sleepers, Nestor is the one to receive the worse treatment. Yet, his first reaction to Agamemnon's appearance is on the whole friendlier. His remark at 83, 'by night when others sleep', does imply some scorn, but it remains a mild, covert way to criticize the other's behavior as disturbing and suspect. His ensuing suggestion of two good reasons why Agamemnon should act the way he does (84) is typical of Nestor's friendly disposition toward his fellow beings. Only when he does not receive an answer to even that, does Nestor finally reach his necessary goal with his curt, impatient order φθέγγεο, which is clear enough to reach the egocentric, not so subtle mind of Agamemnon. However, Agamemnon would have had a better chance to start explaining the situation sooner, had Nestor not taken the word for as many as four lines, but only spoken his first three words τίς δ'οὗτος. One might also consider how to read these four lines, what silences between Nestor's single remarks—and of which duration, if at all—are to be assumed, at which Agamemnon could have started giving the necessary information without offending against good manners by interrupting Nestor. Anyhow, it is Nestor who, at both passages, controls the situation. At K 139, where he takes his turn to be the disturber of the peace, he avoids by his shouting any doubt as to his identity. With his μή νεμέσα, he shows his understanding of Odysseus' somewhat hostile tone at 141-42.

As said, this does not seem to be a matter of compliance with any rules of etiquette, but rather one of greater or lesser courtesy, the difference between the bearing of one who is considerate and realizes what impact his actions can have on others, and of one who lacks this measure of sensitiveness.

In this category, there is further a group of three passages having some features in common which set them off from other passages dealt with so far. One of these is Π 22. Upon Achilleus' inquiry why he is weeping, Patroklos blames him, using harsh

words introduced by the expression μή νεμέσα. He calls Achilleus 'αμήχανος (29), αἰναρέτα (31; Leaf: 'Cursed in thy valour'), νηλεές (33), and, at the end of this climax, he contends that Achilleus' parents are not Peleus and Thetis, but the γλαυκή . . . θάλασσα | πέτραι τ' ἠλίβατοι. (33-35)

The second passage is I 33-49, a speech in which Diomedes accuses his chief of cowardice. The request μή τι χολωθῇς introduces the obloquy.

Lastly, O 115; Zeus has issued a ban on divine participation in the battle among the humans. (cf. N 523-25). The gods obey all the more strictly after Zeus is awake (O 4) and after having witnessed his measurements taken in connection with Hera's disobedience (O 14-33) and Poseidon's (54-9). But, upon learning of his son's death (110-12), Ares tells the other gods in the absence of Zeus, μή νῦν μοι νεμεσήσετε 'if I go down [. . .] to avenge my son—and so I will'.

In each of these three passages, the apology precedes the offense. The occurrence of any apology can reasonably be expected to indicate that the speaker regrets the transgression, to the point where he would have taken care to avoid committing the offense at stake, had he been able 'to do it all over again'. Seen from this angle, there is a certain rhetorical element common to these three apologies; after apologizing, they immediately proceed to do the very thing that needed an apology in their own opinion. The apology serves as a base for building up all the more confidence in the correctness of the decision to commit the planned offense; it buys the right to disturb.[25] In this set of passages, each apologizing offender sets out to satisfy an urge, to act on an impulse that derives its strength from an established general notion of respectability. They have a task to complete that is likely to upset people who have some degree of power over the respective speakers. To complete the task requires either lack of consideration or special courage to act against the immediate wishes of the more powerful. The occurrence of the apologetory remark reveals that each time the latter alternative is in effect. Altogether, the apologetic formula used as an introduction to the offense is not a pure apology but a coded warning; only secondarily does it convey regret.

At O 115, more clearly than at the other two passages, awareness

[25] Cf. Van Erp Taalman-Kip, *Agamemnon,* p. 39: 'to some extent, it implies an apology'. (paraphrased).

of a failure at self-control underlies the apology. Ares feels compelled to hurry off to the scene of the war. He knows that this is illegal and his regret is sincere. In Zeus' absence, he treats the assembly of the gods present as the regulatory body in his stead and he directs his apology to them. He has a practical point; the action which he is about to take is apt to raise their jealousy. Dihle remarks 'das korrekte Auftreten homerischer Helden ... [verrät], daß man sehr wohl wußte, wie sehr der Mensch sich beherrschen, wie sehr er seine eigene Ansprüche zurückstellen und die des anderen achten muß, wenn ein gesittetes Zusammenleben möglich sein soll.' [26] In this kind of apologies, to be sure, the evident aspect of courtesy is closely tied to politeness and consideration as a result of good social breeding. But Ares' apology primarily reflects wariness of opposition and of loss of good will among the other gods who, much like Ares himself, resent being kept from joining the battle by Zeus' veto. It is obvious that he would be the loser in a conflict between him alone and a large gang. On grounds of their numerical majority alone, it is within their power to keep Ares from pursuing his plan. He needs their good will—not the kind of good will that prompts people to keep their friends from transgressing established rules, but the kind that will turn people into accomplices. Ares can count on their sympathy to quite some extent. The news of his son's death had shocked both him and the other gods simultaneously. Thus, in part, his apology is not to gain, but to maintain and reinforce, their natural solidarity.

Dihle's words 'wenn ein gesittetes Zusammenleben möglich sein soll' comprise a motivation more ideal than utilitarian, whereas all three apologies of this set have an immediate objective—to ward off possible retaliations. However considerate the speakers of this group may be, in all three passages they are the weaker party, too. At O 115, Ares stands alone facing the assembly of the gods; Patroklos, at Π 22, talks to his provider, and at I 33-49, Diomedes turns against his chief, Agamemnon.

Ares' policy turns out to be too weak to permit him to reach his goal. That is to say, taken by itself it is all but weak; in addition to the sympathy that the gods already bestowed on him in connection with his son's death, it made him gain the kind of benevolence on their part that in the end served him best. But that had not

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[26] *Antike Höflichkeit und Christliche Demut*, p. 181.

been his aim. In diplomatic respect, his words remain ineffective; Athena holds him back with wise arguments. (O 123-42)

At Π 22, Patroklos is well-disposed toward Achilleus, but he has the urge to reproach him bitterly after his recent experiences in the camp of the Achaians, especially after listening to Nestor's opinion. Patroklos' disposition offers a comparison with Ares'; it is his wish to avoid casting a shadow over his friendship and fear for his friend's anger that prompt Patroklos to apologize in advance, rather, than that his training in good manners would have brought this about, or a pleasing character finding its expression naturally without any specific purpose in the mind of the speaker.

As Reinhard, especially in reference to the lines 36-37, points out, Patroklos suggests to Achilleus that there are gods who keep Achilleus from joining the battle, instead of simply reminding him that his injured pride prevents his participation. Reinhard remarks that it makes quite a difference whether one declares oneself to be mad because his pride has been hurt, or someone else reminds him of that.[27] Patroklos' bearing in this confrontation with Achilleus can certainly be called tactful,[28] yet, not for the reason which Reinhard mentions. At 36-37, the lines Reinhard considers to be an utterance of Patroklos' tact, Patroklos does nothing but function as Nestor's messenger. The tactful suggestion in these lines is not his idea; he repeats Nestor, the speaker of lines Λ 794-95, literally.

At I 33-49, the speaker is not well-disposed toward the one whom he addresses. Diomedes is appalled at Agamemnon's wish to give up the war. Contemptuously, he accuses him of cowardice,

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[27] *Herkommen und Höflichkeit*, p. 269.

[28] G. Finsler, *Die Olympischen Szenen der Ilias* (Bern 1906), pp. 5 f., takes offense at Patroklos' reticence about his help to the wounded Eurypylos. (Λ 842-48). He takes this as an indication that the second part of Book Λ is of a later date than the beginning of the Patrokley. But, first, it does not seem to be in one line with Patroklos' character to expatiate on his humane deeds when he is not asked. Second, the purpose of Patroklos' speech is to impress Achilleus with a report on the terrible condition of the Achaian fighters in order to elicit his helpfulness. It would have endangered the intended effect if Patroklos had even so much as hinted that Eurypylos, one of the Achaians, had already received some help from Achilleus' quarter. Third, Patroklos could have put himself in a bad spot by revealing that he had been of help to one of the Achaians against Achilleus' outspoken wishes. His reticence is a form of the tact Reinhard justly mentions.

openly, in a general assembly of the Achaians.[29] To affront Agamemnon, however, is not his ultimate objective. His accusation of cowardice is not a conclusive verdict after the facts; the decision to give up or continue the war has yet to be made. The rebuke of cowardice at this point is mainly a warning challenge. Diomedes has enough faith in Agamemnon to hold it possible that the latter will reconsider and continue the war. As a call for readiness to fight, his speech is intended to be heard by the Achaians as well. He feels the duty to bring about some counterbalance for the despair which Agamemnon has shown. He tries to point this out to Agamemnon and to protect himself from his possible anger by introducing his speech with the words σοὶ πρῶτα μαχήσομαι ἀφραδέοντι, | ἣ θέμις ἐστίν, ἄναξ, ἀγορῇ· σὺ δὲ μή τι χολωθῇς. With this clause, ἣ θέμις . . . ἀγορῇ, he not only points out to Agamemnon and the others that what he is about to do may look like mutiny but under the circumstances is not, he also braces himself. The honoring title ἄναξ, in its contrast to the previous allocution σοὶ ἀφραδέοντι,[30] and the following σὺ δέ, which suggests a shift in the persons addressed, may indicate that Diomedes addresses this clause formally to a god. If that is so, the god is probably Zeus, and Diomedes attempts to secure a higher sanction for antagonizing Agamemnon.

The expression μή τι χολωθῇς is mainly a literal warning, if not threat, to Agamemnon, to keep his self-control lest he expose himself as unjust. This threatening element is absent from both other apologies and makes it different. Like the two others, it is an apology made in advance, necessary because of the things to come, the main part of Diomedes' speech. But there is a second and more categorical difference; also things already said make this move necessary—he has labeled Agamemnon as ἀφραδέων and 'declared war on him' with the word μαχήσομαι. At Π 22, Patroklos' friendly disposition prompts him to apologize; here, it rather seems to be a matter of cold, somewhat haughty correctness.

Ares' apology, the only one of the three to remain ineffective, takes up an intermediate position between the other two, combining elements of both. The advance-apology for his planned insubordination is the payment of his tribute to etiquette, and as such shows

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[29] Cf. Van Erp, *Agamemnon*, p. 39, as opposed to Leaf's comm.

[30] When ἄναξ has the function of a title in direct address, the one thus addressed is nearly always a god; cf. Part B, p. 151.

a likeness to the Diomedes-scene. But it is equally an attempt to maintain a relationship of good will between himself and the others. In this respect, Ares' behavior has a parallel with that of Patroklos.[31]

3

Two self-accusations represent the third category. Formally, these are not apologies, yet, they deserve their place in this frame on the strength of their apologetic function. The preliminaries to one of these have been mentioned above, the Paris-Hektor scene when Hektor pays Paris a visit to remind him of his duties. At Z 518-19, Hektor returns to the battlefield, and Paris joins him after girding himself with his suit of armor and running through the town. The poet emphasizes Hektor's slowness as opposed to Paris' speed, '[Paris] sprinted on, and quickly met his brother, who was slow to leave the place where he had discoursed with his lady.' As a contrast, he puts words into Paris' mouth that convey the opposite, 'I am keeping you back with my slowness while you are hurrying, and I did not come in time as you ordered me.'[32] This often is read as a very repentant kind of self-accusation, a verbal self-flagellation as can only be accounted for if the speaker is depressed and his self-esteem is low. Fitzgerald interprets this remark as a question, 'Have I delayed you, kept you waiting? Have I not come at the right time as you asked?'. Walter Leaf, in his commentary on these two lines, uses the expression 'fishing for a compliment'. In his translation, Fitzgerald fails to account for the notion of Hektor's alleged 'hurrying', the most obvious one of the untruths spoken in the two lines at stake. Further, the introductory expressions ἦ and δή in ἦ μάλα δή σε καὶ ἐσσύμενον κατερύκω point to a statement made in assertiveness, rather, than to a question, or to a childish invitation to Hektor to assure Paris of a favorable truth about him.

Leaf understands Paris' remark as an exaggeration, but it seems to me to be more than just that. Altogether, it is a series of blatant lies. The exclamatory underlinings ἦ and δή of—among

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[31] Dihle's remark in regard to Plato, '[Man] versichert sich gegenseitig vor einer Unterhaltung, daß man sich nichts übelnehmen wolle', points to the development and conventionalisation of Ares' and Patroklos' anticipatory apologies: *Antike Höflichkeit*, p. 181.

[32] Transl. divergent from Fitzgerald's, in adaptation to Voss's.

other things—the visually obvious untruths of Hektor's so-called running (ἐσσύμενον) and Paris' own so-called being slow (δηθύνων; the poet has only just described him as running like a horse) only have the function of ridicule. Of course, Hektor is truly eager to depart (ἐσσύμενον), but when Paris uses the exclamation δή, he indicates that he deals with visual appearances, and Hektor appears visually to do the opposite of being in a hurry; he is lingering (ἔμελλε στρέψεσθ' ἐκ χώρης). The same ridiculing force characterizes Paris' exaggerations μάλα (in μάλα ... κατερύκω) and καὶ (in καὶ ἐσσύμενον).

Paris' attitude and behavior in the last few minutes up to this moment are described as follows.

> He ran through Troy, sure-footed with long strides. Think how a stallion fed on clover and barley, mettlesome, thundering in a stall, may snap his picket rope and canter down a field [. 1 .] glorying in freedom! Head held high [. 3 .] That was the way [. . .] Paris ran (Z 505-513).

Paris is thoroughly done 'tasting his grief to the full (Z 336)'. He is, now, sooner in the mood for mockery than in the spirit needed to present himself as a dependent, in need of Hektor's good opinion about him, hoping for a compliment. And Paris sees an opportunity for sarcasm, to be sure. At home, Hektor has talked down on him, in front of Helen and presenting himself to her as the perfect warrior eager to rush to battle, as opposed to Paris' strikingly reluctant and inert attitude. Now, on the marketplace, Hektor appears to Paris to be the reluctant one ('slow to leave the place') and he, himself, to be the perfect hero rushing to battle like a mettlesome horse. Paris uses the new circumstances that, to him, look unfavorable for Hektor, to revenge himself for the insult at home by saying ἦ μάλα δή ...—paraphrased: 'Well, as one can see, I am holding you back, indeed, with this slowness of mine, while—just look at that—you are running so fast!'

Of course, Paris misunderstands the situation. In contrast to the poet and his audience, Paris is unaware of the dramatic farewell scene which has taken place immediately before; Andromache has left only a few seconds ago. He cannot possibly share the poet's and his audience's understanding of and sympathy for Hektor's reluctance to leave that place and join the battle outside

the gates. Thus, Paris' ridicule is to backlash and render himself at least ridiculous, if not even a good target for social ostracism and hatred. The poet uses Paris' inevitable wrong judgment of the situation to discredit him further with the audience. But he does not present him as some kind of weakling, childishly begging for a compliment. He renders a picture of a sarcastic aggressor, quick to use an opportunity to get even with an opponent in an argument, only misled by appearances. Paris does not ask, but challenges, Hektor to admit that the blatant untruth is, indeed, untrue, that the reasons for his absence from battle may have been just as sound or just as bad as Hektor's reasons for still lingering on the marketplace, and that, accordingly, Hektor's attitude to Paris at home has been downright insulting.

Paris' final words οὐδ' ἦλθον ἐναίσιμον, ὡς ἐκέλευες are spoken in the same spirit.[33] Upon Hektor's order, Paris has become active in as ἐναίσιμος a way as one could deem possible. These words display the mocking submissiveness of a prince treated like a servant, exposing the haughtiness of Hektor's order, especially of the form in which he has given it (in the third person, line 363). Hektor recognizes the formal self-accusation as an attack. Declarations like 'No man with justice in him would underrate your handiwork in battle; you have a powerful arm' (521-22) and, later on, 'someday we'll make amends for that' (526) are never made, in the epics, without a preceding sharp protest by the insulted ones (cf. group I in this chapter). Although Paris' implied accusation of Hektor's own lack of activity is void and, consequently, insulting, Hektor shows his wisdom and his eagerness for reconciliation by refraining from protest. Paris' hostility, as conveyed by this mock self-accusation, has made Hektor realize that, indeed, he has gone too far at Paris' house, and that, if he wants to obtain valuable help from Paris in the battle, he has to make amends for having shown his opinion of Paris' character so crushingly.

Beßlich assumes, with Monro and against Leaf, a question

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[33] Cf. Post, pp. 165-66: 'It does not occur to him [Paris] to repent or to make atonement'. Post's view of Paris' state of mind and behavior is well in line with Paris' attitude elsewhere; at Γ 59-63, e.g., Hektor has scorned Paris, and Paris reacts likewise without humility—he judges that, while Hektor is right, he does have a heart like an axe. Conceding that his opponent is right is no sign of weakness or lack of stability.

mark at the end of Paris' self-accusation.[34] It makes quite a difference whether Paris, convinced of the justice in his point of view, challenges Hektor with an exaggerated assertion of an obvious, even blatant untruth, or whether he asks, like a dependent, to be comforted and reassured. There surely is a point to viewing these two lines as a question since it fits into the derogatory image of Paris as it is created by the poet and brought forward by Hektor's and, especially, Helen's criticism. But Paris is neither a coward, nor childish. A question in such form would point to childlike submissiveness which not only cannot be proved but to which the solemn and official wording of Hektor's subsequent apology could never have been a fitting reaction. Hektor's admitting that his behavior and criticism as shown in Paris' house has not been ἐναίσιμος, and his promise 'αρεσσόμεθα presuppose, even require, a preceding aggressive protest by Paris—and this is only given when the question mark remains omitted.

The other self-accusation occurs in the same book, Z 344-58, when Helen talks to Hektor. She calls herself a bitch, twice, and presents herself implicitly as at least partly guilty of having caused the Trojan war (348; τάδε ἔργα).

She emphasizes her self-evaluation as a bitch with the adjectives κακομήχανος and ὀκρυόεις, and she adds the wish that she had been dead before the war ever started. With these lines, the first five of her speech, she displays the kind of remorse that suggests a sincere acknowledgment of guilt. But, in truth, the self-accusation goes no further than her self-qualification as a bitch, however emphatically repeated near the end of her speech. Instead of dwelling on this theme and, thus, corroborating the impression of her sincerity, she goes on: 'granted terrible years were in the gods' design, I wish I had had a good man for a lover', dwelling on that theme by venting her negative opinion of Paris in the three following lines. In this way, after her brief self-accusation, she draws Hektor's attention to the gods as the determining agents of the present disasters and to Paris as the villain. This she does in Paris' house, immediately after the painful discussion between Hektor and him, and by this tactlessness in regard to Paris, she makes matters worse for him than they already are.

According to Helen, the gods have designed the terrible war

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[34] *Schweigen-Verschweigen-Übergehen*, p. 113.

(349). By calling them responsible, she does not deny her own part in the developments, but she suggests at least that in her deeds some *force majeure* has played its role.[35] This takes an edge off her self-accusation. Her following criticism of Paris (350-53) has the same function. She emphasizes the relativity of her guilt—with a point as far as reality is concerned; but her words do not convey—in all probability, do not intend to, anyway—the picture of a sincere and generous apologizing attitude as can be expected to be basic to any self-accusation that is not to sound hypocritical.

The structure of her speech is as follows,

1) her self-accusation, mitigated by
2) her pointing at others, as to Paris even with aggression, e.g. line 352, τούτῳ δ' οὔτ' . . . φρένες ἔμπεδοι; this aggressiveness, in reverse, mitigated by
3) the repetition of her self-accusation as part of the conclusion.

By means of this structure, she accomplishes at least two things. First, she impresses Hektor by assuming the attitude of a repentant sinner without humiliating herself. Second, at the question with

[35] H. Gundert, *Charakter und Schicksal homerischer Helden*, Neue Jahrbücher für antike und deutsche Bildung 3 (1940), p. 226, makes a general remark applicable, here, as well as clarifying, 'Schicksal und Charakter [der homerischen Helden können] nicht geschieden, sondern nur in ihrer steten rätselhaften Durchdringung begriffen werden', and on p. 237, 'Es ist eine Welt, in der Innen und Außen noch nicht durch die klaren Grenzen des Bewußtseins geschieden sind'. Also, H. Schwabl, *Zur Selbständigkeit des Menschen bei Homer*, Wiener Studien 67 (1954), p. 48, 'Das Eingreifen der Götter . . . steht für das, was wir Moderne 'Entscheidung' nennen würden. Der homerische Mensch erfährt 'Entscheidung' nicht von innen sondern von außen, als Einfluß einer fremden Macht, die ihn bestimmt'. Further, p. 51, 'Die Idee der Entscheidung im modernen Sinn gibt es bei Homer natürlich nicht'. See also A. Lesky, *Göttliche und menschliche Motivation im homerischen Epos* (Heidelberg 1961). Van Erp, pp. 57-59, discusses Agamemnon's account of the ἄτη (T 78-144) that caused his quarrel with Achilleus. The lack of a clear-cut separation between one's own responsibility and *force majeure* reveals itself as a problem in van Erp's paraphrases of Agamemnon's line of thought; 'Agamemnon continues, 'but what else could I have done? The goddess accomplishes everything, Ate'' (p. 57); further, 'But since I allowed myself to be blinded [repeated on p. 59, 'I allowed myself to be blinded, I do not deny this'], I wish to make up for it'. (p. 58, transl.). This seeming tug-of-war between fate and human responsibility emerges on various occasions in the epics; cf., e.g., Part B, pp. 163-67 on Menelaos at δ 266-89. Van Erp's formulation 'I allowed myself to be blinded' is an attempt at establishing a synthesis of utterances such as 'what else could I have done?' (implied: 'it is not my fault') and 'I want to make up for it' (normal implication: 'it is my fault').

whom the guilt lies, she diverts the attention from herself, directing it toward others without, however, putting herself in a position where she could have been accused of incriminating others and of complaining without self-criticism. By closely connecting Paris with her repeated self-accusation, she does not present him as a suitable object of criticism and condemnation, but rather as a part of her own destiny for which she does assume partial responsibility herself.

Nonetheless, this self-accusation has little value as a token of repentance, as she weaves it around the mention of circumstances which alleviate her but burden others. Helen does not speak with spontaneity; it is her policy to comply with Hektor and impress him. By acting in this manner, she does give Hektor some compensation for the unpleasant visit he has felt the need to pay, and she shows her respect for him by bringing up the theme of her guilt voluntarily, even though, in doing so, she manages to accuse Paris more than herself.

Her speech is effective; she prepossesses Hektor in her favor. At line 360, he expresses her appreciation of her hospitality (φιλέουσά περ) and shows his confidence in and respect for her by commissioning her with some sort of tutelage over Paris (363).

4

Hektor's explanation of his refusal to accept Helen's hospitality (Z 360-68) belongs in the fourth group. Here, explanations of one's conduct function as apologies. The one who intends to make up verbally for harm done, offers this explanation instead of a formal apology. The degree of clarity, comprehensiveness, also elaborateness, of his words indicates the amount of consideration and, along with it, the degree of courtesy with which he treats the one whom he addresses. In Hektor's case, the explanation boils down to 'I am in a hurry to help the Trojans'. (361-62) Had he left it at this, his response would have been clear and complete, maybe somewhat brief, but quite satisfactory. However, he talks on, first adding the remark that the Trojans μέγ' ἐμεῖο ποθὴν ἀπεόντος ἔχουσιν (362). First of all, however much the contents of this assertion reflect the epic truth, it is no sign of modesty on the part of Hektor to point, without compelling motivation, to his own high value and insist on his own indispensability. It is a more primitive than sensitive response to a lady who has just presented

him with enough modesty of her own to call herself a bitch. Second, to the same degree in which his remark is true, Hektor reveals the weakness in his policy of having left the place where he is as needed as he says rather than having send a messenger to town to do his errand for him. That Hektor keeps on talking instead of serving Helen off with a short reply can be seen as a sign of his consideration, but what he says turns out to be a diplomatic slip of the tongue. He makes up for it by entrusting her subsequently with the job of stirring Paris to activity. Further, when he emphasizes his indication of the ones present (σύ γε and τοῦτον), he restores a balance lost by the emphasis on his own person (ἐμεῖο).

Hektor could well have stopped his speech at the end of this line (363). Any explanation why Helen has to stir Paris to activity and Paris himself has to start hurrying is superfluous. Already from what Hektor has said before—even without that—it is self-explanatory that, the sooner Paris will start helping the Trojans, the better it will be. The explanation which Hektor feels the urge to offer instead, at line 364, is inferior to the self-evident reason. According to Hektor, Paris should hurry, not in order to help the Trojans as quickly as possible, but to be able to catch up with him while he will still be within the city-walls. Thus, while Hektor refuses Helen's invitation to be seated, on grounds of his haste to join the Trojans, he now indicates that he will hurry slowly enough that one who has yet to gird himself with all his war-gear will be able to catch up with him while he is still in town. Being all but lame, he thus undoes the reason he has given initially for not accepting her hospitality at least for the time needed for Paris to get ready to go with him.

What has been intended to be an explanation is apt to raise a question, again, and has brought about the need for added information in order to put the seemingly awkward into the right light. In the two following lines (365-66), he explains that Paris will be able to find him within the city, because, in the time which Paris needs for his preparation, Hektor himself has yet another errand to run.

Had Hektor kept the information thus vague, he could have concluded his speech right here and, finally started obeying his θυμός in accordance with the urge professed at line 360. He is, however, deferential enough toward Helen to be accurate, instead, and informs her that he is going home to visit his family; in other

words, he is about to do, to some degree, that of which he has disapproved sharply in Paris' case. Again, a new explanation is needed. Thus, the next lines (366-67) witness Hektor telling her of his doubt whether he will ever see his relatives back. Already on his way out, and for that reason shouting (369: φωνήσας), he gives his last explanation—he is talking about his death.

What could have been a simple response if Hektor had had the situation under control, has now turned into a confused speech. It contains a series of inadequate explanations of inadequate explanations, bearing witness to his sympathetic respect but also betraying his insecurity at dealing with Helen—or at least with the situation into which she has brought him by expressing her wish for a more eligible bedfellow than Paris, without stating explicitly whether she meant Menelaos or not and, then, inviting him to come closer (εἴσελθε, 354), be seated and make himself at home. His busy alignment of specifications and explanations is an indication of his eagerness to keep her well disposed towards him in spite of his refusal to stay and, consequently, of his respect. Besides, Hektor tells no lie and each of his arguments is serious, honorable and irrefutable in itself. His mention of his public and private duties is well in place and brought forward in an inoffensive way. The allusion to his private duties functions simultaneously as a means for the poet to announce Hektor's next move,[36] while the reference to his death prepares the poet's audience for the further sequence. Yet, none of Hektor's words give the necessary reason for not accepting Helen's hospitality. Even his possibly imminent death, referred to in the *grand finale* of his speech, is after ten years of daily danger to his life not quite satisfactory as the compelling reason why now, all of a sudden, he has to run home instead of accepting the invitation and stay a few minutes. It is indicatory, however, of his not being in the mood to stay and have his spirits raised by means of Helen's hospitality. In his near panicky eagerness to get away from under Helen's influence, he has talked himself into a state of mind that is only aggravated during his ensuing encounter with Andromache, which does not exactly help avoid his personal disaster, his running away before Achilleus and his death as a result.

A comparable situation arises at Λ 644-54. Patroklos stands

[36] Cf. Beßlich, pp. 113-5, esp. 114, 'So aber ist diese Szene Kontrast und Überleitung zugleich zur Begegnung Hektor-Andromache'.

at the entrance of Nestor's tent. Nestor welcomes him cordially, takes him by the arm, leads him inside and offers him a seat. Patroklos refuses with almost the same words Hektor has used, Οὐχ ἕδος ἐστί, γεραιὲ διοτρεφές, οὐδέ με πείσεις. His explanation is that Achilleus is νεμεσητός. At the end of his speech, he repeats that he has to go because Achilleus is δεινός (654).

Both Patroklos and Hektor mitigate their rebuttal by an inserted friendly and approving expression, διοτρεφές, respectively φιλέουσά περ. Already in this respect Patroklos proves to be the more dexterous speaker; his compliment expresses his appreciation of Nestor's personality, whereas Hektor's merely shows his appreciation of Helen's hospitable gesture of that moment. A more important contrast exists in the fact that Patroklos' apologetic explanation, and his speech as a whole, is simpler and more relaxed. It has a balanced, even structure. His speech is a perfect ring of seven lines. The central idea is reflected exactly in the middle of the fourth line, where we find the name of the one whom Nestor has in his care. It has been the purpose of Patroklos' trip to Nestor's tent, to find out who this man is. The first three lines concern his coming, the last three his leaving. Patroklos seems to have himself and the situation under control without effort. He is far more at ease, both with himself and with Nestor, than Hektor is in his meeting with Helen. The difference in the circumstances in these two encounters may well play a major role in bringing about this contrast. Quite independently from his meeting with Helen, Hektor is in a state of perturbation; the Trojans are in worse trouble than ever, and he feels responsible for them as their leader. The structure and contents of Patroklos' speech reveal the balanced serenity of one who had had no objection, so far, against having been kept out of trouble. Patroklos has not been obliged to partake in that day's battle, at which the Achaians have suffered heavy losses, and if anyone would try and blame him for his uninvolvement, all he had to do were to refer to Achilleus as the responsible one. However impressive his speech is in its elegance, it does reveal ill-timed light-heartedness and too much self-confidence. Necessarily, he makes a bad impression on the one to whom he is talking, and, quite naturally, it prompts Nestor to make an endeavor to change Patroklos' attitude, as an immediate reaction to his speech.

Referring to one's master as a constituent part of an apologetic

explanation is done in the *Odyssey* as well. At ρ 185-91 Odysseus' host Eumaios takes into account the slight possibility that his guest would surmise a lack of helpfulness on his part, and deals with it. Beßlich has analysed this passage conclusively.[37] The only consideration that can be added in this context is: the maladroitness as shown in Eumaios' words (Beßlich typefies it as 'Umständlichkeit der Rede' and 'Verlegenheit des Sprechers') [38] indicates, like that in Hektor's, his deference for the person to whom he talks. Quite unlike Patroklos in his conduct to his host Nestor does Eumaios take a conscious effort to treat the other as courteously as possible. The style of Patroklos' speech is akin to a brilliant conversationalist's; Eumaios, in comparison, speaks clumsily. Yet, not the words of Patroklos but those of Eumaios are successful; they consolidate the approval of Odysseus, whereas Patroklos ends up having to accept a sermon intended to change his attitude.

While, in the epics, formal apologies are rare, implicit ones are given frequently. Whenever a person—also unsolicited—renders an explanation for his conduct, we have an apology in more or less discernible form. Just one more of these may be mentioned briefly, prior to more detailed discussion in a later chapter, P 248-55.[39] In this speech, especially at lines 252-53, Menelaos explains why he does not honor the Achaian leaders properly and fails to address them individually by their names. Unlike the other speakers mentioned in this group, Menelaos has an immediate practical interest in behaving apologizingly; he needs the good will of the ones addressed far more urgently than the speakers in the above-mentioned passages. He needs his combatants' immediate help in a vital matter. This passage more clearly than the other ones shows that the omission of a formal apology is no indication of any sloppiness or lack of human interest on the part of the speaker. In a situation like this, modern society might expect its members to use an expression more or less equivalent to μὴ νεμεσήτε prior to the declaration, not however, as it appears, Homeric society. But this need not point to a difference between modern and Homeric societies; it may merely point to a difference between requirements of etiquette in a normal and in an emergency situation.

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[37] *Schweigen-Verschweigen-Übergehen*, pp. 23-5.
[38] Ibd., p. 24.
[39] See Part B, pp. 145-48.

CHAPTER TWO

VERBAL ABUSE

The Homeric heroes express their feelings of rejection in many ways. Three of these will be discussed below,

1) judgmental remarks on someone else's mental capacities, a) made in protest, b) as a reprimand,
2) name-calling—σχέτλιος, ἔλεγχος and κύων as terms of abuse,
3) an insulting reproof made without the use of specific abusive language.

1a

At the assembly of Ithaka's population, Athena-Mentor scorns the people for their failure to act against the suitors whom they outnumber (β 240-41). Unaware that he is responding to the words of the goddess of knowledge and wisdom, the suitor Leokritos labels her as a not entirely harmless idiot—ἀταρτηρέ, φρένας ἠλεέ (243). In the following lines, however, he at least pays Athena-Mentor the honor of dwelling upon the idea she has introduced, discussing her proposal—although in the sense of rejection. He has not cared to take this trouble after Telemachos' speech, although Telemachos, contrary to Athena-Mentor, has addressed the suitors explicitly (209-33).[1] Leokritos proceeds to explain to Athena-Mentor the people's inertia by means of two arguments which he tries to connect causally, 'It would be difficult even with more men than these to fight us over our feasting. For even . . . Odysseus . . . would meet an unworthy destiny if he fought against too many.' [2] Then, he reinforces the convincing impression he presumes to have made by repeating his opinion that Athena is wrong.

The poet allows the stupidity and lack of logic underlying the hostility of Leokritos to speak for itself and to emphasize Leokritos' injustice at passing judgment on Athena's mind and calling her φρένας ἠλεέ. Finley defends Leokritos' logic, paraphrasing his words as follows, 'Oh no, replied Leokritos, the many are dis-

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[1] β 244-51; Beßlich, *Schweigen-Verschweigen-Übergehen*, pp. 104-10, discusses this passage exhaustively.

[2] Cf. Ameis-Hentze, *Anhang*, comm. *ad loc.*

interested and neutral, and therefore we and our kinsmen and retainers outnumber you and the forces you can muster.' This does sound convincing, but it is not what Leokritos says.[3]

After the insult, without a formal transition or an interruption to allow Athena to reply, Leokritos proceeds to address the people. This shift of address enables him to formulate the ensuing criticism of Mentor and Telemachos in the third person, in their presence.[4]

According to Beßlich, Leokritos has used 'impertinent and threatening words';[5] yet, Athena-Mentor, Telemachos and the γέροντες do not protest, and the assembly instantaneously complies with Leokritos' call to disperse. It suits the poet's scheme to have the meeting end abortively; but when Leokritos is as loutish as Beßlich asserts, it is remarkable that no one even makes an attempt at calling him to order. The impression of weakness that Athena makes, in this manner, does not seem natural. At χ 294-98, not Odysseus, but Athena and Telemachos kill Leokritos, of all suitors, in a joint effort. This may be an indication of the poet's awareness that Athena and Telemachos do have a score to settle and that Leokritos' initial impunity is by no means permanent. However, the events in Book χ are told so much later than those in Book β that an audience at oral recitation could hardly be expected to make the connection.

It can also be argued that Beßlich, whose views are basically correct, disapproves of Leokritos' speech and conduct more than this suitor deserves. It is hardly respectful to discuss Mentor—or anyone, for that matter—in the third person in his presence; such a procedure can always be called 'talking over a person's head'; but this cannot in itself be proven to be a sign of contempt.

The expression φρένας ἠλεέ used by a human to address Athena is to the poet's audience more comical than a grave insult to a guest of Odysseus' house; however, not the information possessed by the audience of the poet but what the assembled Ithakans know about Mentor's true identity is relevant in this argument.

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[3] *The World of Odysseus*, p. 107.

[4] Lines 252-56; on transitions from addressing one person to addressing another within the same speech see the comments on I 630 in this chapter, section 2. About the device of discussing a person in his presence see Part B, section 5.

[5] *Schweigen-Verschweigen-Übergehen*, p. 105 (paraphrased). Beßlich also mentions Leokritos' 'Hemmungslosigkeit' (p. 109) and the 'geradezu flegelhaften Ton den dieser Freier anschlägt' (p. 105).

The impact of this insult is limited mainly because such expressions are used quite often in the epics. Their frequent occurrence reduces this type of insult to a picturesque way of expressing disagreement.

Leokritos proves to be considerate enough to acknowledge that Penelope suffers under Odysseus' absence (249). Furthermore, he troubles to listen to and discuss Athena's argumentation. Simultaneously, he takes it upon himself to defend the attitude of the people. His reference to food, at 245, alludes to the duty of hospitality. This allusion made by one who has taken part in misusing the hospitality of Odysseus' house is impertinent, as Beßlich states, but not without a point.

The extent to which Leokritos' words are 'threatening' is limited, as well. The only threat in his speech might be his remark about Telemachos' future—'He . . . will never accomplish his voyage!' (256) However, only in retrospect can this be interpreted as a threat; it is too vague to serve as an allusion to the suitors' plan of laying an ambush. The people assembled can only get to understand that, in Leokritos' opinion, Telemachos does not have the power or experience to survive an enterprise like the one he has proposed.[6] The allusion to Odysseus' death should he fight alone against the suitors (246-51) need not be understood as a threat, either—it is an objective estimate of chances.

Leokritos' discourse does maintain a generally loutish tone, but its constituent elements do not contain any immediately apparent injustice as long as one keeps in view that Mentor is not known to be Athena. The poet intends to have Leokritos fall into the pitfall of Athena's disguise—the Ithakans present in the assembly are no better off, either. Nevertheless, there is a lack of logic in the argument that it is difficult for a majority to start an argument with the suitors, *because* Odysseus as a single fighter would lose in a conflict with them. The speaker of this nonsense cannot afford to use the expression φρένας ἠλεέ to address anyone, divine or human.

The people reveal their weakness by allowing Leokritos to usurp the function of one who conducts a meeting, letting him dismiss them. Telemachos conforms with the attitude of Athena-Mentor, who decides against immediate action against Leokritos

[6] Cf. Finley, *The World of Odysseus*, pp. 87-88: 'Penelope's suitors had committed no murder, nor were they threatening one'; and p. 101: 'They refrain from murdering Laertes and Telemachos'.

and the suitors. Her aim of providing Telemachos with facts about the disposition of the people as well as the suitors in order that he will know what to expect from either group has been reached.

H 357-60 presents us with a way of calling a person a fool that is lengthier and more emphatic, yet reflects less hostility. At an assembly of the Trojans, Antenor has put forward a proposal to surrender Helen to the Greeks and make peace. It is clear enough that to annoy Paris has not been Antenor's first and main goal; nonetheless, inevitably, Paris is annoyed. Before the end of Antenor's speech, the Trojans may have cast their glances already in the direction of Paris in expectation of his protest, and, to be sure, he protests. His reaction consists of three remarks, 1) 'What you propose, Antenor, I do not like' (357), 2) 'You can conceive of better things to say' (358), and 3) 'Or, if you take it seriously, this plan, the gods themselves have made you lose your wits' (359-60).

This is a climax in the customary three steps. The first is still inoffensive; Paris' method of objecting remains within the limits of correct behavior by any standards. He describes—although too inaccurately to make his point—1) what Antenor has done to disturb him (ταῦτ' ἀγορεύεις; this term, by the way, is more vague than the translation Fitzgerald offers) and 2) the effect of Antenor's deed on his feelings (οὐκετ' ἐμοὶ φίλα). The principle is correct, but its execution is unsatisfactory. The vagueness of both statements prevents that Paris' plight stands out as respectable and convincing; it necessitates the more drastic steps.

At the second step, he makes no further attempt to specify how he feels about Antenor's idea of taking Helen away from him. He solely concentrates on the subject of what-Antenor-has-done. The remark, 'You can conceive of better things to say', indicates his objection to low quality, but is still vague. Furthermore, it is no longer an attempt to describe what Antenor did, but to describe his own evaluation of Antenor's proposal. At this second step, Paris shifts from stating facts to evaluating and blaming, from using good to using bad manners. Nonetheless, the form 'you can do better than that' in which he molds his criticism, includes a formal gesture of optimism about Antenor's potential. The insult could have been worse.

The third and last step occupies as much space as the first two,

together. In this final step, the insult is merely conditional because of the introductory clause ει' ... ἀγορεύεις. However, declaring a person only conditionally crazy, and giving him a chance to say that he has only spoken in jest, is but a courteous façade. εἰ δή with following indicative is used in cases of confidence too firm to leave room for doubt.[7] But at least, it is some formal mitigation. Paris further softens his criticism, by blaming the gods for Antenor's insanity. This religious maneuver is an additional act of aggression, rather than a mitigation, if Paris is alluding to Antenor's words 'We fight as ... trucebreakers. I see no outcome favorable to ourselves unless we act as I propose' (351-53). Post states about this passage, 'Violation of oaths or of the code of hospitality was expected to bring vengeance from Zeus.' [8] Paris' words would then have been spoken in the spirit of 'You and your talking about truce-breaking! Zeus has made you lose your wits!'; but any such allusion would have been more likely to exist if Paris had specifically mentioned Zeus, rather than the gods in general.

One difference between this manner of calling someone crazy and the manner of Leokritos in Book β lies in the different intensities of the sounds produced. Leokritos yells (β 257, ἐφώνησεν); φρένας ἠλεέ is an exclamation. His shouting has to disguise lack of convincingness in substance. Paris talks; he allows an extended discourse to lead up to the insult. His bearing is assertive and displays control. He insults the other in so courteous a form that typefying his speech as insulting would nearly be beside the mark. His speech sounds surprisingly convincing considering that, unlike Leokritos, he does not even care to argue his case.

After these four lines, Paris turns away from Antenor to address the general assembly. Leokritos uses the same device, but the way he does it marks another difference between these two speeches. ἀλλ' ἄγε, the transition-formula which Leokritos uses (β 252), displays rudeness. The expression implies that he wishes whatever has been discussed so far to be understood as dwelling on a subject of lesser practical importance. Turning away from Athena-Mentor in this manner is part of the insult. Paris takes the trouble to prepare Antenor for the transition with an entire line announcing

[7] Cf., however, Chapter I, section 1. When εἰ δή or εἰ περ, despite the connection with an indicative, lessens the speaker's courtesy at an apology, it is no surprise when the same device has the opposite effect at an insult.

[8] *The Moral Pattern*, p. 164.

his plan to address all Trojans from now on (361). The formal consideration thus shown for his opponent renders his criticism all the more impressive. Paris has mastered the art of calling someone an idiot in an elegant way.

His speech can be called ἔπεα πτερόεντα indeed (H 356).[9] His words have a long-lasting effect. The Trojans do not yield to, but agree with Paris' counter-proposal; Helen is never given back. Leokritos' speech is not called ἔπεα πτερόεντα; its effect is short-lived. The people yield, but there is no agreement and Leokritos fails to keep Telemachos from setting sail. The opposite results of these two insulting speeches suggest that the poet considered not only deeds to be significant, but also the way deeds were done.

In Book Ξ, Agamemnon, Nestor, Odysseus and Diomedes have a conference. Agamemnon proposes to abandon the Trojan enterprise and to start immediately pulling the ships to sea while there is still daylight (Ξ 75-81). Odysseus comments, σευ ὠνοσάμην πάγχυ φρένας (95). Contrary to β 243-51, this exclamation is followed by a serious, well-founded technical argumentation: during the process of pulling the ships out to sea, the Achaian warriors will turn around, pay more attention to the ships than to the battle and thus give the Trojans ample occasion to bring about a massacre. Agamemnon's proposal to leave Troy leads Odysseus to infer that his warlord cannot say the right things (90-92). As long as Odysseus comments on the proposal in general, he keeps the insult ambiguous and Agamemnon may fail to understand the inference. Odysseus then insults him explicitly, and allows the insult to reach its full potential, when he refers to a detail of the proposal: the proposed timing of the boat-launching makes him reprove Agamemnon's mental powers completely (πάγχυ, 95). His evaluation explains and supports both his wish that Agamemnon were 'in

[9] In 61 of the 119 passages where this expression occurs, the words the poet describes as πτερόεντα refer to matters of vital importance to the speaker; at X 81, for example, Hekabe tries to keep Hektor from joining the battle and at χ 311 Leiodes, about to be killed, begs for mercy. In the other half (58 passages), the ἔπεα of this type prove to be significant—sometimes even necessary—as a basis for subsequent events, at α, for instance, where Telemachos welcomes Athena to his house, or Σ 72, where Thetis asks Achilleus why he is weeping—which leads to the manufacture of his new armor and, ultimately, to his death. H 356 has its place in the second category. Cf. W. J. Verdenius, Lampas 5 (1972), p. 103; P. Vivante, Classical Quarterly 25 (1975), pp. 1-12.

command of some disordered rabble, not an army strong as our own',[10] and his attempt to make Agamemnon feel ashamed—'Quiet! or some other Akhaians may get wind of this. No man ὅς τις 'επίσταιτο ᾗσι φρεσὶν ἄρτια βάζειν could ever allow that thought to pass his lips.' (90-92).

Odysseus engages in a battle against Agamemnon's despondency, but he does so with weapons that do not look as if they would be civilized, especially as the expected bearing of a subordinate towards his chief. Expressing the wish that Agamemnon were commander of an unseemly (ἀεικελίου) army is a manner of avoiding the sentence 'you are ἀεικέλιος', yet getting the insult across. Furthermore, Odysseus swears at him (οὐλόμενε!), blames him repeatedly, declares his contempt and tops all this off with the sarcastic—if not downright cynical—ὄρχαμε λαῶν. Here is a disciplinary offense of a far more insulting nature than when one of Odysseus' men calls his leader audacious and reckless and, in view of their recent experience with the Cyclops, tries to keep the rest of the company from following Odysseus to Kirke's dwelling (κ 429-37). Odysseus considers killing this man. The sympathy of the audience is with the leader in κ and with the protester in Ξ—and with reason; the protester in κ objects to taking life by the horns: the one in Ξ to Agamemnon's failure to do so. But this does not make Odysseus' way of protesting in Ξ 82-102 any less mutinous.

Agamemnon demonstrates the wisdom and honesty to accept Odysseus' criticism along with his incorrect way of criticizing. His acceptance may partly be due to the fact that the abuse could have been worse. Of the three insulting phrases, the second and third (90-92: σίγα, μή . . . ἄρτια βάζειν and 95: ὠνοσάμην . . . φρένας) explain the first and greatest (84-85: αἴθ' ὤφελλες ἀεικελίου . . .). In the first, Odysseus allows himself to be quite emotional and to explode at expressing a wish. In the first and second, Odysseus judges that Agamemnon is ἀεικέλιος and has a mental deficiency rendering him incapable of speaking ἄρτια as if these defects were objective facts. Only in the third does Odysseus find the restraint to use a verbal form in the first person singular indicating that, formally, he does not discuss Agamemnon's φρένες but merely his own opinion about them. The form is less presumptuous. When

[10] Lines 84-85; Fitzgerald translates this utterance as an opinion rather than a wish—'I'd put you in command of some disordered rabble'.

he then takes the trouble to explain at length how he came to his opinion, he starts being convincing. This renders the third phrase, however crushing, debatable as an insult.

The order of sequence ot these three remarks presents an anti-climax of insults while it shows simultaneously a climax of realism, pointing in the direction of calming down, the possibility of settlement and ultimately of reconciliation. This arrangement has the force of forestalling attempts at protest. It consolidates Odysseus' attack while making it less hostile than it could have been. Also, when he warns Agamemnon not to let anyone hear it who can speak ἄρτια, he can be defended as giving well-meant advice rather than as intentionally insulting Agamemnon. Quite in this sense Fitzgerald translates, 'Quiet! or some other Akhaians may get wind of this' leaving to his next sentence the specification '[Akhaians] who knew what judgment is in speech'. Lastly, when Odysseus declares that Agamemnon is out of his mind, he at least pays him the honor of taking the proposal seriously enough to discuss it at length, implying that to him Agamemnon and his ideas deserve consideration.

The only objection Agamemnon could have brought forward, would have directed itself against Odysseus' initial lack of respectful wording. But this conference does not take place in a peaceful setting. Odysseus, Nestor and Diomedes are dealing with a leader who has just demonstrated that his morale has collapsed. His despair might have a fatal effect on the army. Whether Agamemnon could have been rescued from this dangerous state of mind by friendly persuasion in Nestor's usual style is questionable. For a quick but thorough conversion, Odysseus' acerbity is needed.

Apparently, Agamemnon realizes that Odysseus' manner of speaking results from his concern for the common good and, for the sake of that purpose, has to be accepted in that form. He declines to protest by calling Odysseus' speech a reprimand, whereas Odysseus has spoken his mind in all but that form. Odysseus' speech might well have been a mere reprimand if he had been able to keep his composure from the start. His wish that Agamemnon were not his leader would have been left out and only in veiled form would he have alluded to Agamemnon's foolishness. Also, a speaker who makes a reprimand assumes a somewhat superior attitude benign at the core; but all three of the above-mentioned remarks, as well as the forms of address Odysseus uses—οὐλόμενε

before these and the sarcastic ὄρχαμε afterwards—exceed the limits of what can be understood as based on a friendly disposition.

The purpose of Agamemnon's reaction at 104-05, μάλα πώς με καθίκεο θυμὸν ἐνιπῇ ἀργαλέῃ can be rendered as 'Your method is tough, but you reached me effectively'. With his description ἐνιπῇ, he distorts the truth about Odysseus' mutinous hostility, forcing it into the mold of a reprimand. By its own meaning, the modifier ἀργαλέῃ partially undoes that distortion. Agamemnon's use of that adjective shows his courage at explicitly acknowledging, not the fact that Odysseus has confronted him, but the manner in which he has done so.

1b

δ 31-32 is a reprimand in all respects. A wedding is celebrated at Menelaos' house. The servant Eteoneus has witnessed the arrival of two strangers and asks Menelaos whether they are to be welcomed or—in view of the circumstances—have to be sent on to some other host. Menelaos replies, 'You were never a fool before, but now you are babbling nonsense', and orders him to welcome the strangers, referring to their own frequent enjoyment of hospitality in the past. (31-36)

He seems to reproach Eteoneus for his dependent attitude. The appearance of the strangers has caused a dilemma: to admit them would disturb the festivities, not to admit them would involve sinning against the code of hospitality. The difference between the disadvantages connected with these options is so great that the choice is easy for anyone of Eteoneus' age, experience and status. Eteoneus is no newcomer in the house of Menelaos. His ties with Menelaos are of long standing; he has accompanied him to Troy, as Menelaos hints by mentioning their return together (δ 33-34). The title κρείων is nearly exclusively reserved for gods and princes; [11] there must be a reason why he is given this epithet at line 22. These factors suggest strongly that Eteoneus holds a position of trust. He can be—and as it appears from this passage, he is—expected to make some decisions autonomously, the minor and the easy ones at the least. The decision in the matter at hand belongs in the latter category.

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[11] This epithet is used 63 times—41 times for Agamemnon (εὐρὺ κ. 'A.), eight times for Poseidon (κ. ἐνοσίχθων) and six times for King Alkinoos. At the remaining eight times, it is used for eight different people among whom only three are neither royal nor divine. Eteoneus is not in bad company.

Formally, Eteoneus' question sounds as if he considers Menelaos capable of rejecting a guest. That wrongdoing would have taken place in front of all the wedding-guests, Menelaos' γείτονες ἠδὲ ἔται (16), traditionally the most censorious witnesses. The mere suggestion that Menelaos could reject the strangers is embarrassing in front of these witnesses. However, when Eteoneus brings these alternatives forward, he has in fact predetermined the decision and leaves only the formal decision to Menelaos. Had Eteoneus really preferred to avoid the disturbance, he would not have approached Menelaos to ask this question, and certainly he would have taken care not to recommend them and to arouse curiosity with his remark that the newcomers look as if they were the offspring of Zeus (27). He forces Menelaos to accept the strangers. The only chance of turning them away without dishonor to Menelaos' house would be an independent, direct rebuttal by Eteoneus. Simply announcing the two strangers, possibly with the recommendation that their appearances remind him of the god of hospitality, would have been a straightforward way of dealing with this matter. Eteoneus speaks as if he leaves the choice to Menelaos, as if he were incapable of handling the matter himself; yet, he leaves Menelaos with no choice at all, taking up his time and attention to no necessary purpose.

Nonetheless, Menelaos' response not only fails to show appreciation of Eteoneus' good intentions; his anger does not seem to fit the crime. After all, Eteoneus can hardly be blamed for indicating that he awaits Menelaos' orders. His mistake is that, after reporting what is new, he keeps on talking, elaborating on alternatives for Menelaos to make a choice. This leads Eteoneus to touch on a social taboo: he expands on the idea of rejecting a guest.

Menelaos is μέγ' ὀχθήσας (30), but rather than bluntly calling Eteoneus a fool, he uses some ambiguity and indicates either that Eteoneus is not using his mental powers to a satisfactory extent, or that he is showing symptoms of senility. This put-down intends no harm; what we really have here is generous hospitality brought to vivid expression as Eteoneus evokes it by mentioning inhospitable behavior as a possibility. Thus, the poet does not present Menelaos' hospitality as an innate trait fostered by good upbringing, but instead as a reaction dependent on a servant who dares to formulate the alternative. Menelaos' reprimand seems to be an overreaction,

since Eteoneus has not insisted that refusing admittance to the strangers would be the better policy; he has not even recommended it. Instead, his mentioning the impressive appearance of the newcomers implies the recommendation to accept them. While an adverse reaction of some sort would not have come undeserved, since Eteoneus was talkative to the point of mentioning what amounts to a taboo, thinking of Eteoneus as a fool seems overdone, and Menelaos' expression of it an abuse.

The rest of Menelaos' speech is delivered in the same spirit of condescension and scorn. He proceeds to expand on Eteoneus' and his own duty to be hospitable on grounds of hospitality received. This implies that he blames Eteoneus for allegedly being inhospitable and having the inclination to balk at the inconvenience of caring for strangers at an inopportune time. For the benefit of himself and perhaps of those wedding-guests who are listening, Menelaos shows off his gratitude to his own former hosts and his hospitable disposition at the cost of his servant on whom he heaps blame. An average hospitable man who would not think of rejecting a stranger just might have let the servant 'babble' and, in response, simply have given orders to admit the strangers—with or without a brief explanation, not to Eteoneus, but to his wedding-guests, who might be affected: they may have to share the available food with more people than expected.

Menelaos intends to correct the one whom he is blaming with the argument that he has been treated well himself. Having been treated ill justifies behaving ill as little as having been treated well is the compelling reason for acting well. Menelaos allows his words to imply that he might have turned the strangers away if he himself had not been allowed to enjoy hospitality. This reveals the dependence which he scorns in Eteoneus, but to a more serious degree, and a greater lack of mental powers than he can justly scorn in Eteoneus. Bad treatment received makes inferior actions as understandable as doing the right thing under influence of right treatment. But to volunteer the information that one needs good treatment first and that one is basing one's actions on what others have done to oneself, suggests poverty of mind rather than generosity. It suggests that, before Menelaos gives, he first reviews what and how much others have given to him. Surely, he is grateful, and he is also rational; but he talks too much. He points out his own rectitude as a means of blaming Eteoneus. Eteoneus' speech

contains one line that might be taken as an illustration of his lack of perfection. Thus, Menelaos' reprimand is not unjust; yet the form in which he makes the reprimand is far less than perfect. His emotional involvement—he is μέγ' ὀχθήσας—results in three and a half lines of blundering of his own.

When one says to a person younger than oneself, 'You were never a fool before, but now you talk like a child (πάϊς ὥς)', one combines the criticism with the indication that the other has it in his power to behave better. When one says the same thing to an aging person, it can be taken differently. The younger one is challenged to live up to his potential, the older one can understand that in the speaker's opinion his powers have been declining to the point of senility. In this passage, the put-down is not so severe because the accuser is not very young himself. Menelaos seems to be fighting against his own fear of senility by implying that the other is senile. His emphatic rebuke makes it seem as if he is fighting also against his own inclination to send the strangers away, by accusing Eteoneus instead. Brief, his act of making a mountain out of a molehill leads to a wrong impression.

The blame is overdone and makes the reprimand a form of abuse, but only formally. That no harm is done or intended appears from Eteoneus' reaction: he runs through the house ordering others to follow him on his way. His running conveys the atmosphere of relief and joy at being told to do what he wanted to do from the start. The sudden action does not indicate that Eteoneus is in panic upon being yelled at and blamed, in contrast to, for instance, Ω 265-80. Yet, Eteoneus' friendly reaction does not make Menelaos' manners exquisite.

Ψ 439-664, the controversy between Menelaos and Antilochos, contains a series of three utterances of rejection. Each time, the speaker is Menelaos. As to form, the series is an anticlimax; the first remark can be described as a saucy rebuff, the second as a moral rebuke, and the third as a conciliatory recognition of Antilochos' inferiority. Measured not by their form, but by their contents, this series contains a climax of disrespect rather than an anti-climax.

During the chariot-race, Antilochos brings his competitor Menelaos in danger; he bars Menelaos' way, when they enter a narrow passage. To avoid an accident, Menelaos restrains his team, and he says, οὔ τις σεῖο βροτῶν ὀλοώτερος ἄλλος! ἔρρ'! ἐπεὶ οὔ σ' ἔτυμόν γε φάμεν πεπνῦσθαι 'Αχαιοί (Ψ 439-40).

In this first utterance, three insults are made in one breath. Menelaos neither yells nor, even, shouts his insults although, in the first place, his choice of words, in the second, the situation call for it. A person who just 'says' something will have more trouble being heard and understood in the immediate vicinity of hoofs trampling, horses snorting and chariots cracking at an unusual maneuver, than someone who shouts. By using the expression προσέφη (438), the poet hints that Menelaos has himself well in control and that his words are not to be understood as a mere expression of emotionalism: Menelaos knows well enough that he is right. Although the dangerous interference of Antilochos must arouse his fear and anger, Menelaos sees to it that he can answer at all times for whatever he utters in this situation.

The first of the three attacks in this utterance, 'No one is more pernicious than you', is a formula occurring in two more passages in the epics, both of which are less poignant. At Γ 365, Menelaos addresses Zeus with these words, because his sword is broken during his duel with Paris and his spear has not hit its target. Here, too, it is more than simply an outburst of emotion. Menelaos has had the chance to revenge himself on his disloyal guest Paris. It has been reasonable for him to expect some help in that pursuit from the god of hospitality and, thus, to blame Zeus upon being disappointed. However, he is careful enough to avoid establishing a link, explicitly, between his mishap and Zeus' alleged perniciousness. It is obvious enough to himself and to those who hear this accusation of Zeus that, within realism, Zeus can hardly be held responsible for the facts that Menelaos' spear has pierced only Paris' shield and harnass, not his body (Γ 357-60), and that the construction of Menelaos' sword proves to be less solid than that of Paris' helmet (361-63). Without evidence of Zeus' wilful interference, the meaning of Menelaos' statement lies less in its own substance and face value than in its bearing as an expression of annoyance and disappointment. In this passage, this expression is rather a ready formula nicely fitting the situation, than an original remark molded for that very occasion.

At υ 201, a similar thing happens: Zeus is being held responsible for human misery and for that reason is addressed with these same words. As a whole, the speech in which this remark is made is not directed to Zeus but to someone else. This time, the attack on Zeus is reinforced by an argument, 'You have no pity on men,

once you yourself have created them; you bring them into misfortune and dismal sufferings' (υ 202-03). However emphatic, this is no personal attack; altogether, it is an indirect approach by which the speaker does not intend to argue with Zeus, but rather to make a certain point clear to the human whom he really addresses.

At Ψ 439, however, there is hardly a trace visible of its possible use as a rhetorical device. Antilochos, at that moment, has really behaved more than anyone else in a pernicious way. Here, Menelaos' outburst is no mere insult or expression of emotion; rather coolly, he renders his opinion of Antilochos, on the firm basis of what he just has watched him do. It can be argued that this attack is not altogether free from rhetoric: Menelaos is in no position to determine who is the most dangerous person on earth, at any given time. Yet, since Antilochos, at that moment and in that part of the world that matters to Menelaos and to him, really has caused the greatest danger, the exaggeration is negligible.

Nevertheless, while any single deed of Antilochos will reflect on his personality, it cannot by itself render an unbiased picture of his character. Since Menelaos' opinion is based on one fact only, it is necessarily less than just. To give such an opinion is an abuse, the more so when it is negative and unasked-for, besides.

The order ἔρρε! occurs in four other passages in the epics. In two of these, the expression is used with the intent to be insulting. At Θ 164, it is used with contempt—ἔρρε, κακὴ γλήνη!, at Ω 239 (ἔρρετε λωβητῆρες) with indignation at alleged sensationalism—implying necessarily contempt to some degree. In the other two cases, X 498 and κ 72 (repeated in κ 75), the intent merely is to scare the victim away from the speaker's premises; he is deemed unworthy of the speaker's hospitality. In all instances, the order is given with contempt and hostility to various degrees; but to the same extent as the judgment 'no one is more pernicious than you are' does the expression ἔρρε have its most poignant use at Ψ 440. Antilochos is in Menelaos' way, in the literal, geographical sense, and he has committed the offense of being where he does not belong more wilfully than any of the victims of the order ἔρρε in the other passages.

At Ψ 439-40, both the expression οὔ τις ... ὀλοώτερος and ἔρρε fall short of being the grave insults they could have been if they had reflected the state of affairs with less accuracy. The third

insult in this sentence, the criticism of Antilochos' mental powers, occurs in many variations throughout the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. This type of insult is commonplace to the extent that, in general, the impact must be expected to be weak. Among all variations possible, the specific form chosen, οὔ σ' ἔτυμόν γε φάμεν πεπνῦσθαι, is merely the negation of a compliment; it is not as blunt as, for instance, the exclamation φρένας ἠλεέ! (β 243). Menelaos combines aggression with elegance by formally building up a case of public opinion—with Menelaos himself for its representative—versus Antilochos, and then formally admitting to the people's mistake of having admired him. Still, in substance, Menelaos presumes to pass judgment on the state of Antilochos' mental health. Taken one by one, the three formulas of rejection used in 439-40 present insults of relatively minor impact, but their concatenation results in an impressive form of abuse.

Although Menelaos remains composed, this criticism of Antilochos' mental capacities is based on feelings, rather than only on an opinion. This fact reveals itself most clearly through a comparison with the way in which he criticizes Antilochos after the race is over and danger is a thing of the past: Πρόσθεν πεπνυμένε! ποῖον ἔρεξας! (570). This is a premeditated reprimand in an attempt to make Antilochos feel ashamed. Still further removed from emotional involvement is his third criticism of Antilochos' mental powers, delivered after Antilochos' apology, as part of the reconciliation—οὔ ... ἀεσίφρων | ἦσθα πάρος· νῦν αὖτε νόον νίκησε νεοίη (603-04). In this anticlimax, the transition from protest on a basis of equality to a more diplomatic form of rebuke—but on the basis of a superior attitude—occurs at 570. In Ψ 440, Menelaos calls it a misunderstanding that the Achaians considered Antilochos sensible; at 570, he at least acknowledges that Antilochos really was sensible until the race. The rhetorical question ποῖον ἔρεξας is an appeal to Antilochos for self-criticism. Menelaos refrains from making any direct statement about the other's intelligence; he gives Antilochos the 'homework' of drawing his own conclusions about the quality of his own behavior and the present state of his mental health, as opposed to the good sense with which he was formerly endowed. Menelaos' anger has made way for his indignation. The first address is directed to an equal opponent, the second to someone who needs to be taught a lesson. At his third criticism, 603-04, Menelaos no longer defines Antilochos' mental health problem as a categorical

absence of reason (440), or loss of reason (570), but as a momentary lapse, combined with and caused by the circumstance that Antilochos (through no fault of his own?!)[12] was overpowered by *force majeure*—his youth. As Menelaos' composure increases, the 'cursing and swearing' changes in three steps into condescending behavior, and his equal enemy—in his view—into an inferior to be patronized, a recipient of generosity.

The first two of these three ways of reacting to Antilochos' deed show Menelaos' respect for him. Especially in the first passage, immediately following Antilochos' transgression,[13] Menelaos hardly says anything more or less, and acts with hardly greater or lesser harshness, than the situation admits and requires. To a high degree, this still can be said of his second reaction, immediately after the race; at 570, Menelaos might incur the accusation of not letting bygones be bygones, but he owes it to his own honor to carry out his threat of 441 that Antilochos would hear more about it.

The third time, 603-04, his remark about Antilochos' mind is the least harsh but also the most insulting. The attack seems superfluous; Menelaos insists on dwelling on the theme of Antilochos' alleged feeble-mindedness, after Antilochos has offered his apologies in due form and has yielded the prize—the horse—to Menelaos, declaring himself willing to add a second one of his own as a gift.[14] To be sure: Menelaos' condescending attitude is no intentional insult—in the same speech, he expresses his appreciation for the life Antilochos has been leading before (607), and he even gives him the horse back. Also, with his contention that youthfulness has got the better of Antilochos, he provides himself with a base for understanding Antilochos' behavior and a means to place it in a category known to him. He is not categorizing Antilochos in a conscious effort to put him down, but the result is a put-down nevertheless, Without the remark about Antilochos' youth, the expression οὐδ' ἀεσίφρων ἦσθα πάρος can be taken as a compliment in the sense of 'basically you are not feeble-minded' or 'your record is otherwise clean'. But in conjunction with the contrast, νῦν αὖτε etc., the necessary inference is that, in Menelaos' opinion, Antilochos is feeble-minded now, regardless of whether his youth or anything else has caused this condition.

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[12] See Adkins, *Threatening, Abusing and Feeling Angry*, pp. 18-21.

[13] Luther, *Wahrheit und Lüge*, p. 83, calls his demeanor 'einen unfairen Trick'.

[14] Ψ 587-97; cf. Chapter I, section 1.

With the words ἐγὼν ὑποείξομαι αὐτός, he vaunts himself as the peacemaker. Instead of just yielding, he announces that he will condescend to yield although justice does not require him to do so. He surely intends to make peace with Antilochos—but on the terms that Antilochos will be established as his inferior and he himself as the patronizing benefactor. That he really wishes to end the quarrel does not find its proof in his verbal claim of 602, but in the fact that he is quick at adopting an argument for peace that Antilochos has introduced as a part of his apology, namely the argument about his youthful age. Menelaos' own mental mediocrity reveals itself both by this act of adopting an idea of his adversary and by the fact that, even at making peace, he does not seem to be able to stop insisting on Antilochos' lack of good sense—which does not help to avoid the impression that the theme of the other's lack of perfection is agreeable to him.[15]

When Menelaos announces that he will render grace to the λισσόμενος (609) since Antilochos and his relatives have worked hard for him, he expands on—and maybe exaggerates—the social distance between himself and his victim. It remains quite within the possibilities of expectation that this humiliating treatment should leave the aristocrat Antilochos resentful. Yet the poet gives no indication that Antilochos is left dissatisfied, and the conflict is dismissed as solved.

The poet could easily have allowed Menelaos to make a better impression by making the indirect statement that Menelaos gave Antilochos the horse with a smile and a compliment. Instead, he makes Menelaos verbalize his own gesture and add as a motivation for his generosity, 'So these men too may know my temper is not cruel and overbearing'. Thus, the poet presents Menelaos as one who will advertize his own kindness, implying that Menelaos does not have the qualities of kindness and generosity to a desirable extent—the desirable extent being an aim toward which he strives.

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Swear-words used in battle or in private feuds will reflect the situation and the circumstances, but the speakers' manners only dimly at best. In the cases not involving established conflicts, of all possible swear-words, the adjective σχέτλιος occurs the most often

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[15] Cf., however, Barck, *Menelaos bei Homer*, p. 14: 'Und nun entscheidet Menelaos den Streit voll königlichen Großmutes'.

by far.[16] Occasionally, at μ 21 and λ 473, for instance, it is used merely to express astonishment with some undertone of admiration—the speaker seems to be fascinated by an uncommon or not quite understandable feat.[17] Its usual function, however, is confined within the range of cursing.

At ι 351, Odysseus calls Polyphemos σχέτλιε after the Cyclops has devoured six of Odysseus' companions. Calling him σχέτλιε is part of a serious accusation in a matter of vital importance to the speaker. Yet, even here, it is not a strong expression. First, Odysseus uses this word at a time when he is still in the Cyclops' power. Annoying the giant too much would involve the immediate risk to his life, and with his preceding remark σὺ δὲ μαίνεαι οὐκέτ ἀνεκτῶς he has already taken a high risk. Second, it is his immediate purpose that the Cyclops voluntarily accept and consume the drink which he offers him while delivering the speech in which σχέτλιε occurs. Odysseus needs to gain his confidence to some extent. Pure friendliness after all that has happened would be at least as suspect as, on the other hand, any unmistakable token of hostility while offering wine to a person. In order to be convincing, Odysseus must steer a middle course between friendliness and hostility; if his approach of the Cyclops is to be successful, it will have to be like an egg-dance. The remark σὺ δὲ μαίνεαι οὐκέτ' ἀνεκτῶς, at 350, the only place in the epics where the person meant is directly addressed with these words, carries plenty of aggression, alone. It has by itself more than an adequate measure of sharpness to function as a counterweight to the gesture—friendly, in itself—of offering a person something to drink. It is even aggressive enough to produce the risk that this speech, as to its tempered unfriendliness, might lose its balance.

The Cyclops is thick-skinned, and his lust for the wine increases steadily. With these circumstances in view, Odysseus can afford to tell him the truth with increasing frankness. But this climax is not established. Instead, the measure of Odysseus' agression in this speech can be outlined as a symmetrical hill, or clock, the expression σὺ δὲ μαίνεαι etc. occupying its place at the top. Halfway down

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[16] Th. Wendel, *Die Gesprächsanrede*, pp. 22-34, offers a comprehensive survey of the unfriendly forms of address. On σχέτλιος, see also J. R. Wilson, ΤΟΛΜΑ *and the Meaning of* ΤΑΛΑΣ, American Journal of Philology 92 (1971), p. 293.

[17] This in disagreement with Th. Wendel, p. 20, who interpretes σχέτλιοι at μ 21 as 'Unselige!' as an expression of 'Mitleid und heimliches Grauen'.

on one side, the imaginary λοιβή he would have offered to him might be located,[18] at the other side σχέτλιε. At the bottom, on both sides, are quite calm, near-friendly descriptions of Polyphemos' transgressions: on the one hand, he has eaten human flesh; on the other, he has violated the law of hospitality (οὐ κατὰ μοῖραν ἔρεξας, 352).[19] To put it differently, when any elements of Odysseus' speech constitute a climax, then, after its highest step, the anticlimax follows immediately. Σχέτλιε bears similarities to the address 'scoundrel'. The addressee can, with or without a good right, always understand it as said with some admiration. It is here well in its place.[20]

Nonetheless, the combination of this word with σὺ δὲ μαίνεαι etc. and with the remark at the end makes this speech, both in its content and as to the expressions chosen, so aggressive that it is to be wondered why Polyphemos does not retaliate. It remains uncertain to what extent it has to be taken in account that Odysseus, in this part of the *Odyssey*, relates his own adventure to an audience of Phaiacians and can be expected to color also his opponent's reactions to suit the impression he might wish to make on his audience. When a poet sets out to have sailors or fishermen tell their own stories, these will be especially convincing when they are somewhat tilted in the speaker's favor. It can also be that the poet means to imply that Polyphemos being insensitive and focusing on the wine does not listen well. After all: Odysseus chooses his words in such a way that repeatedly pleasant things are being said although accompanied by negations. For instance,

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[18] A. J. Podlecki, *Guest-gifts and Nobodies in Odyssey* 9, Phoenix 15 (1961), pp. 128-29 and n. 8, regards this as little as a condition contrary to fact as W. B. Stanford whom he quotes. In the opinion of Podlecki and Stanford, Odysseus contends that he really had brought the wine along as a λοιβή for the Cyclops. First, the condition contrary to fact seems more probable on grounds of the use of the imperfect φέρον. Second, it does not seem right to disregard δέ in σοὶ δ' αὖ λοιβὴν φέρον entirely. Third, a condition contrary to fact here makes better sense: it appears from the immediate sequence, σὺ δὲ μαίνεαι, that Odysseus regards the subject-matter referred to in the clause εἴ ... πέμψειας as unreal, not simply improbable. Therefore, I prefer to interpret this remark as 'I would have brought it to be your libation, if you had ...'

[19] W. Luther, *Wahrheit und Lüge*, p. 68, interprets this as a determination of 'Gastrechtverletzung'; Luther compares it to θ 397, where the king of the Phaiacians finally passes this judgment, causing Euryalos to make an immediate overture toward reconciliation with Odysseus.

[20] Contrary to Wendel, *Die Gesprächsanrede*, p. 22, I do not see proof that this word, here, would be an expression of contempt.

σοὶ δ' αὖ λοιβὴν φέρον sounds pleasant to a person who is only half listening so that he does not notice the condition contrary to fact.[21] Something similar may hold true for κατὰ μοῖραν ἔρεξας when the preceding οὐ is pronounced without much emphasis. Anyway, a straight, unqualified, utterance of rejection will always sound less pleasant than an utterance of acceptance accompanied by a negation—one might compare, for instance, 'You committed a crime', versus, 'You did not act in accordance with the law', or, 'I despise you', versus, 'I do not admire you'. Similarly, at line 351, Odysseus asks how, later, another visitor could come. For someone who distills from what he hears only the agreeable, this need not have the normal meaning of a rhetorical question. To Polyphemos, it can mean that Odysseus does some thinking on his behalf and wonders by what means more people could be allured.

Not only is Odysseus smart enough to mask at ι 349-50 the condition contrary to fact with the optative πέμψειας, he also uses the least offensive manner possible of protesting against bad treatment, namely by describing it. When he says φάγες ἀνδρόμεα κρέα, he uses the same principle of stating an objective fact objectively which Paris uses when he says ταῦτ' ἀγορεύεις at H 357. Odysseus' way of protesting is an improvement on Paris'. If Odysseus had carried out the principle of correct protest with the same vagueness from which Paris' statement suffers, he would have said: 'After what you have done', rather than, 'Now you have fed on human flesh'. While Paris' description is vague, Odysseus' description is accurate. Paris carries out the second part of the principle when he proceeds to state which effect Antenor's act has on his feelings. Odysseus appropriately omits that part; there is no indication whatsoever that Polyphemos would be interested in hearing about Odysseus' feelings. Instead, the rest of Odysseus' speech can be seen as an attempt to describe which effect his host's act has on his ability to function as a good guest. If so, the attempt is at least partly a failure; Odysseus assumes an interpreting (μαίνεαι) and judging attitude (σχέτλιε).

At δ 728, Penelope calls her servants σχέτλιαι because they have failed to give her warning of Telemachos' disobedience in departing against her will, although, in her opinion, they were well aware of what was going on. Since she considers this departure to be the

[21] Cf. Stanford, comm. on l. 349: 'Odysseus flatters the Cyclops by using the word λοιβή'. The Cyclops likes what he hears.

beginning of her son's ill-fated ending (724-27), the accusation is serious. She tends to hold her servants responsible for Telemachos' expected disaster.

Penelope leaves no doubt about her annoyance, yet σχέτλιαι expresses neither hate nor disdain. The word is not strong enough to be indicative of an unfriendly disposition. The speech in which she uses this word sets out with the address φίλαι (722). This implies that the speech is to be understood as delivered in a generally trusting and friendly atmosphere. From the kind and comforting reaction of Eurykleia (743-57) appears moreover that this outburst is not being held against her.

Nevertheless, an outburst it is. The undertone of admiration can in this case only be referred to the servants' courage in displaying by their way of acting—or, rather, by their way of remaining passive—more solidarity with their mistresses' son than with their mistress herself. The ones involved do get a frank verbal rebuke.

The cyclops' failure to protest against Odysseus' criticism, and his acts of accepting the potion and continuing the conversation unabated with his request for further information, indicate that Odysseus' words have had no more impact than to inform him. He does not react to Odysseus' reproach, but to the spirit in which —in his mistaken opinion—Odysseus has spoken, the spirit in which normally one person offers wine to another. When Eurykleia reacts to Penelope's accusation with her affable response, she does the same thing in principle, only in her case with a good right. She chooses not to react to the accusation and the swear-word, but, instead, shows her understanding of the spirit in which Penelope has spoken and of the feelings underlying her speech. Adkins has pointed out that Homeric man lives 'in a shame- [or as I prefer to call it a results-] culture'.[22] He continues, 'If only results count, it is not worth while to distinguish a moral error from a mistake, where both lead to disaster . . . : a disastrous result is αἰσχρόν and will meet with disapproval . . . , whatever the cause; and the man disapproved of will feel the same kind of shame, whatever the cause of the disaster'.[23] Here are two passages in which that disapproval is expressed by the word σχέτλιος, and at which the disapproving person expects, or at least hopes, that the other feel αἰσχρός (-ή). Yet this effect is not established in either case. Or,

[22] *Threatening, Abusing and Feeling Angry*, pp. 18 and 21.
[23] P. 20.

on the other hand, from the points of view of the ones addressed, it can be contended that the use of the rebuking title σχέτλιε (-αι) is a sin against good manners—the sin of 'labelling', or 'name-calling'—and is, thus, a disastrous result, which 'will meet with disapproval'. One might expect Polyphemos and Penelope's servants to protest and to try to establish the result that the ones who delivered the unasked-for criticism feel αἰσχρός, Odysseus and Penelope—and this does not happen, either. As it concerns the conversation between Odysseus and the Cyclops, this problem can be readily dismissed with a reference to Polyphemos' lack of sensitivity; but the procedure in the confrontation between Penelope and her servants shows that either the 'law of Adkins' has its exceptions, or there is something irregular about the word σχέτλιος. This passage is not exceptional by any means; it corresponds to others in the epics where people swear at people with use of the word σχέτλιος.

At ε 118, for instance, Hermes has transmitted an order to Kalypso to let Odysseus depart, and Kalypso calls the messenger, and with him the other gods, σχέτλιοι because they do not grant the goddesses to maintain relationships with mortal men. With this expression of disapproval, however, she fails to make the gods, or at least Hermes, feel repentant or ashamed. Nor does Hermes on his part attempt to make her feel ashamed about having uttered this accusation. He does not blame her—he hardly shows any interest for what she has had to say and takes his leave with a threat disguised in friendly terms: Zeus will retaliate should she not obey him.

Kalypso favors emancipation for the goddesses; but her remark has been put in such a form into her mouth that she herself can hardly take her own accusation serious. Hermes has pointed out explicitly that the order came from Zeus and Zeus alone. Further, his remark that no other god can strive effectively against him (104: ἄλλον θέον without further specification of sex) suggests in no way that the other male gods are actively supporting this order. Kalypso must be aware of this and realize well enough that she has connected her accusation—to which there will be a point, in general [24]—to an incident that has not really led up to it. The

[24] Cf. Finley, *The World of Odysseus*, p. 153. Finley points out that goddesses were subject to contempt when they had sexual relationships with mortals, whereas male gods enjoyed freedom in that respect, and that Odysseus' story about his visit to the underworld, for instance, deals amply with women boasting to have mortal sons by gods.

poet's main purpose, here, seems to be the comical effect; and when Kalypso chooses the word σχέτλιος for her purpose of being disagreeable to Hermes in return, obviously its meaning in this passage, too, is by no means exclusively unkind and rebutting.

At I 630, σχέτλιος is used to characterize a third person, in his presence. Aias complains about Achilleus for his refusal to accept Agamemnon's overtures toward reconciliation. He calls Achilleus barbarous and σχέτλιος because the friendship his peers are offering him fails to influence him. This complaint is more serious than the one mentioned above.

Aias' speech consists of two parts. In the first, 624-36, he talks to Odysseus to discuss Achilleus; in the second, 636-42, he talks to Achilleus directly. In this latter part, he appears to be optimistic enough to make an attempt to stir Achilleus into action. This reveals that Aias' resentful words in the first part are not spoken in true despair, but are an indirect, rhetorical device used to challenge Achilleus to change his attitude. That he does not call him barbarous and σχέτλιος directly does not mean that he avoids swearing at Achilleus for reasons of courtesy or fear of reprisals, but rather that he hopes to impress Achilleus all the more. Although, formally, Odysseus is addressed, the person by whom his words are really intended to be heard is Achilleus himself. To some degree, Aias' frustration is staged ('let us go', 625) by calling him barbarous and σχέτλιος behind his back, formally, he hints to Achilleus what will be the public opinion about him if Aias' attempt fails—they will all call him barbarous and σχέτλιος. For the sake of emphasis —Aias takes the trouble of addressing Odysseus by a title that comprises an entire line—Odysseus is not merely used as a sounding-board, but also as a representative of the people, who will all react with agreement to the spreading of Achilleus' bad reputation. The procedure Aias uses is shrewd; the form in which he presents his attack turns out to be more and simultaneously less courteous than if he had yelled his 'σχέτλιος' directly in Achilleus' face. It is less courteous, on the one hand, because his indirect approach gives this relatively mild insult more emphasis than it has by its own nature. Further, by addressing Odysseus by a title taking up a whole line, he wants to make it clear that Achilleus is by no means the one spoken to, and he implies that there is a great difference in respectability between Odysseus and Achilleus. This device functions to display disdain non-verbally, leaving the in-

sulted one unable to prove it and unable to react as to a clear, direct and verbal insult. To some extent a similar thing happens in Z 342-63,[25] although here, in I 624-36, Aias does not seem to achieve his goal of offending. His diction is too fiery, and his emotionalism betrays that he does not really feel superior enough to Achilleus to discuss him in his presence and make a convincing performance out of his endeavor to use disdain as a tool of aggression. Even so, the attempt remains discourteous. Courtesy, on the other hand, is shown by the results of his policy: he has avoided swearing at Achilleus directly; whether or not Achilleus listens to words not directed to him is, formally, not under Aias' but Achilleus' own responsibility.

There are several speeches, both in the *Iliad* and in the *Odyssey*, in which the speaker addresses one person or group at first, then shifts to address someone else or others. In each of these speeches, there is an element of rhetoric consciously used for the purpose of convincing, veiled but present. Usually, the first one spoken to is addressed merely formally, and it is evident that the one(s) addressed later on in the speech has (have) been the intended audience from the beginning. υ 201 fits in this category; [26] likewise: H 361,[27] although here the rhetorical element assumes a different form. Paris uses his shift from addressing Antenor to addressing the Trojan assembly for a double purpose. He adds force to his declaration of Antenor's insanity; addressing the Trojan public means as much as trying to get the people involved and appealing to them to share his points of view, including the one about the state of Antenor's mental health. But, second, his public announcement that he will not yield Helen to the Greeks receives reinforcement right from this immediately preceding sharp tone against the individual singled-out beforehand. It can well be argued that Paris is even in need of such a rhetorical support for lack of considerable arguments, which by their nature would have given the most effectual reinforcement to his refusal.

In Leokritos' speech, especially at β 252,[28] this pattern is followed as well; but most of all Λ 816-21 seems to deserve attention in this context: Patroklos has a sudden and unexpected encounter

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[25] Discussed in Chapter I, section 1.
[26] See section 1b of this chapter.
[27] See section 1a of this chapter.
[28] See section 1a of this chapter.

with Eurypylos whom he finds wounded. In his perplexity and pity, he reacts by first addressing—for the duration of as many as three lines—the Greek leaders of whom no one is within hearing distance. Also of interest is T 270-75. In the first line of which Achilleus addresses Zeus. In the next two and a half lines, there is no unmistakable indication of any connection between his words and the one whom he addressed so explicitly in the first line. As a result, the poet did not even seem to feel the need of introducing the last lines with a remark indicating his shift of intended audience as is done everywhere else. That Achilleus addresses the Greeks and not Zeus in these last lines appears only from his discussing Zeus in the third person singular. From the very outset, the poet seems to refuse to play his own game, as appears from line 269, where he introduces the entire speech as directed to the Greeks.

This implies that—all formalities aside—Achilleus ought to consider himself abused at I 630. Thus, according to 'Adkins' law', a protest of Achilleus against, among other things, the use of the word σχέτλιος was to be expected. Instead, he even agrees—at least partially—with Aias: πάντα τί μοι κατὰ θυμὸν ἐείσαο μυθήσασθαι (I 645). However, after this general remark in approval of his adversary, he does set out to defend his own attitude. But even that is hardly evidence of shame in any form. Only the vision and purpose of Aias' words are important to Achilleus; the form in which Aias presents these are but a detail. The insult, Aias' accusation of knavishness and barbarism, has been no goal in itself but a means toward an end. It functions as an incitement. Achilleus appreciates this and does not allow himself to be distracted by individual words.

The same holds true for Ω 33. The gods intend to allow the Trojans to retrieve Hektor's corpse. Since three gods oppose this policy, they let Achilleus go on mutilating the body for eleven days. Finally, Apollo calls them names: σχέτλιοί ἐστε, θεοι, and accuses them of sympathizing with Achilleus who 'has no shame'. As in the case of Aias, the accused accept Apollo's words as conveying justice. This can safely be deduced from Zeus' reaction to Hera's protest, and even from Hera's protest itself when, in spite of her rage, she concedes: εἴη κεν καὶ τοῦτο τεὸν ἔπος, 'Αργυρότοξε (56). Yet not one of them is ashamed in any way.

As it appears, here even more clearly than in the other passages,

the expression σχέτλιος is mainly used when the speaker entertains a hope of being able to entice the one(s) thus labeled to demonstrate behavior favorable to his own, the speaker's purposes. At ι 351, Odysseus hopes that the Cyclops will accept the opiate drink. At δ 728, Penelope is in hopes of hearing about an explanation for her servants' act of apparent infidelity to her that will alleviate her fears for her son. Kalypso, at ε 118, wonders about the existence of a possibility to elude Zeus' order with or without Hermes' complicity. Aias, finally, at I 630, hopes that Achilleus will change his mind. In some of these passages, the hope is in vain, in others not. At any rate, under such circumstances, σχέτλιος is carried by optimism and could never have such abusing force as to spoil the other's disposition to the speaker. Also, one at least always uses a correct form of protesting against the one(s) one deems σχέτλιος inasmuch as one takes the trouble to describe with fair accuracy what the other does or has done to incur that labeling. In some instances consideration is shown by the use of an indirect approach, when formally a third person is addressed, rather than the one criticized—which, however, aggravates the abuse as a result.

Far more insulting are the expressions Priamos uses after Hektor's death when he speaks to his remaining sons, Ω 253-64. He calls them κατηφόνες, ἐλέγχεα, ψεῦσται,[29] and 'pillagers of lambs and kids', uttering the wish that they all had died instead of Hektor. Shortly before this, when some Trojans have come to pay a visit of condolence, he calls them ἐλεγχέες, as well. In their case at least he has the decency of preferring to use the personal form to the neuter; but even so, it is bad enough. Also, he chases the visitors away with a cane (247).

Despite the best intentions, the Trojans have been offending Priamos. His discourteous behavior surely is explained by Hektor's death and perhaps further by the Trojans' inadequacy at dealing with that news and handling that situation effectively in front of Hektor's father. To some extent, Priamos makes up for his offense by giving them his reasons, and by the arguments themselves

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[29] Luther, *Wahrheit und Lüge*, pp. 84-85, claims that basically the word ψευστής would exclusively refer to cocky exaggerations and that Priamos uses this approach here in 'bitter irony'. There is no necessary reason for that assumption; Priamos can be referring to anything from hypocrisy to gossip.

which he uses while chasing them away: quite probably each one of them has casualities in his own family to mourn for, and soon maybe they will have reasons to mourn for themselves. Although his way of treating them is disagreeable at face value, his arguments reveal his sympathy for and solidarity with them. Furthermore, his fear for the effect of Hektor's death on the immediate future of the Trojans is appropriate. His loss of equanimity and his failure at self-control are justifiable.

The outburst against his sons, however, is harder to extenuate. Straßburger comments: 'So schimpft ein alter Bauer auf seinem Hof herum'.[30] Priamos concludes the series of insults with the order to prepare a wagon for him. He has given this order already once before, at line 189, and apparently his sons have not yet finished, maybe not even started, that job. That provides an explanation for his lack of patience, maybe also for the sarcastic form in which he gives the order (οὐκ ἄν ... ἐφοπλίσσαιτε τάχιστα), but not for the concatenation of name-calling. Unlike the Trojan populace, his sons had not disturbed him by their presence; to the contrary, their absence was their offense—at first they were nowhere to be seen and had to be summoned. Yet Priam does not seem to interpret their absence as a sign of indifference; at least, his criticism does not reflect this. The general theme of his insults is the contemptible worthlessness of his sons. There is a point to his basic view: five of his sons do not receive further mentioning in the epic. This can be the poet's indication that their actions are never worth mentioning, although of course this need not be true. A sixth, Helenos, acts bravely in the fight with Deipuros and Menelaos (N 576-96),[31] but without apparent success (in matters other than the use of the word σχέτλιος, the 'law of Adkins' holds true). But at least as a predictor and as a counsellor to Hektor, he does useful and significant work (Z 75-102, H 44-56). Also the remaining three are entitled to some recognition. At N 767, Paris heartens his combatants. At various occasions, he hits an adversary (Λ 370, 583, N 663). That he does so with an arrow, from a distance, may not add to his image of a daring fighter, but it does prove his

[30] *Der Soziologische Aspekt*, p. 105.

[31] Van de Wijnpersse, *Menelaos. Odyssee 4 en Ilias passim*, Hermeneus 37 (1966), p. 276, states, 'So we find Menelaos pitted each time against an adversary of whose inferiority he is convinced'. (paraphr.) Van de Wijnpersse is, perhaps, convinced of Helenos' inferiority, but proof is lacking that Menelaos is convinced of it (Cf. Part B, n. 10).

efficacy at promoting the Trojan cause. Aside from a victory over the otherwise unknown Echios (O 339), Polites deserves well of his party as a messenger. Deiphobos gathers some credits as a fighter: he is brave enough to attack Idomeneus twice, although both times he hits someone else (Hypsenor, N 402-11, and Askalaphos, son of Ares and King of Orchomenos, N 516-20).

Although not one of them can touch Hektor's stature, the qualities they show do not allow Priamos to call them ἐλέγχεα and so forth. To protest vigorously and to force Priamos to apologize might have been the wrong attitude under the circumstances. But the poet must have had a reason why he did not let one of them at least give Priamos an answer using some mild, understanding form of protest, and announcing that he and his brothers would now start doing what he had told them to do. This would have shown self-respect, some degree of independence from their father's abuses in forming and maintaining their self-image, and some sense of the freedom needed to make their own decision to obey or disobey his orders. Short, it would have been more of an heroic reply. Instead, cowed by his anger—or fit of insanity, perhaps—ὑποδδείσαντες, they comply.

One can always wonder whether the poet alludes, here, to a feudal form of interaction as akin to Trojan society and as opposed to the Greek societies referred to in the epics. At any rate, at Z 333-41 Paris avoids an open dispute with Hektor, as well. He retaliates, if at all, only later and in an ambiguous form.[32] In 59-66, he protests only after a strikingly emphatic affirmation of Hektor's right to speak as he did. Priamos' unchecked treatment of the Trojans and especially of his sons, for which he is never made to apologize, seems to be rather indicative of his license as a person in charge than of his people's wisdom at declining to weigh his every word—in the manner of, for instance, Diomedes at Δ 413-14. Priamos' sons are ὑποδδείσαντες; had he yelled some more, they would have taken that, too. The only person who measures up to him while he is unreasonable, is Hekabe. Upon his behavior as an old 'hillbilly farmer' (Straßburger), it does not seem to cost her too much trouble to assume the role of an old farmer's wife. Sternly and curtly, she puts him back into order, giving him his job to do: τῆ, σπεῖσο ... καὶ εὔχεο. This τῆ alone sounds dis-

[32] Z 518-19, cf. Chapter I, section 3.

enchanting enough; the same conscious refusal to use elegant manners appears in the first line of Odysseus' address to the Cyclops.

The superlative form ἐλέγχιστε is used to address Odysseus at κ 72. After a useless round trip, Odysseus returns to his former host Aiolos and asks him once more for his help. Aiolos replies: 'Out of this island! Hurry! ἐλέγχιστε ζωοντων'. Odysseus has had no success; consequently, he is contemptible (Adkins!). He is even impudent for not hiding like one who is conscious of his contemptibility. From Aiolos' point of view Odysseus is similar to a beggar to whom he had given something, but who has returned with the news of having squandered the gift, and wants it replaced. To Aiolos, Odysseus is impudently annoying. Odysseus is deeply convinced that Aiolos' help is his vital need and, apparently, too naively trusting to stop and wonder about Aiolos' possible feelings regarding Odysseus' failure and the futility, in consequence, of his initial help. To his failure to use the bag of winds in the right manner, Odysseus adds a few diplomatic mistakes. At 68, he states his problem by accusing others: his companions are κακοί and his sleep σχέτλιος. While there is a point to his complaints, they will hardly impress Aiolos in a favorable way. Odysseus speaks like one who wishes to shy away from his responsibilities, shifting them upon others. Then he adds at once, without a proper transition—without any transition at all, as a matter of fact—his call for help (69), thus using credits which he does not have. It might have kept Aiolos in a disposition to help, if Odysseus had displayed enough of a strong individual's spirit deserving of backing, by omitting that line. He could, instead, have shown his readiness to attempt to solve his own problem himself without suggestions for the designated helper, by saying something like 'I shall have to appease the gods before I try again'. Also, Odysseus could have displayed some sensitivity to Aiolos' feelings after stating what had happened and before ever daring to ask for more. Of necessity, Aiolos reaction is negative; however, calling him names, even using a superlative form, remains insulting. Odysseus' approach has raised his horror and his fear of compromising himself by associating with him.

This is part of a tale that Odysseus himself tells the Phaiacians. He could easily have avoided talking about this episode, or have colored it to put himself in as favorable a light as possible. He

displays this double failure (he did not use the bag of winds properly and failed to elicit more help) in all details to his Phaiacian audience, after having gone through plenty of trouble to secure their appreciation and admiration. His position among the Phaiacians does no longer have its full outsider's precariousness. But to some extent, he does remain the lone stranger to them, enough so that a slip of the tongue can be expected to have the force of jeopardizing his hold on their goodwill and of putting the Phaiacians back into thinking of Odysseus in a judgmental way as they did before his spectacular throw at the sports contest. By nature, Odysseus' volunteering to tell about his failure at handling a failure, seems a failure, again. This time he fails to keep his mouth shut.

However, the poet apparently did not look upon this as a triple failure or, at least, was not concerned about the possible adverse effects in the sense of Adkins' 'law'. The point to be made was that Odysseus could relate how he has survived, safe and sound, in an enterprise at which divine help was of vital interest but was denied wilfully through what could be argued to be no basic fault of Odysseus himself. In the summary of Odysseus' adventures, ψ 310-41 (rejected by Aristarch, however), this episode is more cautiously presented as a blow of misfortune. The poet keeps it short: Aiolos has helped and has been friendly, but it was all in vain—no word about the circumstances that give the event an entirely different character in Book κ.

The rebuke of shamelessness is often made at personal quarrels and is, within that range, nothing special. Outside of it, it occurs at Θ 423, in the form of κύον ἀδδεές. Zeus resents Hera's and Athena's plan to help the Greeks. He dispatches Iris to them to announce a threat. In her speech to these two goddesses, Iris repeats—as she is supposed to—Zeus' exact words as literally as possible. As far as Hera is concerned, Iris behaves correctly by leaving it at just that. But for Athena she adds at the end her own judgment, 'You are αἰνοτάτη, κύον ἀδδεές, if you dare lift your spear against [Zeus]'.

That Iris steps outside of her role as a messenger and adds an idea of her own to the message, is a transgression in itself, regardless of anything else. But further, in doing so, she discriminates between Hera and Athena. In view of the difference between their respective positions in relation to Zeus, it may be perfectly understandable, but her mere act of discriminating according to power

and influence aggravates the impression of the speaker's own shamelessness and lack of fairness. But worst of all seems her unnecessary and unprovoked use of the term κύον ἀδδεές in addressing the goddess of wisdom to her face.

On no apparent occasion has Athena ever done anything to prejudice Iris against herself. Besides, Iris' status among the gods hardly seems to set her free to abuse a deity of high standing like Athena and get away with it. The matter is all the more remarkable when one takes into account that this is the only time when Iris ever abuses anyone. There is no allusion in either one of the epics that there would have been a personal strife between Iris and Athena. The only thing that separates them is politics: Athena sides with the Greeks, whereas Iris as a faithful follower of Zeus sympathizes with Achilleus and, consequently, favors the Trojans for the duration of his strike. Among other things, her assistance to Aphrodite after Diomedes has wounded her (E 353-54) is indicative of this, but also, and especially, her zeal in actions directly on behalf of Achilleus, at Ψ 198-211, for example. But no political bias can account fully for all of the emotionalism of this attack on Athena. In a comparable situation, when she has to convey a threat of Zeus to yet another helper of the Greeks, Poseidon, she treats him with her usual complaisance (O 174-204). She alludes to his being a member of the caste of ἐσθλοί and gives him a well-meant warning in a serious and deferent manner (203-04).

The difference in the attitudes she strikes toward Athena, Hera, and Poseidon, seems to be determined mainly by their different social positions in relation to Zeus: Zeus' daughter can be treated with less deference than Zeus' wife. To some extent it can be argued that Zeus himself gives Iris a license to insult Athena by commenting to her that he is used to Hera's disobedience; she is not acting out of character and thus provides him with a routine-case at worst, whereas his daughter's insubordination is a new and therefore quite upsetting matter (Θ 406-08). Poseidon must be treated with greater courtesy than Hera, in direct proportion to his greater independence from Zeus. Poseidon's point of view can be stated as follows: 'Zeus, Hades and I are lords of—respectively—the sky, the underworld, and the sea; the earth is common territory. As far as the earth is concerned, our rights are equal; so, when Zeus means to do any bullying, he may leave me alone and maybe choose one of his children, Athena for instance (see O 190-98). Iris' behavior

at Θ 423 is in due accordance with this rule. Aside from this, there is another point to what she says: since Zeus' daughter really is about to act consciously against Zeus' wishes, the rebuke of shamelessness is by no means farfetched.

Several passages discussed in the first chapter show that protests refer to the content of an insult, not to the lack of courtesy or fairness of the way in which it is presented. Any reaction of Athena to the content of Iris' words itself would have been as little convincing as it would have been sensible—especially directly to Iris who did not bear ultimate responsibility for the content of the message. As a result, however, the discourteous form, specifically the name-calling, goes unpunished. It is more remarkable that the gods' messenger can call Athena a bitch and get away with it,[33] than when someone in his agony over the loss of his champion son calls his other sons pillagers of lambs without raising indignation.

3

Slanging matches, jeers, in general: insulting remarks, among adversaries at war will hearten the speakers, may frighten their opponents, and occur as frequently as specific swear-words. They may be deemed to be less primitive than single swear-words but they are to no higher or lesser degree acceptable and generally accepted as the verbal part of the aggression in battle. They can hardly provide a base for an evaluation of individuals' manners. Only one passage of that type, E 349 together with the surrounding lines, has a place in this chapter. It stands out of the ordinary since it concerns a generally kind-hearted man who insults a goddess.

Diomedes has wounded Aphrodite in the battle. He shouts, 'Give up war ... goddess, or is it not enough to deceive defenceless women? If you mean to frequent the battle-field, I'll bet, you will end up dreading the battle'.[34] For Homeric humans it is quite customary—even indicative of special respect for divine beings—to treat the gods without much personal consideration. At P 333-34, to name an example, Aineias comes to realize that the one who just incited him is Apollo. The poet stresses the fact that it is Apollo, of all gods. Thereupon, the poet makes Aineias shout at the Trojans:

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[33] Also when Iris calls Athena αἰνοτάτη, her intention is to swear at her; cf. Wendel, *Gesprächsanrede*, p. 33.

[34] Translation div. from Lattimore; cf. Leaf *ad loc.*

'Here ... is one of the gods who tells me Zeus ... is our defender'. Surely for any human involved in the scene, the fact that Apollo is a god is more impressive than that Apollo is Apollo. For Apollo himself, it always seems nice to be appreciated as an innate member of an honored category in the first place, and only if Apollo were to be understood as plagued by unhealthy vanity could one imagine that Apollo should think, 'For what Aineias and those other humans whom I am helping care, I could also have been Hephaistos!' Likewise, partial lack of interest in the identity and, thus, the personality of individual gods appears at δ 376. Menelaos addresses Eidothea, daughter of Proteus, with the remark, 'Whoever of the goddesses you may be ..., you tell me, for the gods know everything, which one of the immortals hampers me here ... and tell me how to make my way home (376-81). The interest does exist. Menelaos makes ample reference to her identity in 364-66, at the beginning of his story about her. But he holds back on showing this to Eidothea herself. By using the phrases 'of the goddesses' and 'for the gods know everything', he submits to her his appreciation of her as a divine being and he compliments her on her omniscience. Yet the initial clause 'Whoever you may be' contains an element of ambiguity. It can be a code to convey frustration at not knowing how to address her; it can also express that, although she has a right to expect him to stop and wonder, he does not really care which goddess she is as long as she is omniscient, not because that gives him something to admire about her but merely because that renders her an excellent source of information; and some of both may well be true.

A phrase like this ('Whoever you may be') is, in the epics, never used when humans meet for the first time and one of them needs the other stranger's help. In such cases, the approach is much more careful and well-mannered. Further, a human says this to a god only when he is in what seems to him to be an emergency situation. With 'Whichever one of the goddesses you are, help me', Menelaos expresses unlimited faith in the gods, including Eidothea.[35] He is honest, as well; he points out to her that her exact identity makes

[35] A paragraph in Van de Wijnpersse's article *Menelaos* (Hermeneus 37, p. 274) starts with the premising clause 'Since Menelaos fails to have even the slightest confidence in the gods...' (paraphr.) Van de Wijnpersse does not present his arguments in support of this opinion. δ 376-81 is one of the passages that indicate his faith; the other passages will be quoted in Part B, section 3.

no difference to him as long as she is a goddess and, consequently, can help. The possible offense lies in the fact that he points out explicitly that her identity makes no difference to him and, in all due faith, does not expect her to resent him for not caring who she is. But then, at a total lack of interest, he would have omitted that phrase altogether.

Whether this possible offense becomes an established one depends, as it seems, entirely on the context. If a person should say: 'I don't care which goddess you are, just get out of my way!', the rudeness of the second clause would influence the first. The first clause would obtain an abusing function even though it does not necessarily derive that force from within itself. When one says, 'No matter which goddess you are, just help me!', one indicates that one's trouble is so severe that help is a matter of greater urgency, even, than the question about proper address. His indication of his ignorance implies that under normal circumstances he would view her identity as a basic subject for consideration at their first encounter. 'Whoever you are' can be a sign of modesty on the part of a human, underlying the wish not to be caught discriminating between one god and the other; but to some extent it conveys some carelessness, too. Mainly, it lies in the brevity of the remark 'no matter who you are', the speed and ease with which one does away with the subject that is supposed to be in the first place on one's mind at a first encounter with a divine being. Instead of 'no matter who', Menelaos could have expressed the more complex notion 'Too bad I do not know who'. Eidothea has addressed him as ξεῖνε without avoiding its vagueness in regard to Menelaos' identity; there should be no problem for him at addressing her, in turn, with a title such as ἄνασσα, if he intended to forestall any hesitation to help him, to coax her into acting in his favor. Had he been dealing with a potential human helper, he would probably have adopted a more careful policy, as happens in P 248. That he does not, implies that his faith in gods and their generosity and helpfulness is greater than in humans. Lastly, in the particular case of Eidothea, 'whoever you may be of the goddesses' can even imply the suggestion: 'From what I see, it is possible that you are as high ranking a goddess as Hera or Athena', which would not offend Eidothea.

Whether it indicates lack of due individual consideration or, on the contrary, avoidance of undue discriminatory approach, the

fact remains that, in their direct dealings with gods, Homeric humans tend to hold back on remarks that would show respect for their individual qualities. Upon interrogating a human, Eidothea's father Proteus receives the answer, 'You know, old man. Why try to put me off?' (δ 465) Again the speaker is Menelaos. Although he bases this remark on his faith in the god's omniscience, it shows less respect for this god than irritation at the old man's questions.

On various occasions, humans rebuke gods; for instance, at N 631-33 Zeus is, in the speaker's opinion, responsible for the war. At ζ 324 Athena is accused of never having answered Odysseus' prayers. Clearly, in some situations, abusing a god is no more than a rhetorical artifice, for instance Γ 365, 'Father Zeus, ... none is more cruel ... than you are! ... My spear slipped ...' But abuse of a god with intended malevolence occurs only at E 249, when Diomedes raises his voice against Aphrodite.

He is not the only one to treat a god without much deferential ado. Also, he acts in accordance with the generally accepted custom in battle of adding insult to injury, e.g., shouting abusive comments after a retreating adversary. Since in this particular case the adversary is divine, the act of insulting requires more than the usual callousness, but Diomedes has reasons to rely on Athena's backing. At E 131-32 Athena has as good as set him on Aphrodite's tracks; it is naturally implied that Diomedes stands under her protection throughout this scene. Surely Aphrodite behaves out of character by engaging in the battle; her conduct provokes the abusive treatment. Nonetheless, Diomedes remains responsible for using this callous approach.

To some degree at least, the content of his words reflects reality: first, his opposition to her presence in a place where she does not belong is sound enough, although Aphrodite could always have told him to mind his own, human, business and confidently leave decisions regarding her place and tasks on this globe to her. Second, he accuses her of manipulating defenseless women. This attack is subjective and exaggerated; yet it would be impossible to clear her reputation completely of any blame in this respect. Within the restrictions of the poet's and his society's bias, the allegiation holds true.

Thus, the insult does not consist as much in the things he says, as rather in the methods he uses: the threat implied in the use of the future tense ῥιγήσειν (E 351), the uninvited judgment in the

rhetorical question ἦ οὐχ ἅλις (349), and the imperative εἶκε (348) turning his description of what she was doing into a suggestion unasked-for. Aphrodite and her champion Apollo, however, withdraw without protesting the ridicule; Diomedes is allowed to have the last word.

The tendency to accept verbal aggression without rebuke when any protest against the content would be a matter of injustice, becomes all the more remarkable when these contents, no matter how truthful, are nevertheless far-fetched. Aphrodite's alleged habit of misleading defenceless women hardly seems to have anything to do with the interaction between her and Diomedes in the situation as it is described. This becomes even more apparent at Ω 262, where Priamos calls his sons pillagers of lambs and kids because they have not prepared his wagon promptly enough to suit him. This rebuke upon catching them at the act of pillaging would not have rendered his manner of calling them names any more courteous, but at least the contents would have been to the point.

In both cases, the speakers are understood to be using a code to express their rejection of the ones whom they address. The liveliness of the codes increases the force of the insults. That Priamos' sons do not stand up for themselves is understandable. Quite apart from the question whether they really have the contemptible habit of stealing small livestock, and apart from considerations as to what is socially acceptable in the Trojan society, Priamos' yelling comes to his sons as a shock; they are scared out of their wits, and the idea of antagonizing Priamos while he is beside himself would look suicidal if it occurred to them at all. But it is hard to imagine that Diomedes' abuse would frighten Aphrodite or Apollo from calling him to order. This passage reveals that the insulted party will refrain from protest even when the aggressor's bad manners extend themselves to the contents of his statement—as long as these contents cannot well be denied.

In general, the nature of the reactions to insults in the epics leads to the impression that the poet regarded the matter of bad manners and lack of due courtesy as too trivial to be worth dwelling upon—this in clear contrast to lack of correctness of a statement's substance. In two of the passages considered in this chapter the abuse is rejected, but only inasmuch as Hermes at ε 146-48 rejects Kalypso's protest as a whole—and only by sticking stolidly to what he had said before—, and further, inasmuch as Eurykleia at

δ 743-48 justifies her policy upon Penelope's rebuke. The only pure exception could have been Paris, who at Γ 60-66 objects against the manner in which he is treated while accepting the substance of his opponent's statement as true. But the very truthfulness of Hektor's statement defies its classification as an insult.

The very few passages where the insulted ones prompt the offenders to apologize—mainly discussed in Chapter one, section 1—are indeed exceptions. In general, insults find acceptance both by the ones immediately affected and by witnesses whenever these are present. Often, the poet merely indicates this acceptance by having the victim of the treatment silently follow an order given in connection with the insult (for instance, β 257-58, κ 77). But just as often, the victim confirms his acceptance verbally, At Θ 427-31, for instance, Athena tells Hera that she drops the plan for which she has incurred Iris' abuse. At Ξ 104-08, Agamemnon promises Odysseus to avoid doing anything undesirable, after the latter has called him everything under the sun. At I 650-55, as C. M. Bowra pointed out, 'after some sturdy words from Aias, [Achilleus] takes another step forward and says that he will think of fighting when Hektor breaks through to the ships ... Achilles has in fact made a considerable concession'.[36] In all of these instances the lack of courtesy shown is accepted along with the contents of the aggressor's speech.[37] Whenever anything is deemed worth the attention that is raised by rejection, it is part of the argument's content. At Ω 56-63 Hera accepts Apollo's rebuke, although she disputes his comparison of Hektor, a mere human, to the demigod Achilleus.

At H 385-97 the Trojan messenger Idaios repeats to the Greeks the words Paris has spoken at the Trojan assembly. If Idaios had obeyed the order to do so to the letter, he would also have repeated Paris' insult of Antenor. He omits it with the natural ease with which one forgets a triviality. There is no indication that Idaios has enough freedom to act upon his own judgment—which would enable him to disobey in part Priamos' order for the sake of discretion.

Although insults occur frequently in the epics, they are hardly

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[36] *Homer*, New York 1972, p. 102.

[37] Agamemnon uses the expression ἐνιπῇ ἀργαλέῃ (Ξ 104-05) to evaluate Odysseus' demeanor, not to reject it. A true exception is Γ 59-66, as we have seen, where Paris acknowledges the justice of Hektor's words but immediately proceeds to criticize and condemn his manner.

allotted any value of their own. Their main function is to enliven and to emphasize. The matter thus accentuated can be dealt with in the lines that follow, but never the insulting manner that gave it its emphasis. The number of passages related in this chapter do not constitute more than a small percentage of the instances where the epic heroes treat one another in offensive, ill-mannered ways. However small, this selection may nonetheless provide an adequate base for the scepticism which generalizing remarks advertizing 'the correct demeanor of the Homeric heroes' deserve.

CHAPTER THREE

COURTESY

A friendly gesture is usually based on the goodwill of the person who makes it, and often on a friendly relationship between the people involved. Such gestures need not indicate any particular courtesy. In this chapter I shall consider only passages in which an act of benevolence occurs as a special courtesy or in a situation where one would not expect it. These passages will be presented in three groups:

1) Situations laden with antagonism, in which an isolated friendly word is used.
2) Flattery.
3) Cases of special tact as when an act of benevolence—praise or help, for example—is veiled by casualness or even rudeness.

I

In Λ 138-42 Agamemnon answers two captured heroes who have begged for their lives: 'Ah, you are δαίφρονος Antímakhos' sons? On Troy's assembly ground when Meneláos went there with Odysseus to make our argument, Antímakhos held out for killing both men then and there and no safe conduct back to the Akhaians. That is the infamy you'll pay for now'. Then he kills them, without giving them a chance to reply.

The expression δαΐφρων need not be dismissed as an epithet used thoughtlessly. At line 123 the poet has already introduced Antimachos as δαΐφρων—sensible, prudent—explaining that he took bribes to support Paris in his desire to keep Helen.[1] Antimachos' proposal to murder Menelaos had been part of the policy he had adopted as a consequence of accepting Paris' gifts.

The post-Socratic reader finds it remarkable that one can be called 'prudent' for taking bribes, and that Agamemnon calls Antimachos 'sensible' while adding that the demeanor revealing

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[1] For the meaning 'breaker of horses', 'expert at horsemanship', see Plamböck, *Erfassen, Gegenwärtigen, Innesein*, pp. 78-80. However, A. Amory Parry, *Blameless Aegisthus* (Leiden 1973), pp. 25-26 and 201-05, contends that δαΐφρων always means 'valiant'.

this 'sensibility' is an infamy (ἀεικὴς λώβη). One could easily assume that his compliment is given sarcastically, but in no other place in the epic, to my knowledge, does Agamemnon use sarcasm, and nowhere else is the word δαΐφρων used ambiguously.

The epithet occurs quite frequently. It is used to characterize the king of the Phaiacians, Diomedes and his father, Achilleus, Odysseus, and once, as a special homage, a woman—the wife of Laertes. In other words, it is applied to people who excel in courage, intelligence, or both. Wherever this word is used no slightest hint of irony can be noted. At 123-25, where the word is used in connection with a covetous political attitude, the poet's evaluation is as sincere as the appreciation he puts into Agamemnon's mouth a few lines later.

The epics contain many instances of gift-offerings intended to induce the receiver to act in the interest of the giver. Although such offerings are rarely accepted, their frequent occurrence suggests that acts of disguised self-interest were commonplace in the Homeric world and were not looked upon as evidence of corruption. Occasionally self-interest is even explicitly praised. In general, egoism expressed in tricks, fraud, or venality does not seem to conflict with Homeric man's honor. Although Luther has shown, on the basis of ξ 363-71[2] and ψ 576,[3] that fraud is considered a contemptible act, he does not fail to mention O 14, where Zeus, awaking from his nap on Mount Ida, reacts indignantly to Hera's ruse, not because he considers her fraud to be unworthy but because he is irritated by his failure to discover it in time.[4] We find passages such as E 426, where Zeus' reaction to a lie told by Athena is friendly and appreciative although he has known the truth all along, and Z 234, where the poet shows approval when Diomedes takes advantage of his guest-friend when they exchange weapons. Such passages make it all the harder to discern any irony in the use of the word δαΐφρων at Λ 123 to characterize a corrupt politician. Nor does the context yield a basis for such an assumption.

The poet maintains a marked distinction between ignominy and good sense in Antimachos' policy. Only ignominy is punished, by the subsequent killing of his two sons. Agamemnon generously acknowledges Antimachos' good sense, evaluating it positively. His

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[2] *Wahrheit und Lüge*, p. 87.

[3] P. 83.

[4] P. 116.

explicit appreciation is a special courtesy, since he has personal ties to Antimachos' intended victims. The contrast of this courtesy with the hostility of his utterance as a whole, which the poet describes as ἀμείλικτον (137), is striking, and we cannot wonder that Fitzgerald omits an account of the epithet δαΐφρων in his translation. After all, it is hardly ἀμείλικτον to compliment people on their father's good sense. Naturally, when an entire speech is characterized by only one word—here by ἀμείλικτον—some details may be left unaccounted for, but this is not an unimportant detail. Antimachos is called δαΐφρων twice within a few lines, each time with a reference to what he has done to deserve the epithet.

Many passages in both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* bear this trait: an isolated friendly remark offsets a situation laden with antagonism. At E 277, for example, Pandaros introduces a threat to Diomedes with a distinctly courteous phrase—καρτερόθυμε δαΐφρον ἀγαυοῦ Τυδέος υἱέ. After these compliments, he goes on to say that he is sorry not to have killed Diomedes with his arrow, and will try now to hit him with his lance. The complimentary phrase, amounting to as much as a third of a speech that in essence is a severe threat, is used with good reason. First, this is a passage in the ἀριστεία of Diomedes; quite obviously, the poet intends us to hear Diomedes praised by a powerful and prominent adversary. Second, the praise fits very well with what has happened so far; at E 95-97, Pandaros has watched Diomedes dash over the plain and create severe disturbance among the ranks facing him. Pandaros has shot him with an arrow, but Diomedes' wound is treated quickly (109-12), and he rejoins the battle almost immediately with heightened intensity (134-43). He has deserved the compliment, and Pandaros' admiration is sincere. Yet Diomedes is his enemy; his everlasting energy can, accordingly, not be agreeable to him. Pandaros' threat to kill him reveals that his compliments are not spontaneous. He intends to bestow as much honor as possible on his adversary before killing him, and he does so with some degree of solemnity. He realizes that the greater the honor that is attached to Diomedes, the greater will be his own honor in killing him. He is also aware that he faces a hero greater than himself. To kill him would require all of his force—more, as it turns out, than he has.

His spear hits the mark, and Pandaros uses only a few words to express his expectation that this time Diomedes will not survive

(280-85). Pandaros' avoidance of the boasts and contemptuous remarks usually made to a stricken enemy, especially by one who is not a Greek, is a form of special courtesy, though it may be prompted by his trouble at believing his good fortune in felling Diomedes. In not letting Pandaros boast too much after his fancied victory, the poet saves him from appearing ridiculous. At the same time, Pandaros' self-control points to the integrity of his character —a necessary condition if his words to his adversary are to have their full force as a form of courtesy.

Diomedes reacts to Pandaros' courtesy in kind. After informing him briefly that he has made 'a miss, no hit', with no sarcastic comment, he alludes to the valor of Pandaros (and Aineias): 'I doubt you two will quit, though, being what you are, till one of you is down'. His threat to kill one of them is nearly covered by the personal compliment he pays them. That he means to pay for Pandaros' courtesy with courtesy of his own appears all the more clearly when his way of speaking here is compared with the manner in which he treats Paris in an analogous situation. At Λ 380-83 Paris expresses his satisfaction at having hit Diomedes and his hope that the wound is mortal. There is no slightest courtesy in his words. On the contrary, they convey vengeful hostility, and Diomedes' reaction is, in consequence, quite different from the one we see at E 287-89. It consists of a series of abusing and sarcastic terms extending over eleven lines and culminating in a cynical threat (385-95). The two confront Diomedes with similar situations; the only difference lies in their attitudes. It is this difference in attitude that accounts for the difference in Diomedes' reaction.

At Λ 430 we see similar forces at work. Sokos says to Odysseus, who has just wounded Sokos' brother, 'Odysseus, great in all men's eyes, unwearied master of guile and toil, today the sons of Hippasos will be your claim to glory: either you kill and strip such men as these or die, hit by my spear'. Again the praise preceding the threat is striking, the more so because this is the immediate reaction to the severe (though not mortal; see 432) wounding of his brother, and because he directs it at the one who inflicted the injury. The relative elegance of the ensuing threat is consonant with the praise. It is not a simple threat to kill, nor is it a simple declaration of war: with more elaborateness than the threat itself contains, he dwells on the possibility that Odysseus may kill him,

instead. As a first reaction to the wounding of his brother, one might reasonably expect a threat accompanied by a curse, or at least a rude warning, not this exquisite courtesy.

After Sokos attacks Odysseus—with no harm of any consequence done—Odysseus' reply (441-55) is interrupted by his deadly assault on Sokos (446-49). Odysseus' words before his counterattack contain a threat that can be described as sharp, even violent. They contain no hint that Odysseus is even aware of Sokos' courtesy. But when Odysseus resumes his speech after his successful thrust, his tone is quite altered. First, Sokos, wounded but still alive (see 458), is addressed in a perfectly correct manner, with honor paid to his father. Odysseus expresses his awareness that he confronts the son of a man who was δαΐφρων, who was able to bring wild horses under the yoke.[5] Then, emphatically, he proclaims that death has reached Sokos, and after exclaiming ἆ δείλε, he professes to deplore the idea that his eyes, rather than being closed by his father and πότνια mother, will be torn out by birds of prey whereas an honorable funeral awaits Odysseus himself.

Odysseus expresses his sense of superiority in a mixture of homage and ridicule. At the beginning of his speech, when Sokos still confronts him in full force, Odysseus does not trouble to compliment his parents. Now that the enemy is slain, the courtesy is more ridiculing than sincere.

Sokos' speech and that of Odysseus after he has wounded Sokos show some structural parallels. In each case the vocative expression comprises a full line. The approving and honoring vocatives Sokos has chosen contrast sharply with the relation in which he stands with Odysseus, because Odysseus has just put his brother out of action. Likewise, Odysseus' courteous vocative expression clashes with the new relationship between him and his subdued enemy. Sokos' vocatives are followed by the thought of a good fate for his adversary; Odysseus follows his with the thought of a bad fate for Sokos. At the end of both speeches, the thought of a propitious fate for the speaker himself takes up a whole line. The difference is that this is the ultimate point that Sokos intends to make with his entire speech, whereas the last line in Odysseus' speech is only its formal shadow: Odysseus does not yet consider in earnest the circumstances of his future death.

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[5] See Plamböck, pp. 78-80.

The dependence of this part of Odysseus' answer upon Sokos' speech permits us to assume that Odysseus' words are intended to be a mocking echo of Sokos' and that Odysseus' very courteous vocative expression is intended to mirror derisively the courtesy of Sokos' first words to his enemy. The poet, then, supplied Odysseus with a sensitive ear for such formalities.

This dependence of one vocative expression upon another appears as well at A 131. Agamemnon has announced his willingness to yield Chryseis to her father on condition that he obtain another slave girl as a substitute. Achilleus—there is no thought of a feud as yet—declares that for the time being that condition cannot be met, and he tries to satisfy Agamemnon with a promise for the future (A 122-29). At the beginning of this speech he uses the title Ἀτρείδη κύδιστε. In two-thirds of the instances where κύδιστος is used as an epithet, the one thus characterized is Agamemnon; once it is Athena; in the remainder, Zeus. It is a title of honor expressing great respect. Agamemnon's reaction is on the whole crabbed (131-47), but he does take care to return Achilleus' courtesy by using the equally complimentary vocatives θεοείκελ' Ἀχιλλεῦ (131). Afterward, though, he talks himself into a mounting rage, and by the end of his speech he addresses Achilleus with πάντων ἐκπαγλότατ' ἀνδρῶν (146). From here on, no courteous titles are used between them; their dissension has now been established.

The omission of the ornamental epithet during their dispute and, in clearly marked contrast, its use and the reply to it as long as the situation is only ominous but the enmity is not yet established, indicate that the epithet at A 131 is a product of premeditated courtesy.

At K 480-81, finally, the speaker perceives the injustice of his lack of friendliness and corrects himself. During their nocturnal stroll, Odysseus and Diomedes enter the vicinity of King Rhesos, whose horses they intend to steal (see K 435-41, where Dolon suggests they do so). Odysseus says, 'Come put your back in it, your heart: why stand there in arms for nothing? Go untie the horses'. Then he corrects himself: 'Or [the extended ἠέ is used] let me do it, while you [σύ γε] kill the men'.

It is not the abrupt way of speaking that makes the unpleasant initial impression. Whenever brisk action is more useful than elegant discourse, the words used to rouse it may be expected to lack subtlety. That Odysseus' rank does not entitle him to order Dio-

medes about is of no moment: this is one of those situations in which someone has to assume leadership. But two things are disturbing here. First, Odysseus blames Diomedes unjustly for passivity and insinuates that Diomedes' weapons are used only for show. Second, there is cynicism in Odysseus' suggestion that Diomedes needs to use his weapons and to put his back and heart into nothing more dangerous than untying horses.

So far in this enterprise, Odysseus has been no more active than Diomedes. It was Diomedes, not Odysseus, that killed Dolon a moment ago. If anyone is to be chided for inactivity, it is Odysseus. But Odysseus' remark does not necessarily have the force of an insult for either of them. Both are aware that Diomedes has not been 'standing there in arms for nothing'; they are on friendly terms; and to some extent, Diomedes really has been showing off (at 372-76). The remark remains a mere *hortatio*. But the command to untie the horses was a bit too abrupt and needed correction. It is quite natural that the job directly connected with the horses should be the first to cross Odysseus' mind. After all, they have come to steal them. The word that introduces his correction, ἠέ, may serve as an indication that the speaker is doing some thinking.[6] The thinking that has been lacking so far is that prudence and dexterity are more useful in stealing horses than weapons and fiery aggression, and that Odysseus has been presumptuous. After all, when one usurps the leadership and starts dispensing jobs, one might as well offer the other the more dramatic function of killing the guards. Odysseus makes up for his lapse by offering Diomedes the more spectacular role that better suits a warrior and is of more immediate importance.

With no vindictiveness, Diomedes follows Odysseus' second suggestion with the bearing of a lion (485), while Odysseus himself performs the more subservient task (488-90). In his correction, Odysseus' commanding tone is at best only slightly softened to an assertive one (to be seen in the firmness in the fut. ind., μελήσουσι). but at least the addition of γε to the pronoun σύ (481) indicates the respect he failed to show before (cf., e.g., σε without γε in οὐδέ τί σε χρὴ, 479). Even though his words assume the character of a counterorder, the ἠέ that introduces the correction permits

[6] See for example A 144-46; in the naming of candidates for a chore, the word ἤ is used to connect the names, but at naming the one who is addressed, ἠε is used, which may suggest increased caution on the part of the speaker.

Diomedes to make a choice, free of any obligation to leave the more heroic role to the one who offered it. By using the word ἠέ Odysseus rids his suggestion of an unfittingly authoritarian tone and makes it merely authoritative.

2

In this section I shall discuss some diplomatic utterances that may be categorized as flattery, as long as that word is understood to have no pejorative connotation.

First Ω 770; in the mourning rites for Hektor, Andromache, Hekabe, and Helen come forward to speak. Andromache's mourning speech has two main themes: her child's fate and Hektor's valor. Since Hektor has killed so many enemies, she expects that the Greeks will seek revenge at the cost of her child (725-45). Hekabe's speech dwells on the circumstances of the death of Hektor and of those of her sons whom Achilleus has killed (748-59). Helen's comments on Hektor's death bear on her situation, as Andromache's and Hekabe's bear on theirs. Helen's is the only one of the three that deals with Hektor's character. She has retained more distance between herself and Hektor than the other two. She is the only person in Troy who can be expected to be more or less objective in regard to Hektor. She gives the most controlled and most convincing account of his friendliness and gentility. She names Hektor as her constant defendant against Paris' relatives; now 'in all wide Troy no one is left who will befriend me' (774-75). She ticks off her complaints against her husband's relatives one by one. She makes an exception for Priamos, however, although her contention that Priamos is 'as mild as my own father' (770) is subdued stylistically by its position within a parenthetical clause.

Helen's mourning speech is to some extent rhetorical. Hekabe's speech appears unpremeditated, as though in her grief she utters whatever occurs to her, with no thought for the effect of her words. Helen's speech, in contrast, consists entirely of well-considered elements. Her flattery of Priamos has been built into the speech in such a way as to be discreet enough, yet very effective. It causes Priamos to consider taking Hektor's place as her protector and defender. The designing element is discernible in her friendly attitude to Hektor in Book Z as well.[7] This sudden compliment

[7] See 'Apologies', pp. 30-32.

to Priamos is no integral part of a mourning speech for Hektor, but it does link this last appearance of Helen in the *Iliad* to her first in Book Γ, where Priamos is surrounded by elderly Trojans who do not join him in greeting Helen as she approaches them. They appreciate her beauty but they do not respect her. They feel that she ought to leave Troy (Γ 159). Priamos alone has a friendly conversation with her, and announces at the outset that he is convinced of her innocence (164). In her reply she addresses him as 'father-in-law', a title she uses again in Book Ω when she discusses him in the third person. In the same reply she emphasizes her respect for him and her high regard for his power. This passage in Γ anticipates the sudden compliment to Priam in her mourning speech. Her compliment therefore does not seem to be a spontaneous sign of her friendly feelings for him at the moment; this is no artless display of affection.

That Helen knows what she is doing seems confirmed by the reactions of the bystanders. When Andromache finishes speaking, only the wailing of the women is heard in response. The reactions to Hekabe's speech are stronger: she has provoked an ἀλίαστον γόον. But Helen's success is overpowering. She sends the entire crowd into a weeping fit: ἐπὶ δ' ἔστενε δῆμος ἀπείρων (776).

The verb στένω does not appear often in the epic. But forms of the same root, lenghtened by the suffix -αχ-, are frequently used to describe lamenting and wailing. After Andromache's speech, for example, the women στενάχοντο. The short στένω is used in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* eight times altogether. It is a strong expression, stronger than στενάχω, στενάχομαι, or στεναχίζω. At Ψ 230 the sea ἔστενεν when winds have piled it into gigantic waves. At Π 163 the stomach of a wolf περιστένεται, when the wolf drinks at a well after devouring a deer. In both cases, the verb describes a situation rather than an action, the situation of being subjected to tremendous pressure. At Ψ 230, the seawater is forced to find its escape by rising to sky-high waves. At Π 163 the stomach can hardly span its contents. At Σ 33 the κῆρ of Achilleus is mentioned, a part of his body that (or as to which he) ἔστενε so forcefully that it is feared he may slit his throat in an attempt to get more air. Here, too, great pressure is evident. Other passages, K 16 and φ 247, allow similar conclusions. It appears that the verb στένω refers less to the activity of wailing and the sound produced by wailing than to a situation. A person who στένει has been so overwhelmed by grief that he

experiences his grief as a physical pressure in the area of his κῆρ or ἦτορ. His condition is commonly revealed by his bent position, suggesting the image of the sea at Ψ 230, sometimes accompanied by moaning but never by loud wailing.

Clearly the poet intends the mourning scene in Book Ω to be a climax. The crowd's reactions mount in intensity. At first the verb στενάχομαι is used, then the expression γόος ἀλίαστος, leading up to the final στένω. The crowd responds to Andromache's and Hekabe's speeches with predictable lamentations. When Helen accuses the Trojans of unfriendliness, the crowd, surprisingly, does not abandon its attitude of sympathy but reacts with the deepest possible grief, the kind that brings about the tremendous physical pressure indicated by στένω. The people have been thoroughly moved by the first two speeches; they apparently distill from Helen's speech whatever serves to shake their emotions still further and overlook her accusations. They add Helen's isolation, intensified by Hektor's death, to their own reasons for grief. The result is strange: the Trojans participate in the grief of the one who initially helped to bring about their misery, and they share Helen's sadness although they themselves have been partially responsible for it by withholding their friendship. It appears that the force of this inner conflict is too great to cope with under the circumstances, and so the tumult of the loud στενάχεσθαι and the even louder γόος ἀλίαστος subsides—though perhaps not entirely; one can always assume that at least some moaning can still be heard, as the crowd is caught in the constricting pressure indicated by στένειν.

This meaning of the verb στένω contradicts its etymological connection with Latin *tonare* and Sanskrit *stánati*: 'he thunders'. At this climax of grief introduced by expressions that describe not only grief but also the sounds that accompany it, one might reasonably expect a description of sound to mark the highest and last step in the escalation as well—the loudest natural sound, thunder. Yet thunder is not what we find. When Helen declares at δ 261, for example, ἄτην δὲ μετέστενον, she does not mean to say that she used to thunder in lamentation as she contemplated the ruin brought about by her infatuation. She might well have been heard to moan under the burden of her responsibility, but even this sound is not suggested by the verb as it is used in the epics.

By Ω 776 the crowd's grief has reached its peak. Priamos, whom

Helen has flattered, speaks: 'Trojans, bring firewood to the edge of town'. His words are no more than a short, practical command. This businesslike summons to action breaks the spell that the mourning has cast on the Trojans, and probably on the poet's audience as well. Priamos does not respond directly to Helen's compliment, but he does so indirectly by breaking the tension that Helen's speech has brought to its highest point. Insofar as he does not react formally to her words, his reaction is negative. Nor does he offer any overt comfort or reassurance to her or to any of the other speakers. But we need not conclude that he rejects Helen's speech or her conciliatory words to him. Her mourning speech has an unexpected effect on her listeners—a remarkable effect in view of the general lack of friendliness in her words and the low esteem in which she is held by the Trojans. It does look as though her complimentary words to Priamos have been altogether rejected, unless Priam's conduct can be understood to stand in contrast to his real feelings.

If in fact Priamos is hiding his feelings, he can have only one reason for doing so: to keep them under control. His curtness can then be seen as an act, a means of covering his emotion at the risk of appearing to judge Helen's speech to be no more and no less interesting than those of his wife and his daughter-in-law—of considering all three speeches to be no more than the silly babbling of women. Two circumstances speak in favor of this possibility. First, however abrupt his command may be (778-81), he does take the trouble to volunteer the information that the Trojans need not fear the Greeks while collecting wood. Priamos is thus portrayed as sensitive enough to understand the unspoken feelings of others and to assuage their worries. Surely, then, he also has the imaginative power to understand Helen's words in all their nuances. Second, Helen has addressed more words to him, however indirectly, than to anyone else. When immediately afterward he himself speaks, he appears to consider that her words were in fact directed to him.

Of course, this is only a hypothesis. If we do not reject it, we must still deal with the fact that Priamos changes the subject without the least allusion to Helen's flattery. Nowhere else does the poet, with no warning to his audience, have someone speak or act in a way that contradicts the thoughts that must be going through his mind. But after all, someone has to introduce the next

item on the agenda after the mourning has reached its climax; someone must end it. The order to collect wood could, under the circumstances, come only from Priamos. His conclusion of the very emotional and dramatic mourning scene may be called brusque, but his bluntness is no surprise when one thinks of his dealing with the Trojans at 247.

At I 197-98 Achilleus welcomes the envoys Aias and Odysseus with the words: χαίρετον· ἦ φίλοι ἄνδρες ἱκάνετον, ἦ τι μάλα χρέω, οἵ μοι σκυζομένῳ περ 'Αχαιῶν φιλτάτω ἐστόν. Ameis and Hentze state: 'Achills Begrüßung der Gesandten ist in der raschen Folge der kurzen Sätze, der Wiederholung des versichernden ἦ und der steigernden Wiederaufnahme von φίλοι in φιλτάτω ein deutlicher Ausdruck seiner freudigen Überraschung ... Der begründende Relativsatz οἵ-ἐστόν hat den Charakter eines Ausrufs'.[8] Surely so; the poet did not intend Achilleus to use a well-considered, stylized mode of speech as though he had his surprise under perfect control (and any attempt to translate these lines leads either to a precise but clumsy product or to such elegant inaccuracies as Fitzgerald's 'Peace! My two great friends, I greet your coming. How I have needed it! Even in my anger, of all Akhaians, you are closest to me.')

Achilleus' contention that Aias and Odysseus are closest to him of all Achaians is sheer flattery. Nowhere else in the epic do we find any indication that these two really are his favorites. Nor do any passages suggest that Achilleus is on a footing of special friendship with either Aias or Odysseus. Achilleus does not flatter them deliberately, however, as Helen does Priamos. Achilleus has no specific goal in mind for any such tactics; he exaggerates spontaneously.

Of the other passages in which people are welcomed after a relatively short absence, or separation, π 12-23 is especially striking: Eumaios welcomes Telemachos in tears and with kisses, calling him γλυκερὸν φάος. But Eumaios has good reason for his exaggeration: it had been by no means certain that Telemachos would survive his journey. At Λ 645-46, the host's welcome appears to be pleasantly courteous, no more: Nestor jumps up, leads Patroklos inside by the arm, and offers him a seat. In the case of Achilleus, even for a very courteous reception of his opponent's representatives

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[8] Comm. ad loc.

a gesture such as Nestor's or even his own first words, χαίρετον ... ἱκάνετον, would have been adequate.[9]

The added comment ἦ τι μάλα χρέω can be interpreted in various ways. One can understand with Fitzgerald 'How I have needed it!' The words imply his isolation bothers him severely. They do not accord with his pride; from a diplomatic point of view he seems to be awkwardly working against his own interests. Leaf defends another possible interpretation: 'How you needed it!' If this is the meaning, Achilleus is aware that the Greeks consider themselves forced to make overtures to him, and this is a ridiculing way of receiving the envoys. He explains his attitude and implicitly apologizes for it by mentioning his anger, and then tries to make up for it by using the otherwise exaggerated expression φιλτάτω. If Leaf's interpretation is correct, his words can be viewed as an allusion to A 340-41, where Achilleus asserts that one day the Greeks will be in need of him.

Achilleus does not acknowledge that that day has come, however, until Λ 610, χρειὼ γὰρ ἱκάνεται οὐκέτ' ἀνεκτός. Düntzer makes a convincing point when he states: 'Achilleus kann unmöglich so roh sein, noch ehe er die Gastfreunde bewirthet, auf so schadenfrohe Weise auf den Zweck ihrer Sendung hinzudeuten'.[10] Achilleus has not been officially informed how matters stood with the Greeks, but we cannot assume that he is unaware of the situation. The fact that he does not seem to wonder about the reason for their visit, even after they have eaten, points in the same direction. But if χρέω is not *his* need but that of the Greeks, his mentioning it does not necessarily imply 'unpatriotic satisfaction' (Leaf) or *Schadenfreude*. He may simply be expressing his first impression spontaneously, without first considering the possible impact of his words. But as he speaks he may realize that he has been tactless, and so mentions his anger—which otherwise has little point—and uses the flattering φιλτάτω.

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[9] C. Hentze, *Die Formen der Begrüssung*, pp. 326-27, remarks that δεικνύμενος (I 196) 'am natürlichsten vom Darreichen der Hand zur Begrüssung verstanden [wird, denn] V. 199 folgt προτέρω ἄγε, da dem Vorwärtsführen regelmäßig ein Handschlag vorauszugehen pflegt'. At p. 347 he mentions other scenes of welcome in support of this view: Λ 777 ff., Σ 382 ff., and γ 34 ff. Leaf, however, takes δεικνύμενος as the act of libation (commentary on Δ 4).

[10] *Aristarch*, p. 146.

Yet quite obviously he is pleased that his visitors have broken his isolation. So χρεώ is probably best understood to signify the need of the Greeks and Achilleus alike, and the idea Achilleus means to get across is: 'There is great need—for all of us—to resume the communication'. This interpretation finds further support in the fact that Achilleus' remark about his anger has, in the special construction of this sentence, no connection at all with χρέω. It is exclusively connected—as a contrast—with φιλτάτω. It is therefore hard to conclude that Achilleus is pleading his anger as a mitigating circumstance at having committed the faux pas of mentioning the Greeks' need to their representatives.

His spontaneous mention of his own need for restored communication—if he indeed includes himself among the needy—does not mean that he humiliates himself by admitting more than his pride would allow him to. Nor is he indulging in sarcasm by mentioning the need of the Greeks along with his own. He points to their interdependence.

When Achilleus sees the need as mutual, the use of the flattering φιλτάτω can no longer be regarded as a premeditated maneuver to make up for sarcasm or to cover up a slip of the tongue with the contention that he has been bothered less by his isolation in general than specifically by the separation from his so-called best friends. By addressing the envoys with φιλτάτω, Achilleus sets a mood that his companion Patroklos reinforces. Patroklos does more for the guests than he has been told to do: he prepares not only a drink but an entire meal. At line 204 Achilleus says again that Aias and Odysseus are his best friends. Odysseus' only acknowledgment of this overcordial reception comes when he praises the opulence of the meal. Aias does not respond at all. Such reticence can hardly be due to lack of respect or to unfriendliness. In the first place, as envoys they cannot afford to assume such an attitude. In the second place, Aias and Odysseus are presented in the Odyssey as admirers of Achilleus. At λ 550-51 Odysseus regards Aias as second only to Achilleus in prominence among the Greeks. At 557 he compares Aias to Achilleus with the intent of flattering Aias.

The lack of an adequate response remains a question without much relevance, however. This passage is not very different from most others discussed so far: however emotionally Homeric man may react to accusations, the reaction to friendly treatment is normally in a lower key than the friendliness shown, when it is not

omitted altogether. Furthermore, Aias and Odysseus cannot do much with an expression of friendship that has little basis in reality; and it may seem to them more appropriate to postpone any enthusiasm until after the hoped-for successful completion of their diplomatic task, in which they represent Achilleus' adversary.

We may surely wonder, however, whether this is a diplomatic error on their part. If they had flattered Achilleus in turn with extravagant tokens of friendship, if they had responded with loud enthusiasm to his display of delighted surprise, they might have created an atmosphere of agreement and unanimity. Their announcement of Briseis' return might have been very welcome—and have been accepted. But the *Iliad* would have been shortened considerably, and the chance to create further suspense would have been abandoned. This reflection strengthens the impression that the concept of this entire episode—meant from the beginning as the description of a failed diplomatic mission—called for Achilleus' initial and unreciprocated flattery. It creates a splendid contrast between beginning and end of this encounter, besides. At the end, Achilleus dismisses the envoys with the curt and haughty order 'And as to you, go back, report the news ...' (I 649) This sounds more like the appropriate treatment of subordinate messengers than of φιλτάτοι. His last words—'Around my hut, my black ship, I foresee for all his fury, Hektor will break off combat' (654-55) —convey callous pride and total suppression of any interest in those whom he had been so glad to see that he called them his φιλτάτω.

At λ 543-58, flattery assumes the form of an appeal to vanity. Odysseus tells the Phaiacians of his meeting with the ghost of Aias in the underworld. Aias was still angry with Odysseus—so Odysseus relates—because he and not Aias had inherited the armor of Achilleus. Saddened by Aias' suicide and by Aias' attitude toward him, Odysseus made the mistake of trying to bring about a change in Aias' attitude—as though he were still alive and able to change—by saying three things: (1) 'You were a great bulwark to the Achaians'; (2) 'We Achaians grieved for your death as incessantly as for Achilleus'; and (3) 'Your value to us was as high as Achilleus'.'

These words convey precisely the kind of reassurance that anyone who has cut himself off from his group in anger would most like to hear. Yet Aias reacts by ostentatiously not reacting—in effect, with a rebuke—and disappears. In the light of the passages

discussed earlier, it is no surprise that Odysseus' flattery fails to elicit a response. But that the flatterer hints at his disappointment is unique. Odysseus comments in the next three lines: 'He gave no answer, but went off ... into the darkness. ἔνθα χ' ὅμως προσέφη κεχολωμένος, ἤ κεν ἐγὼ τόν, but the heart in my inward breast wanted still to see the souls of the other perished dead men' (λ 565-67). Grammatically ὅμως προσέφη can refer to ἔνθα, but one can also choose to overlook the obvious and connect it with the modifier κεχολωμένος, instead. Accordingly, Aias' speaking 'nevertheless' can mean either that despite the distance—inconvenient for speaking—he had gained by walking off into the darkness of Erebos, he would have opened his mouth after all, since his anger was too great for him to maintain his dignified silence permanently; or, as Lattimore puts it: 'There [at a distance, in the darkness], despite his anger, he might have spoken'.

Silence can be used as a means to control one's anger, but I have yet to hear of a time when anger naturally resulted in silence. Since the latter interpretation is nevertheless widely accepted, these three lines are under heavy suspicion of being interpolated. And understandably so; if this interpretation were correct these lines would weaken the image of Aias, and with it the entire situation. Thus, Ameis and Hentze refer to Wilamowitz, who rejects 566-631.[11] And Stanford remarks in his commentary: 'These lines greatly weaken the effect of 563-4 and may be taken as part of the following long interpolation'. Page calls this passage 'Contrary to the Homeric idea of Hades, ... ill adapted to the story of Odysseus, and introduced at ... heavy cost to the preceding episode'.[12] Page even resorts to sarcasm: 'The silence of Ajax, then, was accidental, imposed by the requirements of a time-table ... Ajax was about to reply, but Odysseus is in a hurry ... Surely we are justified in concluding with certainty that whoever conceived the image of the silent ghost of Ajax did not at once proceed to destroy his own conception?' [13]

As long as Page holds to the second interpretation, he has good reasons for his sarcasm. But his conclusion is unnecessary when his argument is used as a sign pointing to the apparent weakness in that interpretation: the unfortunate connection of 'despite' with

[11] Commentary on λ 565-67.
[12] D. Page, *The Homeric Odyssey*, p. 27.
[13] Pp. 26-27.

Aias' resentment. As I have noted, that interpretation is not altogether impossible; ὅμως can be connected with a more distant word, and with a participle,[14] although if the poet had intended us to make that connection, he could easily have avoided the ambiguity by using such a construction as κεχολωμένος περ.

It is more natural and makes better sense by far to understand 'nevertheless' as referring, with ἔνθα, to Odysseus' immediately preceding statement regarding Aias' whereabouts: Aias has been walking off the scene, making verbal communication more and more inconvenient, and thus making speaking something one only does 'nevertheless'. Lines 563-67 convey the thought: 'Aias cut off the communication not only by refusing to answer but also by walking off, joining the other ghosts. Even though he was already there, away in the darkness of Erebos, he might have lost his self-control after all, abandoned his policy of remaining silent, and given me a piece of his mind, in his anger—or I, in turn, might have lost control at the last minute and for a change given him a piece of my mind. But I decided not to let either of those two things happen. I had a better use for my time in the underworld: meeting as great a variety of ghosts as possible'.

While the clause ἥ κεν ἐγὼ τόν can be grammatically completed by the inferred addition of the verb προσέφην alone, the unit προσέφην κεχολωμένος serves the same purpose and reveals the sense of the remark more clearly. ἥ κεν ἐγὼ τόν, 'or I him', has great suggestive force. Its aggressive potential is not realized when one surmises the thought to be merely 'I would have spoken, or talked, to him', as one might refer to an informal chat or a friendly conversation. Had the poet intended Odysseus' statement to be this casual, he might as well have lengthened—and thereby weakened—the remark by explicitly adding such a verb as προσέφην. As it is, 'or I him' conveys a hint of hostility or aggression that finds its parallel at Φ 226, where Achilleus says, 'I take no rest until I ... try out Hektor, whether he gets the best of me or I of him'. In Book Φ the threat is physical; here in λ the aggression is verbal.

The brevity and emphasis characterizing the expression ἥ κεν ἐγὼ τόν, the conspicuous placement of τόν at its end and at the end of the line as well, make the remark too distinctive and forceful to suggest merely a potential friendly or neutral reaction on Odysseus'

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[14] Cf. Kühner-Gerth, II, p. 85.

part. When a person speaks in anger, he speaks angrily; when he speaks despite his anger, his tone stands in contrast to his feelings, and thus is flat, neutral, or even friendly. Aias controls his anger at Odysseus well enough not to raise his voice to him but indicates his rejection of his flattery and his altogether patronizing treatment by silently walking off. When after moving some distance away, he feels his anger prevailing and opens his mouth to retort after all, one can only imagine the remark he would have made to be verbal aggression; and Odysseus, frustrated by the rejection of his flattery and patronizing manner, would be very ready, finally, to counter in kind. The first interpretation—that Aias was so angry that he had to speak—gives a picture that makes sense. But if we understand that Aias, despite his anger, and having moved off from the scene, might have started to thank Odysseus for his well-meant words, or that Odysseus might then have added some more comforting remarks, or some piece of news that Aias might have liked to hear had Odysseus' θυμός not told him to go find some other fun elsewhere, we get a terrible distortion to which Stanford and Page rightly object.

Also, τόν, used to indicate a third person, conveys less deference than τόν γε, or the person's name, or, weaker, τόν δέ. The brevity of τόν suggests unfriendliness. The idea that Odysseus has lost his initial goodwill is more congruent with the following two lines, where he hints that 'the case' of Aias has failed to hold his interest. Page soundly rejects the version 'I would have comforted him further, but I wanted to see the others'. The interpretation 'I would have quarreled with him, but I let it be; I had something better to do; see the others! is humanly convincing. The latter interpretation renders this episode nearly as impressive as Odysseus' story of how he had considered killing the mutineer Eurylochos but then decided the deed would be more trouble than it was worth.

In conjunction with προσέφη, κεχολωμένος serves to complete the clause ἦ κεν ἐγὼ τόν. Odysseus is annoyed at Aias' refusal to respond gratefully to his overtures of goodwill. Since the epic contains no parallel utterances of disappointment after flattery has failed to elicit the desired response, it may well be true that these three lines are interpolated, but there is no need to say that they 'greatly weaken the effect of 563-4' (Stanford) or are 'introduced at ... heavy cost to the preceding episode' (Page).

As for the contents of the flattery, the circumstances of Odysseus'

voyage have cut him off from the other Greeks as completely as Aias has been cut off by death. He is in no better position than Aias to know whether the Greeks mourn, and if so for whom. He has no information to give on this matter. Odysseus' Phaiacian audience knows this. The poet's audience knows too that Odysseus has been occupied with his own pursuits and experiences during his voyage; we have been given no indication that Odysseus has ever sat back and mourned for Aias. This is thus an exemplary case of what Kaiser calls 'die süße Lüge'.[15] Of course, Odysseus' words are not to be taken as empty courtesy. At the moment he encounters Aias in the underworld, and even at the moment he reports the meeting to the Phaiacians, he can very well be understood to be sincerely sorry about Aias' death and its circumstances. The present tense and plural of ἀχνύμεθα comprise, first, an element of perpetuation, and second, a statement about people beyond the scope of Odysseus' information. His exaggerated courtesy involuntarily betrays lack of respect, a reaction that pity often tries to veil.

3

Avoiding a show of sympathy by masking an act of friendship with overtly harsh treatment offers a contrast to Odysseus' initial way of dealing with Aias' shade. At the introduction to the Dolony, Agamemnon, Nestor, and Odysseus go at night to Diomedes. Nestor wakes Diomedes with words of abuse (νείκεσέ τ' ἄντην—as Fitzgerald puts it, he 'lectured' him): 'Up; get up ... Will you snore the whole night through? Do you not know the Trojans have taken up positions near the ships?' (K 157-61) Diomedes jumps up and answers: 'Σχέτλιος is what you are, old man. By night and day you never rest' (164). He asks rhetorically whether there are 'no younger men who might go round about to wake the captains one by one', and concludes with the accusation σὺ δ' ἀμήχανός ἐσσι, γεραιέ (167).

This can be described as a friendly-unfriendly dialogue. Nestor kicks Diomedes (158) and accuses him of misusing sleep to withdraw from reality all night long and of maintaining an unacceptably low awareness level (οὐκ ἀτεις, 160). In this context, the vocative expression chosen for the address may be of some significance. By

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[15] E. Kaiser, *Odyssee-Szenen als Topoi*, Museum Helveticum 21 (1965), p. 127.

calling Diomedes 'son of Tydeus' in a speech as accusatory as this one, Nestor may be implying blame: 'You are forgetting your father. You are doing little honor to him. Whatever happened to your ethics?' In any case, Nestor accuses Diomedes of irresponsible behavior—not exactly a kind way of waking a friend in the middle of the night.

We find other instances of kicking at N 618 and ρ 232, where the people involved are enemies, so that the kicking clearly indicates the contempt and hostility akin to the situation. ο 45, on the other hand, bears a parallel to K 158. In ο the son of Odysseus kicks the son of Nestor to wake him up. The poet uses the patronymic Νεστορίδης three times in lines 44-48, at regular intervals, each time after an interceding line and each time at the same place in the hexameter. Thus, the kicking in ο 45 is in all probability an allusion to the kicking going on among their fathers in K 158. Here, as in K 158, the normally hostile gesture occurs in a context of friendship; it is the kind of surface insult that is acceptable among friends.

Exclamations of annoyance mark the beginning and end of Diomedes' response. His answer is mainly an attempt to blame Nestor for burdening himself inappropriately, doing a young man's job. But there is also an exaggeration in his suggestion that Nestor is going around waking up every last one of the leaders. Diomedes' modesty prevents him from accepting with ease the possibility that Nestor's treatment of him is individual and special.

Only on the surface does this dialogue have an unfriendly character. The code they use hardly veils the friendship between these heroes and the care they take of one another. Though this may be clear in Diomedes' words, Nestor's rebuke seems at first blush more serious, even vindictive: Diomedes ought to have been awake for immediate combatreadiness. Rather than wasting time sleeping, he should have used the nighttime hours to figure out a way to improve the Greeks' situation. In any case, sleeplessness would have been a more suitable reaction to the threatening proximity of the Trojans, according to Nestor, or so he would have Diomedes believe. But Diomedes has been sleeping outside his tent, together with his people. They have their shields with them, and their spears stick straight up from the ground, ready for easy grasping. The metallic shine makes them easily visible in the dark (152-54). Diomedes knows that his precautionary measures

have been adequate, and Nestor can see that for himself. It is evident that Nestor's rebuke is not to be taken seriously—that, like the kick, it is intended only as a form of shocktreatment, to bring Diomedes to full alertness, ready for action, within a moment's time.

Diomedes' part in the interaction confirms this interpretation. He does not protest his rude awakening with true aggression, only with a surface belligerence. He enters Nestor's game by responding to his relentless attitude with a stern attitude of his own, and by uttering criticism in his turn.

Diomedes calls Nestor σχέτλιος at 164. The possible uses of this word and its range of meanings, from the indignant labelling of someone as a criminal to an expression of astonishment with an undertone of admiration, have been discussed earlier.[16] In this passage, its meaning seems to be close to the latter interpretation. Leaf translates it as 'hard, tough, full of endurance', and he specifies: 'Here in the physical sense'. Leaf seems to imply, however, that he dismisses the possibility that the word contains an element of criticism, which cannot well be done. Even in passages that transmit its least pejorative meaning, an element of criticism remains. At μ 21 and λ 473, for example, the criticism applies to the fact that the established order of the world is disturbed when people who have not yet died enter the underworld. The presence of criticism at μ 21 reveals itself in the sequel: afterward, at line 23, the word ἀλλά appears, marking the transition to full friendliness. The element of acceptance stays at least as much beneath the surface at μ 21 as it would in an expression such as 'You're really something!' At μ 279, σχέτλιος is not only prefatory to the remark about Odysseus indefatigability but also—or especially—to Eurylochos' entire speech in which he has a few things to say about Odysseus. Odysseus' indefatigability is a condition of the activity for which Eurylochos reproaches him; the remark about it is thus an introduction to the rebuke itself. Seen in this light, the passage bears a similarity to Diomedes' speech at K 164-67, as Leaf indicates. Yet, had σχέτλιος referred exclusively to Nestor's indefatigability, the translation 'hard, tough', merely hinting at Diomedes' admiration for Nestor's energy, would have been adequate. But Diomedes' remark about Nestor's activity, like Eury-

[16] See 'Verbal Abuse', Section 2.

lochos' remark about Odysseus, is subordinate to the point the speaker intends to make. The lines that follow seem to indicate that Diomedes is less interested in expressing admiration than in voicing the opinion that Nestor is behaving unsuitably in doing a job better left to a younger man. After all, Diomedes' sleep has been disturbed, and he does not hide his annoyance. The criticism inherent in his rhetorical question helps to explain his remark about Nestor's indefatigability, which then itself becomes a criticism. And since that remark in turn explains what he means by σχέτλιος, σχέτλιος must have a critical content. Such translations as 'tough' are valid as long as they are taken in a critical sense.

This is not to deny the element of admiration. The irony of the ensuing rhetorical question is by no means hostile; to ask Nestor οὔ νυ καὶ ἄλλοι ἔασι νεώτεροι and so on is a friendly teasing way of manipulating Nestor into admitting shamefacedly that indeed there are younger people. Diomedes does not intend to offend Nestor, nor does Nestor take offense, as we can see from his later reaction in lines 169-76. There he addresses Diomedes with the word φίλος and agrees quite readily that routine jobs calling for moving about from place to place are better left to younger men. He sees the justice of Diomedes' rebuke and responds to the friendship behind it rather than to the sharpness with which it is uttered.

In Agamemnon's presence Nestor has reproached Diomedes for being asleep at a moment when it must still be fresh in the minds of both Agamemnon and Nestor that Nestor had been found by Agamemnon outside of his tent, just like Diomedes, his weapons within easy reach (74-77). Nestor could not fail to recognize the value of Diomedes' precautions. It is true that Agamemnon had not found Nestor asleep, but he did have the opportunity to observe that Nestor had been relaxed enough about the tense situation to avail himself of soft bedding (75). At this conversation with Diomedes, both Agamemnon and Nestor must clearly remember Nestor's own implied rebuke when he asked Agamemnon who he could be, 'going about alone amidst the host by night when others [that is to say, decent people] are asleep'. Yet a few moments later he takes the opposite tack and in Agamemnon's presence reproaches Diomedes for 'snoring the whole night through'.

Nestor's kicking and his manner of speaking do not have the form of friendship.[17] but it is impossible to imagine that they reflect

[17] For the sarcasm contained in his rhetorical question, see, e.g., α 298-300.

his true feelings. Unlike Agamemnon, Diomedes has no formal proof of Nestor's friendly disposition at this moment, but he seems to join in Nestor's game readily enough. He matches his manner to Nestor's: the form suggests aggression but the bearing is friendly —more obviously so in Diomedes' case than in Nestor's.

Nestor could have behaved differently. Instead of kicking Diomedes, he could have shaken him by the arm. He could have asked him matter-of-factly to get up and explained that his presence was called for at an emergency meeting. That might have been the more desirable approach if ever there had been any tenseness in their relationship, or between Diomedes and the army. The reproach of sleeping when the army is in danger is an accusation of indifference, lack of due concern. If such a reproach had been directed at Agamemnon or Achilleus, or at Nestor himself now that he can no longer be justly expected to involve himself fully in all activities, these words might have been taken at face value. When the circumstances are to be taken into account, however, including the relationship between the men involved, there was little risk of a misunderstanding.

Anticipating Diomedes' annoyance, Nestor gets his licks in first: the best defense is a good offense. But the attack is only mockblame and a challenge to enter his game of playful rudeness. Such a game can be very useful in desensitizing a situation, and the decision to initiate it or join it is basically a matter of tact. We have no reason to assume that Nestor has a conscious policy of behaving tactfully; this is a type of tact that arises spontaneously among men who have endured hardships together, and in Nestor's case it is indicative of an untroubled friendship. The manner in which Diomedes reacts points to the same conclusion. The only distinction we can see is that Diomedes may be consciously adopting the style that Nestor has used spontaneously. Diomedes takes the trouble to camouflage his concern that Nestor may be overexerting himself. His exclamation σχέτλιος is his primary reaction of irritation at the challenge in Nestor's words and the abrupt awakening. Then he explains himself ('By night and day you never rest'), thus bringing forward the secondary element of admiration. His ensuing ironic question contains the basic critical element; its form echoes that of Nestor's question, in which his friendly intention is transparently masked by sarcasm. Diomedes displays a remarkable amount of tact, especially for someone who has just been roughly

roused from sleep. Even the indirect and implied reproach to the younger men which Nestor's companions Agamemnon and Odysseus might have taken personally, can have little force, since Diomedes himself is one of the younger men. We cannot know whether the poet and his audiences considered Diomedes to have behaved with special courtesy, but Nestor's laudatory response, ναὶ δὴ ταῦτα γε πάντα, φίλος, κατὰ μοῖραν ἔειπες (169), suggests that at least the poet did.

At E 221, Aineias says to Pandaros, who has jeopardized his fighting power by failing to bring his horses, 'Mount my chariot, and you'll see how fast these horses of the line of Trôs can run: they know our plain and how to wheel upon it this way and that way in pursuit of flight like wind veering'.

Plamböck comments on this use of the term ἴδηαι, as follows: 'Hier ist die Unmittelbarkeit einer aus eigenem Erproben resultierenden Einsicht gemeint, nicht ein bloß sinnliches ... Beschauen. Dafür wäre ein Besteigen des Wagens gar nicht erforderlich'.[18] From a conversation between Diomedes and his friend Sthenelos (E 243-74, especially 265-72), it appears that Diomedes is aware that these horses are special. It seems improbable that Greek adversaries would know about Aineias' horses if a leader fighting on Aineias' side has to be told about them. Pandaros would not have to mount that chariot in order to discover the horses' qualities, though acting as the driver would give him the firsthand experience that Plamböck mentions. Had Aineias wanted to give him that experience, he could have handed Pandaros the bridles and the whip without wasting further words. But this was not a time to raise and satisfy Pandaros' curiosity or to gratify the pride of ownership. Aineias' words seem to be mainly for the sake of form, since a display of the horses' abilities can be neither the sole nor the primary reason for inviting Pandaros onto his chariot.

The circumstances in which Aineias makes this remark leave no occasion for confusion. The Trojans are in a bad spot. Diomedes is slightly wounded by one of Pandaros' arrows. Instead of impairing Diomedes' force, the injury only spurs him on: he kills one Trojan after another. Aineias approaches Pandaros and asks him what is wrong with his arrows and his reputed prowess, and tells him to shoot Diomedes (171-74). Pandaros explains that he has

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[18] Plamböck, p. 20.

already done so. He complains about his failure to put the man out of action (188-91) and deplores his failure to bring his horses with him from Lycia (191-208). Pandaros manages to appear modest and to boast in one stroke. He voluntarily admits to having made a mistake in leaving behind the horses that his father had offered to let him take, but his explanation for the mistake is subtle boast: he had been afraid that Troy would not offer facilities adequate for the care of such valuable animals, ἀνδρῶν εἰλομένων (203). If this phrase merely refers to the crowded conditions in the city (Leaf, Rouse),[19] it implies at least no insult and at most a vague compliment to Aineias that his town is successful in summoning auxiliaries. But if it means 'in a state of siege' (Voß,[20] Fitzgerald), it can imply a malicious rubbing of salt in the wound of the Trojan Aineias. It is not possible to determine whether εἰλομένων in fact has this connotation; in any case, it is of no great importance: Pandaros has cared more for the well-being of his horses than for that of a city with which he sympathizes but which has been foreign to him at the time of his decision. Besides, at line 183 he proves to be an expert with horses: he has trouble identifying Diomedes' suit of armor, but a brief glance at his horses suffices to permit Pandaros to conclude that the man on that chariot is Diomedes.

Finally, at line 193, he dispenses with modesty altogether when he seizes the opportunity presented by this conversation with Aineias to expand on his father's wealth with somewhat feigned casualness (indicated by που in ἀλλά που ἐν μεγάροισι).

Now it is Aineias' turn to react in a suitable fashion. He has begun the conversation with criticism displayed in sarcasm and a peremptory attitude, but his manner has remained within the bounds of the acceptable in this state of war: a challenge serves their common goal. There is nothing personal in his remarks, no deliberate attempt to hurt Pandaros' feelings. Pandaros' answer has been basically friendly as he countered Aineias' criticism with the statement that he has managed to wound two first-rate heroes, Diomedes and Menelaos, while showing due acceptance of the criticism by admitting that his arrows have not been effective and that he has erred in failing to bring his horses. The reason he offers

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[19] *Homer. The Iliad. The story of Achilles*, transl. W. H. D. Rouse, New York, 7th ed. 1956.

[20] 'Bei umzingeltem Volk'.

for the mistake is directed not to Aineias the Trojan but to Aineias the owner of remarkable horses; it implies a compliment. In discussing both his attacks on the Greek champions and his father's riches, he has asserted himself, at least verbally, as an epic hero worthy of Aineias' backing. He has also indicated the sort of backing he needs in order to be effective as a warrior. He has managed to maneuver Aineias into a position where he cannot decently refuse to offer Pandaros a ride. The way in which Aineias does so shows special courtesy.

First he tells Pandaros to banish his pessimism: 'Better not talk so' (218). He says that together they can stop Diomedes, and bids him to mount his chariot. So far, he has lifted Pandaros' morale, but he has also assumed the dominant position. He adopts a basically parental role as he soothes Pandaros the complainer but in doing so he displays a slight lack of respect for Pandaros the hero and his equal. It is indicative of his special courtesy that he proceeds at once, without prompting, to correct this first by offering him an excuse for boarding the chariot—and a very tempting excuse, too—and then by offering Pandaros the choice between the driver's and the fighter's functions.

His suggestion that Pandaros can get to know the horses well if he mounts the chariot may be quite valid but it has nothing to do with their goal—to kill Diomedes—and it is not the true reason for the invitation. Clearly the real reason is the sympathy he feels for Pandaros in his difficult situation. He could never admit it, however, since any overt display of sympathy or pity for an equal is considered patronizing and therefore has the force of an insult. Even inviting him aboard his chariot without offering an excuse would reinforce the correct but undesirable impression that he is solving Pandaros' problem for him. Tact makes it advisable to provide Pandaros with an incentive to mount other than a need for a favor. Pandaros' own words, revealing his deep interest in horses, provide Aineias with the excuse he needs to mask his benign but patronizing—and therefore insulting—offer of help.[21]

[21] The verb γινώσκειν, which is used here, refers to the viewer's effort to develop his state of knowledge from vague discernment to unfaltering certainty. Sometimes an intermediate stage in the process is indicated, sometimes the final stage, but always the entire process is implied, e.g., ο 532: ἔγνων ... μιν ἐσάντα ἰδὼν οἰωνὸν ἐόντα, and Ο 241, where Hektor regains consciousness after Aias has hit him with a stone (Ξ 409-18): νέον δ' ἐσαγείρετο θυμόν ἀμφὶ ἓ γινώσκων ἑτάρους. However, Snell, *Entdeckung des Geistes* (^{4}1975), p. 22 holds a contrary view about ἔγνω: 'Das erfordert kein Bemühen um Erkenntnis, sondern es stößt einem zu'.

That is not to say that Aineias' argument has no validity in its own terms: Aineias uses the opportunity to impress Pandaros with his own horses which he received from his father. He responds to Pandaros' pride of ownership with some of his own.[22] Aineias thus manages to kill two birds with one stone. A nineteenth-century discussion of the authenticity of this passage casts more light on this situation. Düntzer [23] considered Aineias' speech to be an interpolation, and Calebow [24] quoted his arguments as follows: 'Das vorangehende ἀλλ' ἄγ' ἐμῶν ὀχέων ἐπιβήσεο kommt sehr ungeschickt [aus welchem Grunde denn?], und [es] ist gar keine Ursache gegeben, weshalb Aineias hier seine Pferde loben und gar des ungünstigen Falles gedenken sollte, daß sie selbst von Diomedes getödtet würden'. Calebow commented further: 'Wenn Aineias seinen Freund auffordert, den Wagen zu besteigen, so ist es wohl durchaus natürlich, daß er die Vortrefflichkeit seiner Rosse hervorhebt, die zum Angriff wie zur Flucht gleich geschickt sind, ja es ist dies fast notwendig bei der gedrückten Stimmung des Pandaros, die sich in der vorigen Rede 180-216 deutlich gezeigt hat. Aus diesem Grunde scheint es auch durch die Klugheit geboten, daß er den schlimmsten Ausgang, den ihr Versuch nehmen könnte, nicht erwähnt'. (Indeed, Aineias discussed only flight, not death).

The words 'You'll see how fast these horses of the line of Tros can run' do reflect Aineias' pride, but only incidentally. Aineias tactfully masks his friendly gesture with a display of childlike pride —a special courtesy.

The discussion of Calebow and Düntzer primarily concerns Θ 105-11. In this context, too, that passage is of some interest. At Θ 105-11, Diomedes uses the selfsame argument in inviting Nestor to mount his chariot. The horses referred to are even the same— Diomedes, meanwhile, has captured them. The aspect of pity is even more apparent here than in Book E. The Greeks are fleeing, but Nestor has to stay behind because one of his horses has been injured (Θ 80-91). Hektor charges, but Diomedes comes to Nestor's rescue, saying, 'Old man, they have you in a bad way, these young Trojans. Age bears hard on you, your strength is going, your groom is wobbly and your beasts are spent'. (102-04) Düntzer took offense

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[22] At N 254-94 two Greeks hold a similar conversation, this time about spears.

[23] *Aristarch*, p. 72.

[24] Beiträge, p. 21.

at this remark, and Calebow paraphrased his argument as follows: 'Zu V. 104 ... bemerkt Herr Düntzer, daß Diomedes die Langsamkeit der Pferde nicht bezüchtigen kann, da Nestor nicht durch langsames Fahren, sondern durch die Verwirrung, welche der Tod des Nebenpferdes angerichtet hat, zurückgeblieben sei'.[25] Calebow then mentioned Ψ 309-10, where Nestor warns his son, before the chariot race, that his horses are the slowest: 'Offenbar fährt Antilochos hier mit den Rossen seines Vaters, da ein eigenes Gespann des Jünglings nirgends erwähnt wird, so oft er auch im Gefechte vorkommt'.[26]

Diomedes speaks the truth as he sees it. But his words reveal such pity for Nestor that they can be seen as unintentionally insulting. When Diomedes invites him onto his chariot, the need to draw attention away from the compassion that prompts the invitation is even greater than at E 218-28. Tactfully Diomedes introduces the idea of sports, the theme of testing these horses—and with the same convincing point: they are the same extraordinary horses.

Such arguments, in which diplomatic considerations outweigh the speaker's concern, appear often. At θ 250-53, the king of the Phaiacians summons his people to dance, 'So that our guest, after he comes home to his own people, can tell them how far we surpass all others in our seamanship and the speed of our feet and dancing and singing'. As the dance is a normal part of the festivities, there seems to be little need to offer a reason for it or to supply it with a specific purpose other than the obvious one: entertainment. By doing so Alkinoos shifts Odysseus' role from that of a guest to be entertained to that of a judge over the Phaiacians' performance, with the task—in the event his judgment is favorable—of praising the Phaiacians elsewhere. The dance assumes the aspect of an audition.

The reality does not change: The Phaiacians will help Odysseus by escorting him home overseas after entertaining him. But by presenting the entertainment and escort as exhibitions in seamanship and dancing, with Odysseus acting as judge and examiner, Alkinoos puts his guest on a pedestal. He acts in basically the same manner as Aineias toward Pandaros and Diomedes toward Nestor, both of whom need help in the form of transportation. Aineias

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[25] P. 20.
[26] Ibd.

and Diomedes put Pandaros and Nestor in the position of judges over the performance of the horses that will take them where they need to go. All of the speakers proclaim the excellence of the upcoming performance.

In the case of Alkinoos, of course, the performers are not horses but men, and they represent a whole people, including the speaker himself. Alkinoos thus presents his people and himself not as the generous fellows they are but as auditioners to be judged. This possible self-degrading element can be seen as an indication of Alkinoos' loss of confidence after Odysseus' double victory—his victory in the sports contest and in the entire conflict with Euryalos.

The psychological background aside, however, Alkinoos' words are a mark of special courtesy toward Odysseus, and they also bear a special message to the dancers: Alkinoos exhorts the Phaiacians to put their best foot forward, raising their morale by reminding them that they do these things well. This stranger can surely be expected to talk about them when he leaves; there is nothing wrong in showing him some excellence to talk about. When a community serves as a host, it easily accepts the transient guest as a judge of its behavior, especially when the guest has given proof of his own excellence, and thus of being more than a mere suppliant for help.

Before the sports contests, at θ 100-03, Alkinoos makes a similar remark, and under circumstances that reveal with still greater clarity that his argument is a diplomatic maneuver intended to disguise the true reason for the proposed action. Odysseus weeps and is in evident need of distraction from whatever has overwhelmed him. Alkinoos' promptness in furnishing that distraction is itself an indication of his courtesy. A sudden proposal of other activities, with no covering excuse for them, might have exposed Odysseus' crying as the real motivation for the suggestion and might thus have made the situation even more painful than it would have been if his host had not interfered at all.[27] Tact requires him to present the proposal as something other than what it is, a measure taken in pity as a means of resolving a difficult situation: 'So that our stranger can tell his friends, after he reaches his home, by how much we surpass all others in boxing . . .'

To the poet, to his audience, to Alkinoos, and to Alkinoos'

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[27] See δ 116-22 (Part B, pp. 162-63).

audience, including Odysseus, it is obvious that Odysseus has no special interest at that moment in the boxing or other capabilities of the Phaiacians. Yet Alkinoos' argument hits home. Odysseus can hear between the lines Alkinoos' confidence that he will reach his home, and will be in good enough condition to tell his friends of his adventures. The Phaiacians are reminded of some of their good qualities and are given the chance to show them off to the potential dissipator of their fame. Here again a speaker offers help to a person who needs it by submitting for his evaluation—with a promise of excellence—the performance of those that will be providing the help.

Aineias' words at E 218-28 contain a second element that contributes to the view that he deliberately avoids an overt display of helpfulness for the sake of discretion. In one line of this passage he entrusts to Pandaros the job of driving the team (226); in another he tells what he intends to do himself: assume the fighter's role. These two lines lead to a third in which a reversal of roles is suggested: if Pandaros elects to do the fighting, Aineias will take over the driving.

When a person who is relaxed and unconcerned offers someone a choice between two possibilities, the order in which he presents the choices is quite arbitrary. To draw conclusions about the speaker's preference from the order in which the alternatives are named is a matter of pure speculation. But there is a marked difference between a clear-cut 'You choose: fight or drive' and Aineias' far more circuitous way of speaking. His manner of communicating in these three lines could be taken as an indication of some slight initial confusion as to which role he considers preferable. Surely there is plenty to be confused about. Aineias might prefer to do the driving because the team is his. But since a fighter has a greater opportunity to be a hero, the fighter role may seem more attractive. Of course he can, unhindered by Pandaros' presence on his chariot, do what he otherwise would have done: first drive where he wants to go, then jump off and fight. On the other hand, from his point of view it may seem preferable to let Pandaros do the driving, in accordance with the excuse he has used in inviting him aboard the chariot: the only way Pandaros can try the horses out is by driving them. But Pandaros' main reason for accepting the invitation is that he wants to get to a better position in which to fight. Thus the fighter's role may seem better for Pandaros.

Then too, Pandaros can first drive—or even ride as a passenger—and fight after the chariot has taken him to an advantageous spot. And so on.

Had Aineias really been confused, his speech might have become endless. But from the order in which Aineias communicates his considerations, it is apparent that he is not confused at all. Initially Aineias offers Pandaros the whip and the reins in accordance with his promise that Pandaros may use the opportunity to get to know the horses. In the following line (227) he dwells long enough on the thought that he himself will then take the remaining role of fighter to produce the impression that he now remembers that the fighter's role is the more important. Common decency requires him to offer Pandaros that role, thus ending the game of testing horses now that its goal—to overcome any hesitancy Pandaros may have felt about accepting Aineias' help—has been reached anyway, and return to the reality of the battle situation.

When a speaker in the epics presents more than one possibility to the person or persons he is addressing, the first possibility mentioned usually reflects the thought that is the more obvious. The second will be an afterthought, and tends to be in the nature of a correction. At η 319-21 Alkinoos suggests to Odysseus that the Phaiacians are willing to take him not only to his home but anywhere it pleases him to go. Alkinoos mentions the first possibility with natural ease. The thought that Odysseus wishes to go to Ithaka and nowhere else is the more obvious one, and the first to enter Alkinoos' mind. The second thought represents a further consideration that can be reconstructed as follows: his initial offer to take Odysseus home is fully responsive to the wish that Odysseus has uttered, but it sets a limit that Odysseus may regret if he decides to change his plans or if he has other wishes, unspoken or not yet fully formed, at variance with the one he has expressed. And so Alkinoos courteously corrects his initial answer by declaring himself willing to take Odysseus anywhere he pleases—though to the effect that the correction displays his generosity in a somewhat boasting way.

At Z 340, Paris declares his willingness to return to the battlefield and asks Hektor to wait until he has put on his suit of armor. He merely means to demonstrate his readiness to cooperate as soon as he has prepared himself. Then he seems to realize that by bidding Hektor to wait he is treating him casually, as though they were

on terms of well-established intimacy. With the modesty of the converted sinner toward the regulating authority, he corrects himself and makes at line 341 a different offer that puts no demand on Hektor's patience.

K 480-81, where Odysseus offers Diomedes the choice between stealing the horses and killing their guards, also falls into this category, as we have seen.[28] At K 442-45, self-correction is less evident than an attempt to make the later thought appear the more desirable. Dolon has no illusions that he will be set free, but at first he still seems to believe that he is not going to be killed. He naively suggests that Diomedes and Odysseus march him off to the ships under guard. Then it seems to dawn on him that they are unlikely to go to such trouble when they can kill him on the spot. He proceeds to suggest another possibility that would also entail little trouble for them. Now he tries to keep talking as long as possible. He has made his first proposal with the brevity of easy assertiveness, in a matter-of-fact way. He starts his second suggestion with the word ἠέ—a short word, but longer than necessary to convey the notion of 'or'. It suggests that he is trying to buy time. He goes on to use three lines to say something he could have said in, say, a line and a half. When he seems to realize that he cannot draw out his theme much longer, he again extends an ἤ . . . ἤ to ἠέ . . . ἦε—without, however, achieving a true extension. His show of deliberation barely masks his attempt to keep Diomedes and Odysseus from acting on the third possibility, which has remained unspoken.

At δ 743-44, Eurykleia has the courage to mention such a possibility explicitly. Perhaps with some rhetorical exaggeration, she offers Penelope the choice between killing her and letting her live. She uses this choice as a code to convey the thought that she is determined to carry out her plan regardless the consequences for herself. But within this unit one thought follows another, indicating that it does make a difference to her whether she is killed or allowed to stay alive. 'Even if you kill me I shall carry out my plan' would have made complete sense and would have conveyed indifference about her life and death with more truthfulness. 'You can kill me or keep me alive, I shall . . .' contains a formally unnecessary addition, but without it the words would have been

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[28] See discussion at pp. 80-82.

rude, not suited to Eurykleia's image. With it, Eurykleia exposes the first option as her first and naive thought, open to improvement. The second option, the one she undoubtedly prefers, is the improvement and makes her words comparable to the presentations of options in the other passages.

Likewise, when Aineias presents Pandaros with his alternatives, the first one he mentions seems to be the one that naturally entered his mind first; the second seems to reflect an increase in awareness, and is the one that Aineias prefers. In a battle chariot, the driver's role is subordinate to that of the fighter. Only one passage in the epics seems to contradict this rule: at E 731-48 (as at Θ 382-88), Athena and Hera are to fill these roles and they agree that Athena, although lower in rank, will fight while Hera drives. This arrangement might suggest either that the driver's role is not always subordinate or that here the epic mirrors a culture in which Athena holds the higher rank. But neither need be the case. Délébecque explains this feature adequately on the basis of the difference between the respective spheres of interest of the two goddesses: 'Athène qui n'est pas la propriétaire, ne semble pas s'intéresser beaucoup aux chevaux ... Elle ne conduit pas. Héra manifeste un grand attachement pour ses chevaux et s'en occupe elle-même, sensible â leur fatigue (IV, 27), les équipe (V, 720 ss.) et les dételle (V, 776) elle-même, aussi VIII, 374 ss. sur l'ordre d'Athène.' Délébecque also mentions Ξ 299, where Zeus is astonished 'de la voir arriver à pied'.[29]

Correcting himself, Aineias offers Pandaros the more honorable role and offers to be the driver himself, although he could not be blamed for lack of courtesy if he insisted on keeping the more splendid role for himself. The impression that these two options have crossed Aineias' mind in the order in which he has presented them is so natural and normal that Pandaros does not hesitate to accept the second proposal. His ready acceptance of the more honorable role, however, does seem to call for an apologetic explanation, and he offers one when he says that at the imminent confrontation with Diomedes, the horses will need to be at the peak of their performance—as they will be when they have the driver to whom they are accustomed. This explanation occupies most of his answering speech (230-37).

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[29] E. Délébecque, *Le Cheval dans l'Iliade,* Paris 1951, p. 72.

But Aineias has known from the beginning that Pandaros is more troubled by his failure to kill Diomedes than by his lack of horses. He invites Pandaros onto his chariot so that Pandaros can be in a better position to attack, not in order to show off his horses. From the beginning, then, he has planned to leave the fighting to Pandaros.

From the point of view of courtesy, Aineias cannot arbitrarily discontinue the game of horse testing and offer Pandaros the better role without first offering him a chance to continue the game if he wishes and really drive those horses. He has to offer Pandaros free choice between dropping and continuing the game that has been instrumental in getting him on the chariot. Saying, 'You choose, fight or drive', would call a halt to the game as abruptly as offering him the fighter's role immediately, with no certainty that Pandaros would accept either role. Such a tactic would emphasize the fact that the professed reason for Aineias' invitation is a disguise for friendly help. It would expose Aineias as the wealthy benefactor and Pandaros as a person in need of help. It is a sign of tact, a special courtesy of the kind shown by Nestor when he kicks Diomedes awake.

CHAPTER FOUR

GRATITUDE

The first considerable contribution to research on this topic has been made by J. W. Hewitt in a series of articles published in the years 1912-31.[1] In his first article, he asserts, 'Homer ... makes no definite mention of gratitude nor of its expression in sacrifice even where it seems *a priori* inevitable.' [2] He continues, 'in one or two instances we find the terminology of propitiation attached to rites which otherwise would rather suggest thanksgiving.' [3] One of those instances is A 472; at a feast given by Chryses upon the restitution of his daughter, the guests ἱλάσκοντο Apollo ('made [or kept] him benignant') [4] during an entire day. However, as Hewitt admits, after having been badly battered by pestilence until that day, the guests have good reasons not only to join Chryses in gratitude, but also to woo Apollo for the sake of their survival. Another example quoted is Z 526-29. Here, Hektor pledges in front of Zeus, not to thank him if he grants victory to the Trojans, but to appease him (ἀρεσσόμεθα).[5] This interpretation is based on a misunderstanding. As we have seen in the chapter 'Apologies', the form ἀρεσσόμεθα in that passage points to a matter between Hektor and Paris, not between Hektor and Zeus. Nevertheless, there is some point to Hewitt's conclusion, 'If the Homeric poet knows of the thank-offering, he evidently has at his command no terminology to describe it, but is struggling with language that still bears the flavor of the propitiatory sacrifice.' [6]

Although Hewitt's special area of concern is the religious aspect of gratitude, his findings are to a great extent applicable to the expression of gratitude in general as part of etiquette. There is no

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[1] *Development of the Thank-Offering*; *The Thank-Offering and Greek Religious Thought*, TAPA 45 (1914), pp. 77-90, *Some Aspects of the Treatment of Ingratitude in Greek and English Literature*, TAPA 48 (1917), pp. 37-48, *Development of Political Gratitude, Gratitude of the Gods*, Cl. W. 18 (1925), pp. 148-151, and *Gratitude to Parents in Greek and Roman Literature*, AJPh. 52 (1931), pp. 30-48.

[2] *Thank-Offering among the Greeks*, p. 98.

[3] P. 99.

[4] Ibd.

[5] P. 100.

[6] Ibd.

Homeric equivalent to formulas like 'thank you (very much [indeed])'. When regret has to be expressed, Homer uses formulas more or less fixed, which point to the existence of accepted standards for correct behavior in that respect. In regard to expressions of gratitude, however, formulas are not known to Homer, or he has special reasons to disregard them. The concepts 'gratitude' and 'ingratitude' are within Homer's mental horizon. Hewitt confirms this in the article *The Development of Political Gratitude*; 'The first instance of political gratitude that meets us in extant Greek literature is that of the individual to a king.' [7] He mentions β 47-241 as an example, especially 71-74 and 230-41, where Telemachos gives the people of Ithaka a reminder of their debt of gratitude to Odysseus and Mentor scorns their passivity in this respect.

Thankfulness is not a spontaneous emotion; its development initially costs a certain amount of energy, whereas ingratitude, as the absence of that emotion, does not. Thus, in the development of human society, gratitude is younger than ingratitude. Hewitt suggests this, but it leads him to the conclusion that thankfulness is too young a concept to occur in Homer's works. This defect underlies all of his later articles.

The duty to show one's gratitude arises upon accepting an undeserved benefit. In a community without fixed rules regarding displays of gratitude, individuals have a hard task. It is easy for them to slip into the error of placing the borderline between privileges and rights according to their immediate advantage. Hewitt says in his article *The Gratitude of the Gods* 'The man who offers a gift to a god has a right to expect a return and to feel aggrieved if he fails to receive it. The question is whether, in that case, he thinks of his god as unjust, or whether he thinks of him as ungrateful—that is, whether the transaction is on a business basis or on a friendly basis.' [8] The giver clings to the principle 'nothing for nothing' and views an adequate act of thankfulness as his due. The receiver can not always escape the inclination to remember that the gift does not oblige him legally. Accordingly, after accepting the gift, he may consider the transaction closed.[9]

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[7] P. 37.
[8] P. 149.
[9] For instance, at T 21-22, Achilleus accepts his new armor without a word of thanks. For a discussion at length, see pp. 128-32 of this chapter.

Hewitt rightly views 'unjust' as the most probable answer to his question, but this reaction of the disappointed Homeric giver is defensible. Any concept of 'duty of gratitude' implies the giver's right; gratitude and justice are hard to distinguish. To be aware of one's duty of gratitude and to act accordingly are part of social justice. To express or to fail to express one's gratitude is a matter of correct or incorrect conduct. Hewitt quotes passages of interest in this respect, first, A 39-41, translated by 'If ever I have roofed a temple for thy delight, if ever I have burnt fat thigh pieces of bulls and goats ...' Second, he remarks, '[the] formula ... reappears in [γ] 98-101, where Telemachos appeals to Nestor on the ground of his father's services to the Greek cause, in [X] 82-84, where Hecuba shows her breast to her son and begs him to keep out of the fight.' [10] Hewitt also mentions A 394-412, where one god is urged to call upon another god's sense of gratitude. He quotes these passages to point out the difference between the attitudes in Homeric times and those of later ages. Today's society makes a clear distinction between justice and gratitude; for instance, if one orders something and receives it, it is considered just, rather than grateful, to pay for it. Then, if one receives a gift, gratitude may prompt one to reciprocate, while one is under no legal obligation to do so. For that reason, Hewitt asserts that in all four quoted passages a claim is made upon gratitude; but this interpretation fits only to modern situations. Besides, on the same page in the same article, Hewitt himself implies that in such instances Homeric man probably considers justice rather than gratitude to be the matter of concern.

Although maybe less pronounced, the distinction between gratitude and justice exists in Homer's world as well. The Homeric giver may feel he has a right to be thanked; the receiver who is not equally convinced of the existence of the giver's right withholds his gratitude as often as not. A grateful attitude is based on a feeling; while it can be developed, it cannot be forced without seeming hypocritical. The manners of Homer's ingrates are less than perfect; whether they incur criticism depends on its relevance to subsequent events, but any objection is with necessity restricted. It can only be directed against the aspect of injustice, not against the absence of a feeling or against refusal to pretend its presence.

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[10] *Gratitude of the Gods*, p. 149.

At X 168-76, Zeus perceives that Hektor is being chased around the city-wall. He asserts to the other gods, 'This beloved man is hunted around the wall before my eyes! My heart is touched for Hektor; he has burned thigh flesh of oxen for me often.' Hewitt calls this appreciation of Hektor's sacrifices 'still a step below gratitude'.[11] That is true only if the meaning of gratitude is restricted to its formal expression or to a service given in return. Zeus expresses his gratitude, although not directly to Hektor. He recapitulates the benefits Hektor has bestowed on him and describes how Hektor's suffering affects his feelings, implying the causal connection between the sacrifices and his feelings on this occasion. In the lines 174-76, he makes the proposal to consider action in Hektor's behalf as a reward.

Hektor is killed; but that does not mean that Zeus is not grateful or that in the Homeric world the concept of gratitude has not yet developed to maturity and remains 'a step below'. Zeus does not say, 'I am grateful'; that he is can only be deduced. However, the statement that he worries because his benefactor is in trouble leaves no room for doubt about his gratitude.

At Ξ 235, Hera explicitly promises her gratitude to Hypnos— ἐγὼ δέ κέ τοι ἰδέω χάριν ἤματα πάντα. She will be grateful to him if he complies with her wish that he make Zeus fall asleep. This is no formal expression of gratitude, either, and nowhere in the Iliad, after Hypnos has complied, is Hera presented as speaking in terms of, 'From now on, I am forever grateful to you', or doing him a favor in return.

This is not due to the poet's inability to express gratitude. Whoever need not struggle with linguistic problems in order to formulate the idea, 'I shall be grateful', would have no trouble wording the phrase, 'I am grateful'. This omission is readily understandable in view of the more exciting events related after this episode. Besides, the only advantage to any display of Hera's thankfulness would have been the presentation of a desirable trait of her character. Some emphasis would have been laid on her troubling to express her gratitude although she had more important things on her mind. After all, although Hypnos is called 'master of all gods and humans' (Ξ 233), he is socially her inferior. The majestic one in an undemocratic environment will not be heard

[11] Ibd.

saying 'Thank you' too often. The poet might have spoiled the picture of Hera as the queenly instigator of a ruse. Making an inferior an accomplice in a crime and thanking him later for his cooperation do not fit well together.

Also at Δ 95 does a majestic figure give an inferior one a promise. Athena tells Pandaros, πᾶσι ... Τρώεσσι χάριν καὶ κῦδος ἄροιο—if he will take a shot at Menelaos. While it can be understood that Hera deals with Hypnos honestly, it is clear from the start that Athena does not intend to show Pandaros her gratitude—whether by raising his popularity among the Trojans, or in any other way. Yet, even if she did, it would have been ill-judged from a literary point of view if the poet afterward had made Athena thank Pandaros for his cooperation.

Χάρις has a wider bearing than that of a verbal expression of gratitude; it can also mean material rewards or services. For instance, when Iphidamas dies, he is said not to have had the chance to obtain any χάρις from his wife although he has given a lot (Λ 243). Hera specifies what χάρις she has in mind by promising Hypnos a golden throne with a footstool (Ξ 238-41). Hypnos then points out the dangers involved and the bad experiences he has already suffered on a similar occasion. Hera adjusts her offer—she will let him marry one of the Charites (267); he agrees by choosing the Charis Pasithea, and the deal is firm. (271-76).

Why the poet never cares to hint whether this promise is fulfilled or not, is an irrelevant question. At any rate, the absence of a proof that the promise of gratitude is carried out does not indicate that the display of gratitude as an aspect of good manners is unknown to Homer. It is even impossible to conclude that he omits it deliberately in order to depict Hera as an ingrate, although a considerate attitude, or readiness to live up to her promises, would hardly harmonize with her image in the epic as a tough intriguer. Hentze justly mentions Hera's 'kluge Berechnung in eigennütziger Absicht' revealing itself in her policy of greeting Hypnos by handshake.[12] Thanksgiving is bound within the limits of retrospection; it cannot, without difficulty, point forward to later facts. It has the unwanted force of slowing up the sequence of the story and can be expected, for purely technical reasons alone, to be more often omitted than not. Hypnos' part in this deal is the only point

[12] Formen der Begrüssung, p. 331.

of interest for subsequent events in the epic. Therefore, only Hypnos' action is described in the lines following this scene.

Also, from the point of view of justice, a formal verbal acknowledgment—such as 'thank you'—from Hera is superfluous. The interlocution between Hera and Hypnos has shifted from a request for a favor and a promise of gratitude to negotiations and, finally, a business contract. In today's society, an oral formula of thanks under such circumstances may be common because 'good manners' seem to call for it, but can easily remain omitted, as well. Although it cannot be proven that Homer intentionally omits the indication of gratitude standard in the world he describes, it is unlikely that it is lacking because his society's sense of gratitude has not yet been fully developed.

We have seen that rudeness of the form in which an unfriendly remark is made does not usually elicit any protest as long as the substance reflects reality.[13] From this it can be deduced that, for Homeric man, the inner situation alone is worth considering; the formulation and the comments are less significant. In congruence, Homer disregards the courtesy of thanksgiving where the act of thanksgiving itself would be redundant, notably when a formal contract has been established. When the fulfilment of the contract does not exceed the other party's rights and therefore cannot be classified as a favor, a grateful attitude is not called for, and Homer avoids it. Thanks given under such circumstances would probably not have been regarded as special courtesy but as an exaggeration. Likewise, the poet avoids that his heroes show greater gratitude than the reality he describes requires.

This sobriety consolidates the impression that Homer's etiquette is kept strictly in immediate touch with, and dependency on, the reality of any given moment, without much leeway for an appreciative attitude regarding special courtesy just for the sake of greater elegance or excellent manners. The image of Homeric good manners, that thus appears, differs greatly from that of the nineteenth century Viennese standards.

However, that style of courtesy in regard to expressions of gratitude is not entirely avoided by Homer. In the lines Ψ 647-50, Nestors thanks for the cup Achilleus has given to him after the chariot race, 'This I take kindly, and my heart is cheered that

[13] Cf. chapters 'Apologies' and 'Verbal Abuse', passim.

you remember me as well disposed, remembering, too, the honor that is due me among Akhaians.[14] May the gods in fitting ways reward you for it all'.

By their nature, apologies and thanksgiving have formal aspects in common. They consist of verbal, and sometimes material, gestures between two parties and encourage creation and use of formalities. Both he who apologizes and he who gives thanks is making an attempt to pay a debt and thus to restore a balance for whose loss he feels responsible. Therefore, a high degree of formal similarity between the two may justly be expected. The most elaborate and emphatic apologies are accompanied by a gift-offering. Nestor's words in Ψ 647-50 are the most elaborate and emphatic display of gratitude in the epics; yet, he has no intention of proving his gratitude by offering a gift or rendering a service in return. Such a gesture would have been a display of exaggerated zeal. Achilleus' gift is but one of a number of prizes and a leftover prize at that; thus, Nestor's thanksgiving is already exuberant as it is, so exuberant that Leaf has doubted its authenticity.

The four lines ending this speech (647-50) are structured as a set of two lines, 647 and 650, with two lines in between which Leaf considers to be 'a very obscure couplet'.[15] Assuming that these four lines, in the order given, are authentic, we have Nestor giving abundant thanks for a leftover prize, a bowl 'with handles on both sides' (616), given in explicit pity for his old age. If we take Leaf's hint and carry it to the extreme of deleting lines 648

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[14] Plamböck, *Erfassen, Gegenwärtigen, Innesein*, p. 142, comments on the form λήθω used in this passage, 'Der empfundene Vollsinn, den das (mediale) λανθάνεσθαι haben würde, nämlich: 'du verschließt dich nicht von dir her vor der mir gebührenden Ehre', [müßte] bei dem Willen Nestors zu einer ausgedacht höflichen Replik als unfein erscheinen: auch nur daran zu denken, daß Achill 'von sich aus' so etwas tun könnte, verstieße gegen den Takt. Aus diesem Grunde wählt Nestor die objektive Form 'ich bin dir nicht verborgen'.' This is perhaps an exaggeration; to the unbiased, an expression such as 'you do not forget to do the right thing' is a compliment, all the more when the one addressed is one generation younger than the speaker. It is rather an expression of satisfaction and approval than of surprise that the one addressed does not make an expected mistake. I do agree with Plamböck's rejection of 648-49, however; first, these lines are late—which renders a bias well possible, second, at a choice between 'You do not forget' and 'I do not remain hidden to you', the former carries a judging, school-masterly tone of which Nestor's demeanor does not usually suffer, whereas the latter wording is indicative of modesty and restraint, akin to Nestor's manners of relating to people, in general.

[15] Leaf, comm. *a.l.*

and 649, we are left with the two lines 647 and 650 immediately following one upon the other, in which Nestor concludes his comments (611-45), first with brief thanks for Achilleus' gesture of giving, then, at 650, with extra thanks for the gift itself, as if as an afterthought.

Further, if the lines 648-49 are disregarded, the plural τῶνδε in 650 is difficult to understand. When Nestor gives thanks for τῶνδε, he may be referring to the bowl's handles, since these handles may have been more elaborately structured and decorated than the bowl itself. But it would be strange, if not downright blasphemous, for Nestor to invoke the gods' blessing on Achilleus in exchange for a pair of bowl handles no matter how exquisite.

Anyway, what Nestor is primarily grateful for is not the gift itself but rather Achilleus' choice of Nestor, among the spectators, as recipient of the honorary prize. This is just what Nestor acknowledges in the lines 648-49, when he elects to interpret Achilleus' gesture as homage, which in fact it is, rather than as an act of sympathy for his own physical weakness which was ostensibly Achilleus' interpretation. Fitzgerald translates the title γέρον at line 618 by 'venerable sir!', thus emphasizing the only aspect of Achilleus' address that can be taken as complimentary to Nestor. However, when γέρον is used in a context of listing disadvantages of old age, any translation categorically different from 'old man' involves stretching possibility beyond likelihood.

Achilleus turns a leftover into an asset by offering it to the most worthy veteran in the epic. Not only is this a dexterous device; it is also an act of courtesy towards Nestor. Achilleus' accompanying speech, however, encodes the honor; he gives it the face value of an act of pity and makes the prize appear to be more a consolation than a honor. Under these circumstances, it would have been sufficient for Nestor to respond solely to Achilleus' statement at face value—which he does, in the lines 626-46—and to thank him briefly for the gift. In the last three lines of his speech, however, he does more than social justice requires of him: he attaches to Achilleus' gesture a meaning different from the one that Achilleus himself has suggested—an ideal one—and he goes to the length of invoking the gods' blessing, which seems fitting only under Nestor's idealistic interpretation of Achilleus' gesture, but redundant in regard to Achilleus' own interpretation.

This is not to say that the mention of gods in an expression of

gratitude in the epics is in itself redundant. Quite to the contrary, such mention was felt to be an integral feature of such expressions. In four passages in the Odyssey, gods are mentioned as the potential rewarders; they are to carry out what duty of reciprocation the grateful one feels he owes. In three of these passages, Odysseus thanks Eumaios for his hospitality. In ξ 53-54, he asserts, 'May Zeus, stranger, and the other gods everlasting grant you all you desire the most, for you have received me heartily'. Later in the same book, he says, 'I wish, Eumaios, you could be as dear to our father Zeus as to me, when I am so poor, but you grace me with good things'. (440-41). In the last of the three passages, ο 340, he expresses the same wish word for word, but this time the motivation offered is 'Since you stopped my wandering and my terrible sorrow'.

These thank-offerings, unlike that of Nestor (Ψ 647-50), stand in well-proportioned relation to their occasion. Far from being a leftover prize, the gift here is the hospitality of an ordinary man living in poverty who has shown respect for an unknown beggar by his modest and friendly attitude. Odysseus does not exaggerate: he does not offer his thanks in a three-step climax, but each time only once, and, of all the gods, he brings to the fore the one whose province includes hospitality. The wish expressed at ξ 53-54 can be regarded as a meaningful allusion to 39-40 in the same book, where Eumaios complains about Odysseus' absence and accuses 'the gods' of being the cause. Obviously enough, 'other gods everlasting' will have to—and will—play their parts in the realization of Eumaios' most fervent wish. Despite Eumaios' objection that it has simply been his duty to behave the way he has since 'all vagabonds and strangers are under Zeus' (ξ 57-58), these three thank-offerings comprise naturally adequate and self-evident elements only. They contain no exaggeration.

Each of the three times, Odysseus indicates why he wishes Eumaios well. Odysseus hardly intends to give information about Eumaios' hospitality—the poet's audience is already informed about that, as is Eumaios himself. Until he takes the trouble to verbalize what Eumaios has done, Odysseus' awareness and appreciation of the benefits bestowed on him are unknown. Further, Odysseus indicates each time what Eumaios' act means to him; for instance, Eumaios' hospitality means an end to his troubles. While objective statements about Eumaios' hospitality would have

been superfluous, Odysseus' interpretations, his subjective statements, make sense since they communicate feelings otherwise unknown. Nestor does the same at Ψ 648-49, although his interpretation of Achilleus' act is more speculative and has greater emphasis.

These three passages have two prominent elements in common with Nestor's speech, thus presenting the pattern by which gratitude in the Epics is expressed: the speaker verbalizes the good done to him, and a god (gods) is (are) mentioned in the form of a blessing. The latter element receives the main emphasis. The former one has the function of providing the causal connection, and is secondary. Outlined according to this pattern, the typical expression of gratitude would be: '(1) May the gods bless you, (2) because you have done this or that for me'.

The fourth of the *Odyssey* passages is ν 38-46, Odysseus' speech on his departure from the Phaiacians. Here, these two elements are presented, as well. In the lines 40-41, Odysseus gives a synopsis of the good done to him and, in the lines 44-46, he wishes his benefactors happiness and well-being in various respects, mentioning some of the parts gods will have to play in its realization.

As to the secondary element: Odysseus mentions that the Phaiacians have given him whatever he wished for. This general statement would have been a sufficiently inclusive acknowledgment if he had left it at that, but instead, he specifically mentions an escort and presents, thus strikingly omitting to mention that they had received him kindly and had saved his life. Also, before expressing his wishes for their prosperity under divine influence, he first extends good wishes to himself—'May the sky gods make these [gifts] prosper for me. May I return to my house and find there a blameless wife, and all who are dear to me unharmed.' At first sight, these two statements do not exactly support the impression that Odysseus is here expressing gratitude. His first remark can easily be taken for a veiled expression of impatience, in the sense of, 'I got from you everything I wanted, escort, presents; so what are we waiting for? Let's go!'. His second remark reveals worry to a higher degree than a brief 'Let us hope for the best' could ever have done. Of course, he cannot be blamed for worrying, and expressing his worries does not make his subsequent good wishes to the Phaiacians any less sincere. But the question remains why Odysseus can give gracious thanks to Eumaios, acknowledging with emphasis that the latter received him heartily,

but can give thanks to the Phaiacians for the escort and gifts only, disregarding the more basic benefits.

There is a difference between the two forms of hospitality offered. Eumaios' hospitality is unproblematic from the start and is offered without restrictions. As to the Phaiacians, however, Odysseus needs to exercise his diplomatic assets until they stop distrusting him and settle down to offering hospitality without question or challenge.[16] To say that Odysseus does not have to thank them for their hospitality since he has had to prove he deserves it, but does have to thank them for the gifts and the escort because he has received those gratuitously, is an oversimplification. The gifts offered are an integral part of the Phaiacians' hospitality. Yet, the abundance of these gifts seems greater than necessary (10-15). Also, while a Homeric host is expected to equip his guest for his journey, his helpfulness exceeds his duty when he escorts him all the way home. Wary of redundance, the poet may not have felt it fitting to let Odysseus give thanks for hospitality that has not been altogether unproblematic; for instance, unwittingly, his Phaiacian hosts have depressed Odysseus to the point of his repeated sobbing and hesitation to join in the athletic contests. Odysseus does take care, however, to mention the gifts and the escort, the two respects in which the Phaiacians' generosity surpasses their duty.

The main element, the wish for his benefactors' well-being under divine influence, is here by no means a simple phrase such as 'May the gods bless you' or '... make you happy'; it is a conglomerate of three thoughts—

1) 'May you make your wives and children happy' (allusion to Nausikaa's and her parents' wish for her matrimony),
2) 'May the gods give you aptitude and success in all respects' (with ironic allusion, perhaps, to Alkinoos' somewhat naive pride in his people's proficiency at dancing, their questionable success at throwing the discus and Alkinoos' mediocre leadership), and
3) 'May there be no disaster for the people' (allusion to the prophesy).

His wish for divine influence to promote their happiness appears openly at the second thought and, in more veiled form, at the third.

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[16] Cf. Rose, *The Unfriendly Phaeacians*, pp. 387-406; also, however, De Vries, *Phaeacian Manners*, Mnemosyne 30 (1977), p. 120.

Thus, according to the definition which the Odysseus-Eumaios scenes provide, this valedictory address includes an expression of gratitude. The extension of the basic wish, 'may the gods bless you' to 'may the gods grant success in all endeavours, and no unhappiness be found in your people', is merely an embellishment. Odysseus' suggestion, reflected in the first and second thoughts, that their happiness has to be, in the end, of their own making is, however, a true third element.

The copiousness and elegance of this speech as a whole are another indicator that it is a reaction to more than just the πομπή καὶ φίλα δῶρα. Since this address is full of allusions, it may imply his gratitude for their hospitality, for the games held in his honor and for other things, maybe too numerous for him to mention.

At θ 462, Nausikaa confronts Odysseus with her hope that he will think of her, once he is back in his own country, since he owes his rescue to her primarily. She recapitulates herself what she has done for him; in a delicate manner, she makes the undelicate hint that he owes her something, and forces him, as a matter of duty, to thank her for her help. Odysseus replies: 'May Zeus ... grant me to reach my house ... τῶ κέν τοι καὶ κεῖθι: I will pray to you, as to a goddess, all the days of my life. For, maiden, my life was your gift'. (465-68).

The words καὶ κεῖθι, 'there, as well', hint that Odysseus has already here, on Scheria, been praying to her and treating her as a goddess. He suggests that, in part, he has already performed his duty of reciprocation. Thus, his use of the word καί implies a mild reproach of Nausikaa for her utterance. If this word had been omitted, he would merely be promising to pay his debt of gratitude, later, by honoring Nausikaa as a divine being, provided that Zeus brings to completion the rescuework which she has begun. Since he does use the word καί, he is promising to continue something he has already been doing—only, in Ithaka, where she cannot derive the gratification from watching him do so.

His promise of future gratitude is conditional upon reaching his home. It is this home-coming which he mentions first, and he dwells on it at disproportionate length. This must suggest to Nausikaa that her rescue of Odysseus has only relative value to him so long as his ultimate goal remains unattained. Seemingly contradictory to this is his assertion that he will pay her divine honors for her

help. Thus, on the one hand, he prevents Nausikaa from exaggerating her importance to his own well-being, while, on the other, he builds up her self-esteem. Yet, it is in agreement with his apparent policy to put her exactly in her place that he, in expressing his gratitude, replaces one of the two expected elements—the good wish in the sense of, 'may the gods bless you'—with sweet-talk.

Nevertheless, the pattern of this speech of gratitude stays in line with the model. Odysseus contends that he will treat her like a goddess, as he feels he is already doing now.[17] In general, when the object of human thankfulness is a god, the human's wish for divine blessing on that god seems not only superfluous, but possibly harmful to the relationship between the human speaker and that god. A god will hardly welcome a human's wish for blessings to be bestowed on him by his fellow-gods; it is better omitted. Thus, it can certainly be argued that Odysseus is actually treating Nausikaa as if she were a goddess, by omitting that wish.

However, in Odysseus' eyes, Nausikaa is and remains a human. As an expression of gratitude from one human to an other, this one of Odysseus' falls short, both in completion and in sincerity, as compared to the manner of his own triple thanks to the swineherd. It is, to be sure, a nice bargain, that Nausikaa should be treated as a goddess in exchange for protecting Odysseus and introducing him to the Phaiacians; but his promise to continue such treatment in the future, when he is far away, has only rhetorical value. Odysseus' address at their first encounter, 'I am at your knees, O queen ...' (ζ 149-69), could well have been a prayer directed to a goddess; but such homage directed to Nausikaa will have substance only so long as Odysseus remains within the limits of her human visual and auditory perception. It is meaningless when the person praying is in Ithaka, and the human addressee on the island of Scheria, unable to derive any satisfaction from his prayer. Nausikaa accepts his words, but whether due to the weakness of her position—she has no power to push for anything more substantial—or to lack of acuteness, remains open to question.

[17] De Vries, p. 119, states, 'He now already adores the princess'. If this implies that Odysseus, at this point, sees a goddess in her, I have to object. One does not say to a person who, in one's serious persuasion, is divine, 'I shall treat you as a goddess'. ὥς as in θεῷ ὥς denotes a comparison, not an equation. Any comparison implies with necessity awareness of a difference between the items compared. The use of ὥς reveals Odysseus' opinion that she is not divine.

In sum, this expression of gratitude contains at least one of the two standard elements of the model, namely the acknowledgment of the good done to the speaker. The primary element is given only token representation—Odysseus uses the concept of the divine, though not in the form of a blessing. He makes an unrealistic promise and implies that he has in part already done his duty and therefore Nausikaa's admonition is somewhat preposterous. Odysseus couches his expression of gratitude in a form inferior to the model, but this inferiority fits the immediate situation. Nausikaa's lack of discretion is deservedly but gently rebuked.

The lines Σ 394-407 show gratitude in an entirely different form. The beneficiary's gratitude is deeply felt and unqualified, and he expresses it not only in words but also in a deed, not bothering with formalities in any way. The occasion is Thetis' visit to Hephaistos. His wife Charis welcomes her in an unconventional way, asking her first why she has come, and offering ξείνια (385-87) only afterwards. She does so, however, with unmistakable signs of her friendly disposition—she hugs Thetis and uses expressions such as αἰδοίη and φίλη in addressing her. Thus, Charis gives both Thetis and the poet's audience a clear introductory impression of the manner in which inter-personal relations are conducted in Hephaistos' household: there is spontaneity in the expression of feelings of friendship, and an apparent disdain of external formalities.[18]

While this informal welcome is taking place in Hephaistos' living quarters, Hephaistos himself is in his workshop. These two separate areas are so situated that one must pass from one to the other through a doorway (cf. line 416). Shouting from the living area to the workshop, Charis calls Hephaistos' attention to Thetis' arrival; neither her way of greeting nor her shouting is apt to make a very ceremonious impression. Still less elegant is the answer of Hephaistos at 394-409. He bubbles with enthusiasm and shouts the sixteen lines of his reply all the way from his workshop.

In contrast to what Odysseus does at θ 465-68, Hephaistos arrives spontaneously at the subject of his gratitude to Thetis.

[18] Lines 423-25 seem to me to be illustrative of the existence of the separation between 'internal' and 'external' in the Homeric world: Hephaistos' clumsy, unrefined, outer appearance contrasts that of Charis, whereas, independent from Charis' example, he welcomes Thetis in the same manner as Charis has done beforehand.

It is true that he addresses Charis rather than Thetis, but this indirectness does not seem to be intentional; there is no indication that Hephaistos is choosing—through shyness, perhaps, or an awkward sense of discretion—a circuitous way of informing Thetis of his awareness that he owes her gratitude. On the contrary, the presence of Thetis has no bearing on his manner of expression. His unprovoked statement that he owes Thetis something (τῶ με μάλα χρεὼ ζωάγρια τίνειν; 406-07) is all the more striking in comparison with θ 462, where the word ζωάγρια is used, likewise, but by the creditor, Nausikaa, when she confronts Odysseus with his debt. Hephaistos' expression of gratitude is in no way extracted from him by his creditor.

Further, he proceeds to demonstrate that his words are sincere. With an eagerness that far surpasses the demands of formality, he grants Thetis the favor she has come to ask. He fulfills her wishes so splendidly that nearly one hundred and fifty lines are needed to describe the extent to which Hephaistos' help exceeds her requests. The verbal expression of his gratitude is far surpassed by the material expression.

Hephaistos' verbal expression of gratitude is indirect; but then, Thetis' rescue of him has taken place long before this encounter, and to give thanks for it directly would therefore have been out of place, here. Yet, it does make sense to draw the attention of the poet's audience to the fact that Hephaistos owes Thetis gratitude. This makes it *a priori* clear that the help Hephaistos is going to give Thetis can be understood as settling a debt, and thus not creating any new debt on the part of Thetis. Rather than simply listing Hephaistos' reasons to be grateful, the poet provides for a natural explanatory introduction to the following scenes by letting Hephaistos himself refer to Thetis' rescuework. Aside from providing immediacy, this device gives the poet a chance to show Hephaistos in a favorable light; Hephaistos appears, here, as generous and appreciative. At Z 234-36, when Diomedes and Glaukos have interchanged their weapons, the poet observes that Glaukos comes off the worse and calls him 'crazy'. He could have put this observation into the mouth of Diomedes or Glaukos himself; but Diomedes would have appeared ridiculing and cruel, and Glaukos might have seemed resentful, or even stingy. In the case at hand, however, the poet promotes Hephaistos' character, allowing Hephaistos himself to comment on his reason to be well inclined towards Thetis.

As a result of this device, however, Hephaistos spends sixteen lines shouting the complete story of Thetis' rescue-work from one room of his house to another. This seems to be a rather long shout; Hephaistos might more naturally have shouted only the last two lines, σὺ μὲν νῦν οἱ παράθες ... ὄφρ' ἂν ἐγὼ φύσας ἀποθείομαι. His acknowledgment of the good done to him could then have appeared in his welcoming speech to Thetis (424-27); but Thetis knows the facts already. Under such an arrangement, for Hephaistos to expand at such length would have created an impression of factitiousness. A shorter version of the story might have been less comprehensible to the poet's audience, who were not necessarily as well informed as Thetis. Also, the poet would have forfeited this opportunity to tell a story within a story. Most important, the arrangement actually employed mirrors Hephaistos' spontaneity: upon hearing the name of Thetis, he immediately bursts out with the recapitulation of the event that he associates with that name. He does not intentionally choose Charis for a sounding board; she has merely put a torch to the powder-magazine by mentioning Thetis' name.

While the material aspect of this expıession of gratitude, Achilleus' armor, is splendid, the verbal aspect deviates far from the model. Yet, the model can be traced: the second element, the synopsis of the good done to Hephaistos, is present. He does not address his benefactress directly, but his synopsis is more detailed than is usual, and he dwells on his reason to be grateful for sixteen lines. The first element of the customary expression of gratitude can be distilled from both his words and his subsequent deed. Whereas Odysseus wishes Eumaios blessings under divine influence, the *god* Hephaistos points out to Thetis that he is all eagerness (με θυμὸς ἄνωγεν) to attend personally to her welfare, and he does address her directly within the framework of this element (426-27). Then, he sets about fulfilling her wishes. Thus, the wish for divine blessing obtains an ideal substitute: the god proceeds to enact a blessing.

This expression of gratitude contains all that good manners may require. Yet, the expression, 'May the gods bless you, because you did this or that for me' is varied to such extent that an impression is created that the poet is juggling with tradition. In expressions of gratitude, as opposed to apologies, the poet seems to be set on avoiding formulas. The variation in this passage is both natural

and factitious. However, this factitiousness is manifest only in the prolonged shouting of the detailed story. Hephaistos' behavior provides another paradox; he displays good manners through his lack of manners. The poet handles the combination of Hephaistos' generous spontaneity and his awkwardness to such effect that Hephaistos is seen, by his nature, to do the right thing, conducting himself more than correctly without regard for the matter of correct conduct (consider, for example, not only his prolonged shouting but also his manner of opening the conversation with Thetis by the direct question, 'Why have you come?').

The absence of a formal and straightforward expression of gratitude in Ω 373-467 is, at first sight, disturbing. Presenting himself as one of Achilleus' servants, Hermes offers himself to Priamos as escort for his nocturnal trip over the plain full of enemies. Neither does Priamos give thanks for this offer—at least not formally—nor does he later give thanks for the escort itself, even after Hermes has revealed his true identity (Ω 460-61). He does earlier express his appreciation for the offer of help, 'Some god stretched out his hand above me, he who sent before me here—and just at the right time—a traveller like yourself, well-made, well-spoken, clearheaded, too. You come of some good family' (374-77).

Before setting out, Priamos has obtained a promise of Hermes' help (182). When Priamos meets Hermes, he has reason to suspect, from Hermes' appearance and comforting words, that he is facing his promised divine escort. Instead of thanking his divine protector, he acknowledges to Hermes that 'some god' is protecting him, thus speaking of that god in the third person. He does express his gratitude, but only indirectly. He acknowledges the possibility of 'some god's' help, not the reality of Hermes' offer. Also, only one of the two necessary elements is accounted for: the verbal acknowledgment, not the good wish. Instead of thanking Hermes for his offer, he bestows on him a series of compliments. These compliments are just so many judgments. He does not say, 'I admire you', but deems the other objectively admirable. He takes the liberty to observe that the other's mind is in good working-order, and professes to know with certainty that the other's parents are μάκαροι. He puts himself on the pedestal of authority. Had Priamos recognized Hermes as one of his Trojan subjects, or had Hermes invited comments on his appearance and behavior, Priamos'

judgmental attitude would have had some justification. It is to be wondered whether Hermes' accepting reaction, ταῦτά γε πάντα, γέρον, κατὰ μοῖραν ἔειπες (379) has perhaps an ironical tinge, while he delivers an uninvited judgment in return.

In any case, Hermes approves. His approach has led Priamos to assume that a god is protecting him, and Priamos' compliments are sincere. Hermes' approval indicates that, to Hermes, Priamos' display of relief and expression of admiration satisfactorily replace a formal expression of gratitude. To Hermes—and one can safely add: to the poet and his world—Priamos has generously complied with the dictates of correctness.

Thus far, Priamos is reacting only to Hermes' offer of protection, not to its fulfillment. Priamos has yet to find out whether Hermes is speaking in earnest. Therefore, a formal expression of gratitude as used in the conversations between Odysseus and Eumaios would probably have been too weighty to suit the occasion. Here, a casual expression such as 'thank you' might have been quite practical. The question why it is missing cannot be answered with the contention that Priamos is not grateful. Formally, Priamos transfers his gratitude from Hermes to 'some god'; yet, by mentioning his appreciation of that god to Hermes, he makes it clear to him that gratitude is the feeling Hermes' approach has evoked.

After their journey over the plain, Hermes identifies himself as a god and disappears without waiting for an answer (468). In the first place, his immediate departure prevents any formal gesture of gratitude. In the second, Priamos now knows with certainty that his helper has not acted upon his own initiative, but has been sent by Zeus. To some extent, this implies that his act of thanksgiving would better be directed to Zeus, not Hermes. Besides, he must realize that he is the victim of a double trick on the part of Hermes—his disguise and his reticence about his role of Zeus' messenger. In the third place, as we have already observed, the standards of good behavior for humans in the epics are different depending on whether they are addressing gods or other humans.[19] When a human addresses a god to ask for help, there seems to be no need for the use of honoring titles or epithets at length. One can show one's impatience with a god overtly (cf. δ 465). One need not bother apol-

[19] Cf. 'Verbal Abuse', Section 3.

ogizing for mistakes (cf. E 349-352, κ 68-69). The gods do not expect such exertions; and that they should expect that seems to be beyond the poet's range of expectations. In keeping with this is the fact that gods do not expect from humans any verbalisation of gratitude, and that humans do not feel motivated to provide one. Thus, Hewitt's remarks on the lack of gratitude shown to gods are quite to the point.[20]

Homer and his ancient audience will have understood that, with Hermes' identity known, Priamos is unable to respond with an expression of gratitude; to a modern reader this will seem awkward, but the practical difficulties Homeric man encounters at the task of expressing gratitude to a god can perhaps be explained. The first element, the wish for divine blessing upon the other, would not be suitable if that other happens to be a divine being him- or herself. One would not exactly do a god a favor by wishing for him to be subject to the patronizing influence of another god. Furthermore, such a wish implies that, in the grateful human's opinion, the god in question so far has had to do without those blessings. That however well off one may be one always has use for more blessings is in mortals' eyes true only for mortals—the happiness of the homeric gods increases and diminishes, but it is presumptuous for a human to insinuate to a god his awareness of this. For a mortal, this is as unsuitable as to show pity to a god.

As to the second element: to recount the benefits bestowed on one is basically to give information. One is at least informing the other that one is aware of those benefits (e.g., 'You received me'). Usually, one goes a step further and offers one's interpretation of the deed(s) in question ('You received me heartily') or describes the effect of this deed ('You put an end to my troubles'). To what degree these bits of information are superfluous or useful depends, in the case of a human giver, on his own level of awareness. But a god is, according to Homeric man's definition, a being who already knows everything. Any effort to acquaint a god with one's gratitude is therefore unnecessary. The full extent of one's own goodness, the meaning to the recipient of one's deed and the recipient's degree of awareness of these are to a human giver not always clear. But for a human to assume such lack of insight on the part of a god is not only unfitting but impossible. Priamos is already baffled by the disclosure of Hermes' identity; the prompt disappearance of his divine helper prevents further embarrassment.

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[20] Hewitt, *passim*, esp. the early articles (cf. n. 1 of this chapter).

The nature of Hermes' approach at the beginning of their encounter, together with the promise of escort Priamos has previously obtained, gives Priamos a reason to surmise that the stranger facing him is more than human. On the immediate grounds of what he perceives, he treats him as human, showing his gratitude. But the fact that this display is indirect and covert, being no more than the remark that there must still be a god who helps him, seems to be an indication of Priamos' incertainty about the other's status. In order to be able to relate to Hermes correctly, Priamos needs to know whether Hermes is divine, a human equal, or a human ranking below him. So he asks (387). In reply, Hermes claims to be one of many sons of a man of Priamos' age but not of his own royal level. Further, he introduces himself as a servant of Achilleus. This invites Priamos to deal with Hermes on a basis of social inequality; and, in a manner comparable to that of Hera when she offers Hypnos a throne, he offers Hermes a cup. (429). Hermes refuses this payment with an excellent excuse: he is afraid of being disciplined by Achilleus. Hermes now forestalls any further barter by taking the reins and beginning the journey to the camp of the Greeks. Priamos acquiesces; Hermes has already hinted that he is roaming about, unable to sleep at the thought of next day's battle (401-04); thus Priamos can conclude that he has nothing better to do. Once Priamos has learned that this young stranger lives in the very place where he himself is headed, he can suppose that he is even doing the stranger a favor by helping him home. Thus, gratitude on either side would be superfluous, and Priamos does not even prepare for a display of appreciation at the end of the trip.

Achilleus does not offer thanks, either, when Thetis brings him his new suit of armor. Instead, he expresses admiration, judging the quality of the gift, 'These the god gave are miraculous arms, handiwork of immortals, plainly—far beyond the craft of men' (T 21-22). But that is about all. He does not even trouble to discuss with appreciation any details, as Priamos does when he discusses Hermes with Hermes ('You are clear-headed', etc.). The difference in age—Priamos appears to be a generation older than the one to whom he directs his judgment—legitimates Priamos' attitude of authority; Achilleus has no such justification. The impression of conceit could have been avoided if Achilleus, like Priamos, had added one or two expression of admiration, to please his mother.

But then, what Thetis has done for Achilleus is not just a casual favor. It has, not unlike Hermes' friendly overture, an aspect of necessity. Thetis' gesture is an inevitable link in a chain of events. This aspect of necessity carries more weight here than in Hermes' case. Thetis' help has grim connotations contrasting with the splendor of the suit-of-armor itself. Her gesture is part of the sequence of events connected with the theme of Achilleus' grudge and also part of that connected with the Trojan war. The nature of this gift is a portent of the fate of many people involved, including Achilleus himself; to give thanks for the weapons might have been cynical.

Still, Thetis has exerted herself on Achilleus' behalf; he owes her thanks. His short, but positive, judgment on what she has brought him is an expression of approval, of satisfaction, but not of gratitude. To Achilleus, Thetis' act is part of her duty. Her endeavors to alleviate his human troubles, even when she can only occasionally help in practical matters, are something to which he feels he has a right. His divine lineage makes his human fate all the harder; for this fate he holds Thetis responsible. To express gratitude for an action that one has a right to require is a deed of pure courtesy, and has little in common with genuine gratitude developing naturally when a person realizes that he has been treated better than he has deserved.

Such deeds of courtesy are not immediately natural. Of all the heroes in the epics, it is primarily Achilleus who seems to have no tendency to engage in any but spontaneous activities. To Achilleus, only one aspect of the gift or armor exceeds his inevitable due: the suit of armor has been wrought in an artistically exemplary way. Only this evokes a special reaction from Achilleus, who accepts the weapons, expresses his admiration for their beauty—and that only briefly—and this is all he seems to be able to do.

It is easy to contend that this passage more than others would be apt to show the difference between the more modern and the Homeric attitudes regarding good manners in expressing gratitude. One can contend that, given his good breeding—that is to say, his good manners—a modern Achilleus would routinely thank his mother for a gift or a helping gesture, regardless of its connotations, or how much or little he may otherwise resent her having forced him to face a human fate. But, in the first place, Homer hardly

allows his heroes to use automatic, thoughtless, routine remarks.[21] Second, the Homeric Achilleus would act routinely, like a modern Achilleus, only if indoctrinated with 'good breeding' in the use of formalities, such as saying 'Excuse me', regardless of whether or not one is repentant, and 'Thank you', whether or not one is grateful. A more substantial form of good breeding' consists in developing genuine respect for others, a genuine sense of responsibility for damage done, a genuine awareness of receiving more than one gives, and then, facility in stating as much to the person or people involved.[22] That it is this latter form of good breeding which occurs, in the epics, in regard to gratitude is satisfactorily evident from the several instances mentioned above. There is good reason to assume that Homer intentionally depicts Achilleus as not having his manners under control. At Ω 40, he makes Apollo state, ['Αχιλῆϊ] οὔτ' ἄρ φρένες εἰσὶν ἐναίσιμοι. Apollo says this at a moment when there is a need to present Achilleus in a derogatory way for the sake of a contrasting effect; but Achilleus' lack of manners agrees with his general lack of self-restraint, which appears in his prolonged obstinacy in the affair concerning Briseis and his exaggeratedly cruel treatment of Hektor's corpse.

The new suit-of-armor is a gift of such splendor that Achilleus' people shiver and do not dare to look at it (T 14-15), and the poet devotes one hundred and fifty lines to its description. The reaction of the recipient consists of a mere two lines, plus a third in which he communicates to the giver his plans for the gift. In those two lines, Achilleus' response remains restricted to a businesslike acknowledgment of delivery, although he is polite enough to show at least some appreciation, namely, his satisfaction that Thetis has done her shopping at the establishment of a divine blacksmith, not a mortal one.

Formally, Achilleus has the same difficulty that Priamos would

[21] Fixed formulae in the Homeric epics are not indicative of thoughtless indulgence in the use of stereotypes. Per Krarup, *Beobachtungen zur Typik und Technik einiger homerischen Gesprächsformeln*, Classica et Mediaevalia 4 (1941), 230-47, observes that repetitions and epithets have their own, full value in each single instance, while all, taken together, have a special value beyond it. Specific formulae are used exclusively in certain situations: one formula occurs only in situations involving a person of authority, another only in a moment of danger, a third only at a meeting, a fourth only under conditions of intense emotions, etc.

[22] I am referring, here, to the distinction between 'external' and 'internal' manners, as described by Straßburger, *Der soziologische Aspekt*, p. 112.

have had to face if Hermes had given him a chance to speak at the end of their trip. Achilleus is mortal, Thetis is a goddess. Even if he were not too conceited to be grateful, he cannot simply wish blessing upon her, nor can he give her a synopsis of her deed. As a goddess, she does not need such information, and a human endeavor to boost her divine ego would be misplaced; besides, to verbalize what her gift means to Achilleus might have led to cynicisms. Achilleus has to avoid the customary formulation of gratitude altogether. But the words he uses are no satisfactory substitute.

The question arises whether Achilleus' lack of manners is due to the poet's unwillingness to have him display better or to his inability to do so. But such inability might well have resulted in clumsy behavior on the part of Achilleus; Achilleus' bearing, however, radiates perfect control over the situation, in contrast to his lack of control over himself, and also to the behavior of the Myrmidons around him. According to T 15-18, the Myrmidons have lost their composure at the sight of the glamorous gift, '[They] dared not look straight at the armor; their knees shook. But anger entered Achilleus as he gazed, his eyes grown wide and bright as blazing fire, with fierce joy'. His primary, non-verbal reaction is fully appropriate, and so is his choice of saying something, at least, to Thetis upon receiving this gift.

By avoiding a formal expression of gratitude and by acting as a self-appointed judge over the gift, Achilleus presents himself as a person with externally poor manners. Yet, he does take care that the judgment he delivers is approving and accurate—he duly acknowledges that the weapons are products of divine craftsmanship. In substance, this judgment must please Thetis, and Achilleus immediately proceeds to please her in another way. He entrusts her with his worry that flies might use Patroklos' corpse for a breeding ground, while he is absent avenging Patroklos' death (24-27). This problem as he states it is too trivial to be taken at face value; to get the body embalmed and the flies warded off he does not need Thetis' application of nectar and ambrosia. He acknowledges Thetis' endeavor to protect his own body with her gift of the suit-of-armor, by inviting her to extend her protection to the body for which Achilleus himself, in turn, feels responsible. The compliment of reinforcing Thetis in her parental protectress role is perhaps unintentional. That Thetis is pleased appears from her eagerness to do him the second favor of embalming the corpse

(29-39). Thus, Achilleus does pay her his debt of gratitude by pleasing her in these two ways.

Nevertheless, although he is her son, he can be expected to act primarily as an adult, and the question remains, Why is his gratitude conveyed in a coded form; why does he not explicitly express his appreciation for her action on his behalf? In other words, his manners remain questionable. Nevertheless, they make sense, for the poet presents Achilleus as a product of ill breeding and gives two instances in which the ill breeding is still going on. Achilleus needs new weapons and needs a corpse taken care of while he is gone. Both are practical problems, easy to solve and certainly so for a man of Achilleus' wealth, power and social status. He does not need his mother, yet he presents these problems to her, suggesting that she solve them for him, thus choosing an infant's role for himself. By eagerly playing along with this and actually solving his problems for him, Thetis is doing him a disfavor. From this point of view, his gratitude is, at best, seemingly in order.

After receiving her help in the matter of his war-gear, he wants more help in the matter of Patroklos' corpse. It can always be argued that asking for more is a primitive way of saying 'thank you'; it involuntarily implies that the initial help was welcome.

Altogether different is π 435-447, a case of simulated gratitude. The suitor Eurymachos mentions to Penelope that her husband often held him on his knees, during his childhood, and fed him. He submits this as the reason why the son of Odysseus is now πάντων πολὺ φίλτατός ... ἀνδρῶν to him and is, consequently, under his protection.

This expression of gratitude is indirect; Eurymachos is not talking to Odysseus himself. Also, there is no wish for Odysseus' well-being under divine influence. Yet, it complies to a great extent with the standard as mirrored in the Odysseus-Eumaios scenes. Eurymachos acknowledges the good done to him, and by no means curtly. He honors Penelope as Odysseus' wife by directing this acknowledgment to her as proxy—an acknowledgment which is all the more courteous since, as a suitor, he has an egoistic interest in playing down her connection with Odysseus, rather than thus reinforcing it. He also provides the standard causal connection between the good done and the good to be done in return. He pays respect to Penelope in her quality of being Telemachos' mother by naming to her Telemachos as the beneficiary—also as Odysseus'

proxy—of his gratitude, and in doing so he acknowledges that these three people are a close-knit group. To Penelope, this again must be a deed of special courtesy, since it is in Eurymachos' apparent interest to achieve the contrary effect of the destruction of the ties between Odysseus, Penelope and Telemachos. From the point of view of diplomacy, Eurymachos is using the right policy: he endeavors to convince Penelope of his full acceptance of her family-bonds as they are, and this is basic to attempts to change them.

As compared to the standard expression of gratitude, it looks like *hybris* when he discusses Telemachos' 'dearness' as dearness to himself instead of to the gods, and Telemachos' well-being as subject to his own protection, not the protection of the gods. In truth, however, Eurymachos avoids *hybris* by not introducing the divine into his lie. Yet, here lies his weakness; his very restraint in this respect renders his expression of gratitude unauthentic, and can give him away to Penelope as a fraud.

In establishing which procedures Homeric society considered correct, it makes a difference whether a speaker in the epics is dissembling or is in earnest. A liar probably will use arguments that seem to him to have the best chance of being convincing;he has an interest in his words being favorably received. When there exist rules of conduct regarding the situation, he will, in all probability, take pains to conform perfectly to them. Thus, when in Homeric society person A has treated the child B habitually with fatherly inclination and care, then, twenty years later, this would provide full motivation for the adult B to feel far more closely connected with A's real son than with anyone else. How far Eurymachos really pushes his argument, can only be determined by the answer to the question whether φίλτατος is to be understood as 'being the most closely connected', indicating a two-way relationship, or as 'dearest', indicative of individual feelings of a subject toward an object. To my knowledge, this answer has not yet been given.[23] If

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[23] About the dual meaning of φίλος (1. pron. poss., 2. 'beloved') cf. H. J. Kakridis, *La Notion de l'Amitié et de l'Hospitalité chez Homère*, Thessaloniki 1963, whose conclusions satisfactorily refute H. B. Rosén, *Die Ausdrucksform für 'veräußerlichen, und 'unveräußerlichen Besitz im Frühgriechischen. Das Funktionsfeld von Homer.* φίλος, Lingua 8 (1959), p. 292: 'Der Übergang zum genusdifferenten φίλος ('Freund' = 'Liebender, Geliebter') ... ist ... zweifellos nachhomerisch'.

In agreement with Fränkel, *Dichtung und Philosophie*, p. 92, Snell attempts to solve the problem connected with the allotment of two different meanings to one expression by putting 'dear' in quotation marks: 'dear' is

φίλτατος means 'dearest' in this passage, Eurymachos is simulating the strongest feelings of friendship, and his lie must be too apparent to escape Penelope. If φίλτατος, here, has the other meaning, Eurymachos is presenting his connection with Telemachos as governed by the strongest and tightest family-bonds; the lie is only in the exaggeration—if it is an exaggeration: not even Penelope seems to be able to prove it. Telemachos and he can be, but need not be, regarded as fosterbrothers. Eurymachos behaves as if they certainly are, disregarding the risk of putting his courtship of Penelope in an incestuous light. His gratitude, then, concerns the alleged fact that Odysseus has already accepted him into the family, resulting in his claim (which he hopes she will accept) that there is already a family-bond between them.

It is his purpose to reassure Penelope. Given the prevailing circumstances, he can only do so with a lie, and the lie is to be as convincing as possible. For years, he has been among the most prominent characters to help consume Odysseus' present and Telemachos' future possessions. Thus, his claim of solidarity with Telemachos must arouse Penelope's suspicion, and even if she believes it, she can regard him at best as the family-parasite. But to suggest that Telemachos would be dear to him, even the dearest of all people, would be a much greater contention, totally unworthy of belief, and his statement would be of insulting brutality. This would not blend into the image of Eurymachos' personality that Homer has created. Nor does it agree with what follows, since a too apparent, impertinent lie should have led to an indignant protest on the part of Penelope, rather than to her reaction as described in the lines 449-50—she leaves in a state of uncertainty.

Eurymachos' words depict good manners in an exemplary way, especially because their contents contradict his real disposition. His gesture of friendliness is an all but spontaneous expression of good will. It is his refinement, deserving the label of courteousness

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he who pursues the same interests with the same intentions; even one's own organs that serve one graciously are called 'dear' (cf. Snell, Dichtung und Gesellschaft, p. 24). Although it seems that the way in which organs function will be determined by health rather than by dearness, I do agree with Snell's conclusion that the common factor must lie in the relaxed, unobstructed proceedings within a no-problem situation (Snell, p. 25). When Penelope invites Odysseus to be φίλος, she encourages a transition from 'guest' to 'one who belongs'. While the proposed transition is a purely functional one, the invitation itself is an act of friendship.

that causes Eurymachos, first, to wish to reassure Penelope, second, to woo her by alluding to a sympathetical trait in Odysseus' character and, third, to know what attitude to strike so that he can put his connection with Odysseus to use for his present purposes. In this respect, it is unimportant whether he is referring to some natural law according to which foster-brothers are more closely tied to each other than to other people, or to a human law concerning duties of gratitude.

In the first book of the *Odyssey*, Eurymachos is presented as the man of good manners among the suitors—in accordance with his way of dealing with Penelope in π 435-47. His comments on Athena-Mentes' bearing—she comes in and leaves without giving any identification—are puzzled and curt, 'How suddenly he started away and vanished, and did not wait to be made known. He was no mean man by the look of him' (α 410-11). When anyone among the suitors bothers to flatter Penelope, it is Eurymachos—'If only all the Achaians in Iad Argos could see you at dawn of day tomorrow there would be even more suitors come to feast in your house' (σ 247-49). These words imply that Penelope is playing a game in which she invokes sympathy by complaining about the troubles she incurs through her attractiveness. He implicitly criticizes this game and warns her of the possibility that the destruction of Odysseus' property may be consequently increased. But he keeps his criticism and warning covert enough to be flattering, thus leaving her, on the one hand, the freedom to continue or stop this game while, on the other hand, reserving for himself the privilege of continuing in his role as one of the attracted offenders. His lordliness determines both his poor internal and excellent external manners.

When Antinoos excludes Odysseus from the archery contest, and Penelope disapproves (φ 288-319), it is Eurymachos who takes the trouble to appease Penelope with a plausible explanation (321-29). While such apologies sometimes suggest a low self-esteem on the part of the speaker, they will always present an homage to the persons addressed.

In general, Eurymachos' courtesy is hardly based on opportunism. It is certainly not based on fear of possible social retributions if he should fail to so exert himself. Far more likely, it is an aspect of his *savoir-vivre*, which makes him as a diplomat superior to anyone else in Ithaka. He is, for instance, the first and, for a while,

the only one who realizes that Telemachos has become irrevocably aware of his rights and capabilities, upon his mysterious conversation with Athena-Mentes. He realizes that, if any success for the suitors is to be obtained without bloodshed, it is from this moment on possible only so long as Telemachos' rights are fully recognized and formally confirmed, κτήματα δ' αὐτὸς ἔχεις ... (α 402).

In Ω 33-54, Apollo upbraids the gods for their attitude regarding Hektor. He points out that Hektor used to offer sacrifices to them, whereas they do not now trouble to rescue his corpse from Achilleus' wrath.

Hewitt contends, 'The specific charge which he makes is cruelty, not ingratitude'.[24] This has merit but does not accurately reflect the truth. Apollo calls the gods σχέτλιοι. This is a vague reproof, fitting all kinds of undesirable deeds and qualities in various degrees, not—and certainly not primarily—cruelty. Further, he calls them δηλήμονες; they are destruction-minded. This does not necessarily extend itself to cruelty. Lastly, to serve as a justification for labelling them with these terms of abuse, he reproaches them that they are on the side of Achilleus who does not breathe the right spirit and is obdurate to boot (40-41).

In most of his articles, Hewitt complains about the general absence of gratitude in the epics. Odysseus' bearing towards Eumaios, alone, sufficiently proves that this complaint is not altogether justified. Hewitt quotes Ω 33-54 as an example, insisting that Apollo has in mind not the ingratitude of the gods but their cruelty. No doubt, the reproach of vicarious cruelty is implied in this passage though it must be inferred from what Achilleus is doing. What the gods themselves are doing stands according to Apollo in contrast to Hektor's exertions in their interest. Apollo is saying that the gods are intentionally requiting Hektor with indolence. This seems to exemplify the concept of ingratitude—presupposing with necessity that of gratitude—as nicely as one could wish. Apollo clearly has a sense of social injustice and of lack of fairness in general. Cruelty is in this particular case only a secondary effect of ingratitude, consisting in a passive, but conscious withholding of what would have been reasonable remuneration: to put a stop to the cruelty which Achilleus is actually displaying.

The gods are σχέτλιοι because they do not feel obliged to do

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[24] *Gratitude of the Gods*, p. 149.

anything for Hektor in return for his sacrifices and because they, thus, automatically side with one who is not ἐναίσιμος—who does not subject himself to exact limits.[25] Apollo does not imply that the gods themselves would not be aware of any limits of their own. He calls them neither unjust nor cruel, but merely σχέτλιοι. As we have seen, this word is a weak expression,[26] weak enough to serve as a reproach to somebody who consciously omits to do something expected but not required of him. In cases of severe injustice, serious neglect of duty, or criminality, this expression is unimpressive; it is then used only as understatement.

Apollo's restraint in this respect seems to pay off: the gods proceed to comply with Apollo's wishes though it is not their duty to interfere in human affairs. It must be owned to Hewitt that what Apollo's shaming *hortatio* actually compels the gods to do cannot be called a display of gratitude. They are not grateful to Hektor. The mere fact of his sacrifices, which they do not particularly need, is insufficient to create in them such a feeling. They are using Apollo's reminder of what Hektor has done for them as a welcome excuse to interrupt a show that having lasted for twelve days is boring them anyway. Obviously, the poet does not intend this gesture to function as a spontaneous act of gratitude; rather, it is in the minds of the gods a posthumous honor to be bestowed on Hektor. It remains entirely within the range of courtesy. But the success of Apollo's reproach remains illustrative of the accepted Homeric concept that failure to act with gratitude upon being treated well is subject to valid blame.

Yet, altogether, direct words of thanks are seldom uttered in the epics. Without formal prompting, they occur in only three situations; Nestor gives thanks for his honorary prize, Odysseus for Eumaios' help and for the help of the Phaiacians. However, it is true that there are in the epics numerous instances of people benefitting from the good deeds of others. On various occasions, for example, offers of hospitality are rejected somewhat apologetically and without a word of thanks. Again, when the participants in the funeral games for Patroklos receive their prizes, there are no thanks given. The consideration that Achilleus was not obliged to organize the games and award these prizes, appears to have no bearing at all in the Homeric world.

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[25] Cf. Leaf's comm. on Z 519 and A 418.
[26] Cf. 'Verbal Abuse', pp. 53-62.

There is a contrast between the scarcity of apologies and the frequency of insults and other infringements. The number of instances of giving thanks is even more greatly exceeded by the number of favors done. Apologies, at least, are made often enough to allow some insight into their possibilities of variation. The pattern of these variations corresponds to the vigor of the protest against the offense in question. Expressions of gratitude are too rare to exhibit any such patterns. But, when they do occur, they are so elaborate that a long history of development is to be inferred. Yet the epics provide scarcely any trace of earlier, more primitive forms.

One such form, however, is apparent: the wordless display of gratitude wherein one responds to an action with an action. At P 147, Glaukos reproaches Hektor with the words οὐκ ἄρα τις χάρις ἦεν μάρνασθαι, because the latter has failed to rescue the corpse of Sarpedon, although Sarpedon had been of great help to him, and threatens, in response to Hektor's negligence, to go on strike. At I 316-17, using the same words, Achilleus complains about Agamemnon. In the *Odyssey,* Penelope reproaches Antinoos for his intention to kill Telemachos, although (as she explicitly states) Odysseus has saved his life (π 418-33, especially 430-33). In these and similar cases, the indictment never concerns the absence of a verbal expression of gratitude, but always the absence of a material one. These indignant responses to the failure to demonstrate gratitude reveal, more distinctly than existing expressions of gratitude could ever do, that the concept of gratitude is well integrated in the Homeric world.

Beyond this, there is no parallel between apologies and expressions of gratitude. In its most solemn form, the giving of thanks could conceivably have embodied simultaneously both a material and a verbal aspect. Instead, both epics mirror a development from the gesture in return (δ 695, Ω 33-34, and others) to purely verbal expressions (ξ 53, for instance, and Ψ 647-50), while Ξ 235 possibly represents an intermediate phase.[27]

In the pages above, an occasional attempt has been made to find explanations for failure to give thanks. These have at best validity only for each individual case. Modern scholarship tends to display a certain admiration for the behavior of Homeric heroes.

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[27] See above, pp. 112-14.

In this connection, the scarcity of expressions of gratitude in the epics is of some interest. A general explanation for this scarcity may perhaps be found in the circumstance that the epics depict societies in which both givers and receivers are in their struggle for survival to a high degree subject to external forces beyond their control so that not much room is left for non-essential gestures of giving, of hospitality or assistance. On this point, Bruno Snell remarks, 'Da 'geistige' Bindungen fehlen (i.e. ties of friendship that grow and are confirmed by sharing opinions and feelings) ist alles gemeinschaftliche Leben umso stärker an feste konventionelle Begehungen und Formen geknüpft'.[28] Thus, offers of prizes in contests, assistance, and the like, arise not through feelings but because the structure of society necessitates them. Consequently, such giving is felt to be merely the correct, normal thing, and to give thanks remains superfluous. At I 225-28, in his confrontation with Achilleus, Odysseus in his role of a diplomat formulates a compliment, but does not give thanks for Achilleus' welcoming address and the meal which follows. The striking friendliness of this welcome—Achilleus calls his guests not only φίλοι but even φιλτάτω and φίλτατοι in the span of a few lines—is not a genuine expression of existing friendship, but rather an undue flattery. At the end of their meeting, Achilleus betrays how far from intimate their relationship really is.[29]

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[28] Dichtung und Gesellschaft, p. 45.

[29] Cf. 'Courtesy', pp. 86-89, esp. p. 89.

PART B

CHAPTER FIVE

THE MANNERS OF MENELAOS

1. *Menelaos' Concern for Public Opinion*

People conform to the requirements of etiquette for many reasons. Perhaps the strongest incentive for Menelaos is his concern for the impression he makes on his fellows and for their opinion of him. At Z 350-51 Helen complains about Paris, 'I wish I had had a good man for a lover who knew the sharp tongues and just rage of men'. It cannot be determined whether she means Hektor (to whom she is talking), Menelaos, or no one in particular,[1] but the description fits Menelaos very well. His actions are determined by conscious respect for public opinion. At Ψ 591-92 Antilochos placates Menelaos after a confrontation by offering him the horse he has won in a contest. Menelaos allows him to keep the horse, 'so these men too may know my temper is not cruel and overbearing'.

In itself Menelaos' gesture has nothing to do with good or bad manners; it is a matter of generosity. By offering a reason for generosity, however, one suggests that one is not naturally generous. We are led to suspect that the consideration revealed in the explanation has helped the speaker overcome—for the moment, at least—his natural stinginess. The explanation robs the act of its generosity, and, rightly or wrongly, the speaker makes a bad impression.

As for the argument itself, Homeric etiquette does not require a show of modesty. Menelaos does not hesitate to proclaim his forbearance rather than allow people to decide for themselves whether or not he is cruel. His policy is readily understandable: earlier, during his dispute with Antilochos, he has acted with austerity and disdain, before witnesses. Now, after his opponent's conciliatory gesture, he senses it is time to change the impression of harshness he must have made on the bystanders if he is to retain their esteem.

Had he refrained from giving such a reason for his return to

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[1] Z 350-51; I prefer 'I had the good man' (following Voss-Rupé) to 'I had had a good man' (Fitzgerald); see B. Snell, 'Was die Alten von der schönen Helena dachten', in *Über Literatur und Geschichte. Festschrift für Gerhard Storz* (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1971), p. 13.

friendliness and simply expressed appreciation for Antilochos' move toward reconciliation, he would have been the perfect gentleman. If his earlier harsh performance had made an unfavorable impression, it could have easily been corrected by gracious words. Instead he cites his concern for the opinion of the people present as his reason for reconciliation with Antilochos. It appears to be a diplomatic, perhaps even a logical, mistake. When seen in combination with the lack of modesty he has shown, it seems to invite further unpleasantness and embarrassment for the witnesses. Yet the following lines seem to indicate that the poet considers that the incident has been brought to a satisfactory conclusion, for as soon as Menelaos finishes speaking, everyone focuses his attention on the distribution of prizes. There is no indication that this could be interpreted as an attempt to cover up an embarrassing misunderstanding.

One cannot escape the impression that the cause of truth is served by Menelaos' bold words. When truth and tact conflict, Homeric society prefers truth. In the epics a subjective conscience is replaced by the objective institution of public opinion in determining what is becoming and unbecoming. A member of early Greek society was as good or as bad as his reputation.[2] Menelaos conforms to the expectations of his society.

In Δ 148-87 Menelaos is wounded, and Agamemnon fears that the wound is fatal. When he speaks to Menelaos he betrays the fact that his fear concerns not Menelaos' suffering but the possible reaction of his compatriots and even of his enemies. If Menelaos dies, the Greeks will want to return home, bringing shame to them and especially to Agamemnon, for 'in my mind's eye I see some arrogant Trojan on the grave of Menelaos ... leaping to say: "... [Agamemnon] brought an army of Akhaians here for nothing,and sailed back in the long ships again to his own land—but had to leave Menelaos behind!" Someone will say it, and let the vast earth yawn for me that day!' (Δ 176-82).

Menelaos is aware that Agamemnon believes he is dying. He has a right to expect expression of concern from those about him, especially from his own brother. Yet it does not disturb him that Agamemnon's chief concern is not for him but for possible Trojan ridicule. Menelaos not only accepts Agamemnon's anxiety about

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[2] Cf. W. Luther, *Wahrheit und Lüge*, p. 112 and note.

public opinion, he shares it. And so he proceeds to set Agamemnon's mind at ease. It is clear that in his opinion, too, the impression one makes on others is the most important thing—indeed, the only thing—worth discussing in the face of any wound he may ever incur.[3]

This does not mean that he subordinates his own interests to those of society. He who manages to forestall public ridicule ends up with feelings spared, which is very much in one's own interest. Nor, on the other hand, does Menelaos care nothing about society; on the contrary, he considers the reputation of Agamemnon and the Greek army to be more important than his own destiny. If Menelaos dies, the troops may give up and go home; the disaster, then, is not Menelaos' death or, even, the army's aborted mission but what people are going to say.

A person so concerned about his reputation may be expected to be very much aware of the impression he makes on others. He will tend to act in such a way as to create certain impression. Menelaos' concern for his reputation obliges him to abide by the existing social rules, and he does so with convincing vigor.

2. *Menelaos' Manner of Requesting Assistance*

At P 248-55 Menelaos needs assistance to recover the body of Patroklos. In the turmoil of battle he is unable to make out the identity of each of the men who are in positions to help. Still, he says, he hopes they will heed his call. This statement implies an apology for his failure to address each of them by the name. By itself, such an apology is an expression of courtesy. Yet perhaps his words are prompted not by courtesy but by fear that anyone who does not hear himself addressed by name will not believe he is being summoned, and will disregard the call. If that is true, Menelaos

[3] See, however, C. Barck, *Menelaos bei Homer*, p. 18: 'Keiner bleibt in so überlegener Weise Herr der Lage wie Menelaos, der hier selbst seinen Bruder beschämt und mit dem hohen Maße an Selbstbeherrschung, wie es von einem verantwortlichen Feldherrn erwartet wird, weiterhin seine Stelle ausfüllt'. Barck compares the attitude of Menelaos to Agamemnon's and furthermore to those of Diomedes and Odysseus who, after their injuries, abandon the battlefield and retreat to the ships. In contrast with these two heroes, Menelaos is only slightly wounded. This fact does not exactly serve him to put Diomedes and Odysseus to shame. Further, if really he had been injured as seriously as Agamemnon feared, his state of mind would probably have shown a greater similarity to Agamemnon's. His sober reaction provides no reason to praise his composure and self-control in view of the slight degree of his injury.

is more concerned about the practical effect of his behavior than about its courtesy. Perhaps he feels he has reason to complain of a lack of a spirit of community and mutual help among his fellows. In fact, this assumption is underlined by his words 'Let each one come forward on his own against the shame of seeing Trojan dogs sport with Patroklos' (254-55). Aware that his inability to name the men whose help he seeks may make his summons ineffectual, he appeals to their own initiative and their feelings for Patroklos.

The first line of his speech contains a general epithet for those addressed. He calls them φίλοι and, for the sake of emphasis and precision, ἡγήτορες ἠδὲ μέδοντες. That sounds quite satisfactory; but, as though fearing that this characterization may not be sufficiently persuasive, that those epithets may have failed to capture their full attention, he adds three full lines on the respectability of their rank (249-51). In these lines he gives special attention to their habit of accepting the hospitality of the Atrides and of drinking wine at the community's expense.

References to this kind of thing are quite common. In Δ 257-64 Agamemnon expresses *in extenso* his admiration for Idomeneus as a drinker of wine, and admonishes him to fight as formidably. In M 310-11 Sarpedon exhorts Glaukos to fight by asking rhetorically what other activity is habitually rewarded with—among other things—full cups. They must fight, he says, 'that Lycian men ... may say: 'They are no common men, our lords ... They eat fat lamb ... and drink rare vintages, but the main thing is their fighting power'.' (317-21) At Δ 343-48 Agamemnon reproaches Menestheus and Odysseus for responding less eagerly to a challenge than to the Atrides' invitations to dinner.

To drink wine at the community's expense is an honor, but a reminder of this privilege is not intended as mere flattery. People thus privileged incur responsibilities toward those who provide the wine. No matter how flatteringly (Δ 257-64) or how insultingly (Δ 343-48) people remind others of the honor they have received, their intention is to spur the honored ones to perform a duty of some sort. Here Menelaos only reminds the others of the honor bestowed on them; he omits any mention of its consequences, as in Books M and Δ the other speakers do. The omission reveals his courtesy.

Whether because of his innate courtesy or the practical disadvantage involved in failing to address his potential helpers

personally, his inability to do so troubles him greatly. His distress is evident in the construction of his speech. It occupies eight lines in all, four of which consist of an attempt to indicate the men whom he is trying to address to the extent that circumstances allow. In the following two lines Menelaos volunteers an explanation for the vagueness of his address. In the remaining two lines he formulates his request more solicitously than would have been necessary had he been able to call them by their proper names and titles. All this is done at the cost of what he really has to say. Only the two words τις and ἴτω serve this purpose in the main clause; all of the needed information on where the helpers have to go, and why, has to be drawn from a dependent clause. We may conclude that the correct form of communication required personal address, upon pain of complications if the speaker needed the other's goodwill and help.

Earlier in the same book (P 120-22) Menelaos has the good fortune of being able simply to follow the basic rule of conduct in this respect: Αἴαν δεῦρο, πέπον! The person whose help he needs is called by his name and gets his summons, with a short but friendly epithet. Then follow, in clear order and without complications, the necessary statements concerning 'where' and 'why'. In contrast to the state of affairs at 248-55, the atmosphere remains simple and relaxed. As a result, everything runs smoothly; Menelaos does not have to resort to appeals and explanations. Menelaos asks Aias for help another time at Λ 465-71. He summons him by name, but this time he bestows on him a full line of epithets.

Menelaos' appeal at P 248-55 shows a lack of proper appreciation of titles; an apologetic statement atones for it. The summons at P 120-22 employs a brief but friendly epithet. The appeal at Λ 465-71 uses a lengthy, almost wheedling approach. These differences have no effect on the outcome: in each of the three instances Menelaos receives the help he has requested without delay. This circumstance might tempt us to conclude that it does not matter how cursorily or elaborately one addresses a man whose help is sought; but the differences are not to be overlooked. At P 120-22 Patroklos has been killed and his corpse is in the hands of the enemy. The emergency does not allow for lengthy compliments. If measures are to be taken at all, they must be taken at once. The recovery of Patroklos' body is a matter of the utmost urgency. The state of affairs at Λ 465-71, however, is clouded by

doubt. Menelaos believes that Odysseus needs help, but only because he has heard a faint shout coming from somewhere near Odysseus in the midst of the dust and turmoil (466—ἀμφι ... Ὀδυσσῆος). The urgency of the need for action is much less clear than at P 248-55. The reasons Menelaos gives for asking for Aias' help are necessarily vague: 'A faint shout has reached my ears—Odysseus' voice it is, as though the man were in trouble'. and, 'I am afraid some hurt will come to him'. Menelaos needs to be more persuasive here than at P 120-22 if he is to get the assistance he seeks, and so he addresses Aias in greater detail. Thus it is easy to see that a brief address is sufficient in a situation of clear and undoubted emergency, that in an ambiguous situation the address must be more elaborate, and that if a personal address is impossible one must compensate for its lack by offering lengthy declarations and circumlocutions in order to meet the requirements of etiquette.

3. *Menelaos' Approach to the Gods*

The only god whom Menelaos addresses in the *Iliad* is Zeus, and the only passage where this address takes the form of a prayer is Γ 351-68. The occasion is his duel with Paris. Before throwing his lance, Menelaos asks Zeus to grant him revenge as an insulted host: 'Let him be humbled, ... and hearts in those born after us will shrink from treachery to a host who offers love'.

The moralizing tone is striking—humanity needs a lesson. Anyone who overhears the prayer—and, to be sure, Menelaos speaks loudly and the crowd is large—is to be impressed by the atrocious injustice done and by the obvious merits of his case. Although his prayer shows no sign of arrogance, it does betray such a wealth of self-confidence that a bystander might find it irritating;[4] yet no one does. Barck rightly states, 'Menelaos kämpft hier nicht für sich; er kämpft für ein unverbrüchliches Recht, das ihn und seinen Streit überdauert ..., während das persönliche Unrecht an dem betrogenen Gatten demgegenüber in den Hintergrund tritt. Das Gebet besitzt also regulativen Charakter'.[5] Furthermore, the poet, as Barck points out, has placed 'die Gestalt des Menelaos auf der

[4] There is some hypocrisy in his argument why Paris should be humbled. By not postponing his business trip to Egypt, he was able to provide his guest with no more than the bare bones of hospitality. Hospitality as a matter of form is less than generous when one prefers to put one's duties as a patriarch ahead of one's duties as a host.

[5] *Menelaos bei Homer*, Wiener Studien 84 (1971), p. 20.

Grenze zwischen Vor- und Rückverweis'.[6] Menelaos summarizes what happened in the past (violation of hospitality rights) and what ought to happen in the future (avoidance of such infringements). But the manner in which he speaks to Zeus raises two questions: whether his words are fitting as part of a prayer, and whether they are really intended for the ears of Zeus or for those of the bystanders.

When Menelaos invokes the assistance of Zeus before his attack on Paris, he indicates by the words he chooses that this prayer may also have another intent—he points out the justice of his case for the moral benefit of all mortals present. Thus the prayer assumes the character of a public speech intended to arouse in the listeners as much sympathy as possible for the cause the speaker represents. If this is what Menelaos has in mind, he must take care not to make the slightest breach of society's rules. A man who attempts to convince his listeners of the righteousness of his cause cannot afford to risk losing their sympathy by displaying bad manners. We may therefore assume that by Homeric standards this prayer is correct in form and content.

Zeus, the god for whose help Menelaos appeals, gets hardly a compliment. The epithet ἄνα (Γ 351) is the only expression in the speech that meets this description, although the acknowledgment of Zeus as a patron of hospitality, implied in the prayer as a whole, is a tribute too, however indirect. The tone of the prayer is characteristic not of one who asks a favor but of one who makes a claim. This tone, in conjunction with the apparent care with which Menelaos' words are tailored to his mortal audience, may lead readers accustomed to the Christian tradition to doubt the correctness of his approach to this god. Indirectly, it appears from Γ 449-61 (especially lines 453 and 461) that Menelaos has the full sympathy of the others. Apparently no one takes offense at his behavior. No one considers that he has insulted Zeus by addressing him with words actually intended for mortal ears. If Menelaos' prayer is accepted as proper by his listeners, we may assume that it appeared proper to the poet, and probably also by the society in which the poet lived.

Before Menelaos threw his lance in this decisive duel, the poet wished him to summarize briefly the cause of the party who, in

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[6] P. 12.

the poet's opinion, had justice on his side. He could have done so in a speech addressed to the Trojans, but such a speech was likely to turn into a series of blunt accusations. The poet avoided this unfortunate possibility by putting his arguments into a prayer. Moreover, by directing his words officially to Zeus, Menelaos emphasizes the solemnity of the moment. Direct reproaches are avoided, his words gain impact, and Menelaos is provided with an opportunity to make an exemplary, admirable, almost priestly impression.

After casting his lance, Menelaos resumes his speech. From now on his words can certainly not be described as a prayer. He reproaches Zeus for thwarting him. His words, 'Father Zeus, of all the gods, none is more cruel ... than you are' (Γ 365) clearly lack respect. But this exclamation is only an introduction to the three following lines: 'my spear slipped ... and ... my sword is shattered' (366-68). Menelaos does not accuse Zeus of doing or failing to do anything to deserve the epithet 'cruel', nor does he give any indication that he intends to continue quarreling with the god. The speech begun with such rancor at Γ 365 quickly fades into a fit of temper. It is his bad luck he rails against now. The scene offers a sharp contrast to Ψ 439-41, where Menelaos rebukes Antilochos in the same way but follows his reproach with a series of abusive remarks. And at X 15-20 Achilleus directs a very personal reproach to Apollo, 'Deadliest of immortal gods, you put me off the track, turning me from the wall ... You saved my enemies with ease and stole my glory ... I'd take it out on you, if I had the power'. In Γ, in contrast, Menelaos merely complains about what has happened to him. The speech appears to be pure self-expression.

Yet the poet apparently intended to provide a more personal tone to Menelaos' second speech to Zeus. The first invocation is introduced only by the participle ἐπευξάμενος, governed by the clause 'After him [Paris] ... Menelaos was ready to let go the bronze spear'.[7] This is the poet's device to subordinate the prayer to the action of the duel. The second speech is announced with much more emphasis: 'Lifting his eyes to heaven he groaned: ...' (Γ 364) The first speech has a secondary function, it motivates the attack and is for that reason quite proper as a purely official

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[7] Γ 349-50; translation by Lattimore.

prayer. But the way the second speech is introduced suggests that it has an independent function. Despite the impersonal tone of Menelaos' words in the second speech, the poet wishes the scorning of Zeus to be understood as the scorning of Zeus and not as a more or less undirected outpouring of abusive language. Nor do these words to Zeus serve to disguise an appeal to his audience, as the first speech does.

Altogether Menelaos shows good manners in his treatment of Zeus in a number of ways. He stops to pray before commencing the duel. He calls Zeus ἄνα. (This brief term cannot stand comparison with the lengthy series of epithets that the epic heroes typically take the trouble to develop—Menelaos not excepted as Λ 465 shows —ἄνα is a religious epithet; it will do.[8]) Further, Menelaos displays his appreciation of Zeus as a patron of hospitality; and, finally, he endows the things he has to say with special import by calling upon Zeus. If he had not held Zeus in high regard, he would not have bothered to involve him in the proceedings.

It is true that he uses his invocation of Zeus as a rhetorical device, but this is quite a normal thing to do. Achilleus' prayer in T 270-75 is no less rhetorical and much less adroit: halfway through his prayer, Achilleus turns to his human audience and discusses in the third person the very god he has been addressing.[9] By his choice of words Menelaos lays himself open to the charge of dissimulation, though it cannot easily be proven. But Homeric audiences did not take offense at either Menelaos' or Achilleus' behavior on these occasions. Despite the esteem in which they held the gods, they took real interest in divine intervention only when a direct connection could be made between eartly events and divine influence. No one cared about the feelings of gods. Certainly nobody worried that Zeus might feel offended if he discovered that words presumably addressed to him were actually intended to influence other mortals. On the contrary, to the Homeric public the words of Menelaos and Achilleus obtained higher sanction by the invocation of Zeus, even as purely a matter of form.

Nor were Homer's audiences offended by the fact that Menelaos' appeal for assistance sounds rather like a show of righteousness.

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[8] Odysseus addresses Nausikaa with the title ἄνασσα (ζ 175) indicating that he chooses to treat her as a goddess (cf. line 149).

[9] L. A. Post justly asserts, 'Achilles' prayer is neither theological nor religious; it is pure legal diplomacy' (*The Moral Pattern*, p. 159, n. 1).

Paris' transgressions have indeed given Menelaos the right to Zeus' support. To refrain from insisting on one's right and to shape one's wish in the form of a reverent request may be fitting in the Christian view, but in the Homeric world such behavior would have been regarded as a sign of weakness, even of lack of trust in the integrity of the god in question.

As a sign that his confidence in the god had been shaken, his cursing was likely to increase the public's understanding sympathy for Menelaos and his situation. After his initial cursing exclamation, Menelaos keeps himself under better control than Achilleus does in his address to Apollo. Achilleus hurls at Apollo a series of personal reproaches; Menelaos remains prudent enough to voice his anger at Zeus only indirectly, by reviewing his setbacks.

N 631-33 might, according to Leaf, be excluded from the interpolation N 631-39. They constitute a remark directed to Zeus, but they belong at the same time to a speech to the Trojans (620-39). Menelaos has killed Peisandros (610-19). Instead of being happy about his success,[10] he addresses himself in a resentful, grudging way, first to his enemies and now to Zeus: 'Father Zeus, incomparable they say you are among all gods and men for wisdom; yet this battle comes from you. How strange that you should favor the offenders'.

Again it is not Zeus but the public, the Trojans specifically, whom Menelaos really addresses. Even in the part of his speech that is formally directed to Zeus, most of the emphasis falls on the expression ὑβριστῇσι. By turning his formal attention to Zeus, he endows his characterization of the Trojans as offenders and

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[10] W. M. A. van de Wijnpersse contends: 'Each time we find Menelaos in combat with an adversary of whose inferiority he is convinced' (*Menelaos. Odyssee* 4 *en Ilias passim*, p. 276), thus suggesting that Menelaos takes care always to choose adversaries who are inferior to himself. That such is not the case is evident from H 101-03, where Menelaos declares himself to be ready—and really sets out to prepare himself—for a duel with Hektor. Yet the fact remains that all of his adversaries in single combat do turn out to be inferior to him. C. Barck remarks, 'Während seiner Aristie ... tritt er immer Einzelgegner entgegen, die durch ihren hohen Rang wesentlich seinen Ruhm mehren' (*Menelaos bei Homer*, p. 15). That statement is correct: Menelaos' adversaries serve his fame by their high rank rather than by their use of arms. Menelaos is wise enough not to boast about his success, or to display any degree of pride or joy. Barck further notes, 'Seine Wappnungsszenen ... sind vergleichsweise bescheiden gezeichnet ..., die Glanzsymbolik eines leuchtenden Helmbügels oder die Waffengestik des wippenden Helmbusches ... fehlen' (*ibid.*).

outrageous people (Lattimore) with nearly as much solemnity and certainly more convincing power than he could have done by throwing the word in their faces as a curse, as he does in lines 621 and 622. Also, by switching from a direct address, in which he automatically honors the Trojans by his personal involvement with them, to an indirect one, he gives himself the opportunity to let contempt sound through his speech. His transition suggests the thought 'I might just as well stop talking to them, because there is no reasoning with them'. Further, his implication that if ever the Trojans acquired help from Zeus, this assistance would be objectionable, could be formulated all the more elegantly in this way. Here, too, Zeus is invoked for a rhetorical purpose. But this manipulation is accompanied by such proper religious behavior that his good manners get full exposure: he speaks of the μῆνις of Zeus Xeinios as hanging over the Trojans' heads, and he mentions the wisdom of Zeus—although he follows it with a conjunction that suggests the contrary. At P 171-73 Hektor introduces a comparable criticism of someone else's understanding in the same manner, but he continues explicitly: νῦν δέ σευ ὠνοσάμην πάγχυ φρένας.

Here, where Zeus is the target, Menelaos avoids any such unveiled criticism. He says only, with some vagueness, 'Yet τάδε πάντα come from you'—not, it should be noted, 'This battle comes from you'. Formally, it is left to Zeus to interpret 'all this' as he will—as the war, or the fact that everything has already been set in motion to avenge Menelaos, or the latter's victory over Peisandros, or the fate of that adversary, who would not have had to die if the revenge from Zeus had been a little quicker in coming. In short, Zeus is free to interpret Menelaos' words in any way he wishes; it is only the word 'yet' between the compliment on Zeus' wisdom and the remark about 'all this' that indicates that Menelaos means to incriminate Zeus and to cast doubt on his wisdom. In its form it is the most prudent reproach in the epics. Ultimately, to be sure, Menelaos means to scorn the Trojans, not Zeus. If he seriously believes that Zeus alone is responsible for all his troubles, and if he therefore intends to reproach the god personally and directly, his speech falls short of the mark; to be effective it would have to be longer, sharper, more reckless, openly hostile. Menelaos restrains himself and thus manages to present the Trojans as the actual villains. No personal relationship between him and Zeus can be adduced from this speech, or from the earlier one either.

We find a different situation in the *Odyssey*. There Menelaos' explicit association with the gods is confined to his relations with Eidothea and her father, Proteus. It must be kept in mind that Menelaos himself is the narrator of this story, told in δ 351-592. He relates the story to Telemachos, who is younger by a generation and has something to learn from him. We may therefore expect that Menelaos takes care to appear to be a person who deals with the gods with as much propriety as possible, according to Homeric standards.

After an introduction, the main story starts at line 351, with a remark about the gods and their superior power: 'The gods held me still in Egypt ..., for I had not rendered complete hecatombs to them. The gods have always desired that their orders should be listened to'. These words contain no hint that he blames the gods for their opposition; indeed, true piety and respect are implied in his reference to the gods' orders.[11] He likes to think in terms of discipline, and he wants Telemachos to learn to think in those terms too.

For nineteen days Menelaos is marooned on the isle of Pharos; then, so he narrates, the goddess Eidothea takes pity on him. He emphasizes her pity by using more than one expression for it (ὀλοφύρατο καί μ' ἐλέησε [364]). He emphasizes his gratitude to the goddess as well. In doing so he displays indirect but nonetheless real courtesy toward the goddess, whether his purpose is primarily didactic or not. At the same time his compliment keeps Telemachos from misinterpreting the somewhat rough tone in which Eidothea asks Menelaos why he wants to stay on the island and be hungry: 'Are you flimsy-minded or are you enjoying hardships?' (371-72). Menelaos indicates that she is tactful enough not to 'mother' him, but in view of Telemachos' lack of experience he can do so only by presenting her words as a veiled expression of pity.[12]

He answers Eidothea: 'So I will tell, whoever you may be of the goddesses, that I am not detained of my own free will, but it must be I have offended the immortals ... But do you tell me, for the gods know everything, which one of the immortals hampers me'. (376-81) Four of these six lines contain a reference to or

[11] Piety and respect are also indicated in line 397, where he points out to Eidothea that it is 'hard' for a mortal to overpower a deity.

[12] Other passages where friendliness is masked for reasons of tact are mentioned in Chapter III, section 3.

description of the gods, no two the same. His piety appears somewhat exaggerated, but none of the four descriptions is superfluous in the context of what he wants Eidothea to understand. 'Whoever you may be of the goddesses' is a respectful way to address an unidentified goddess. In ε 445 Odysseus addresses an unknown river god in the same manner. Both Odysseus and Menelaos have an interest in making a favorable impression on the gods they address; consequently they have a practical reason to display good manners. Before ε 445 Odysseus has had no contact of any kind with the river god, and Odysseus' approach to him is perfectly neutral. But Menelaos is required to give an answer to a question put in a harsh, challenging tone, and might be expected to show less courtesy than Odysseus. On the contrary, the address Odysseus chooses, ἄναξ, ὅτις ἐσσι, sounds more casual than Menelaos' ἥ τις σύ πέρ ἐσσι θεάων. The latter address signifies a more personal approach based on courtesy rather than an impersonal interest in the identity of the goddess. In any case, neither Odysseus nor Menelaos is in a situation in which the identification of the immortal in question is a matter of primary importance. In each case the primary reaction is 'Here is a chance to get help'. Both addresses contain surrogates for the names of the deities; both speakers are willing to behave with the proper courtesy, as is shown by their use of a makeshift epithet, and, to be sure, the forms chosen are better than nothing. But like all epic heroes, neither man seems to be overwhelmed by the divinity of the deity.[13] One hopes to have his life saved, the other to collect vital information, but it occurs to neither of them to promise the god gratitude in general or sacrifices in particular.

Menelaos' prudence and tact are evident from his remark 'I am not detained of my own free will, but it must be I have offended the immortals'. One need not be oversensitive to criticism to view such a wording as 'The gods detain me' as an accusation against the gods, and against Eidothea as one of them. In his actual wording, he says only that his delay on Pharos is not voluntary; he does mention the gods, but he accuses only himself. He even expresses his supposition that the gods are the cause of his hardships with a mere μέλλω ἀθανάτους ἀλιτέσθαι. His behavior is modest. Nevertheless, while giving the answer he owes her, he makes his position

[13] See Chapter II, section 3.

quite clear to Eidothea without wasting words: he stays on the island not by choice but because the gods detain him.

In the next line he grasps the opportunity to compliment the gods—and especially Eidothea, whom he is addressing—on their omniscience. The compliment has a very plain and practical purpose: he wants to coax information from her. At the same time he is warning her—in the sense of: 'Don't try to tell me you don't know'. Here, the imperative εἰπέ has the character more of a command than of a request.

In all this Menelaos instructs Telemachos in the proper way to deal with a deity: self-confidently, without much flattery or ceremony, but certainly with formal respect. There is no need to address a god with a long string of complimentary epithets, but his name should be used. The only permissible excuse for failure to address the god by name is ignorance, which is to be expressed in a way that serves as an apology. As the gods' only importance lies in their involvement in human affairs it is unnecessary to lose oneself in endless homage that leads to no concrete result. One does better to discuss plainly whatever (human) matter is at stake.

Menelaos' later conversation with Proteus (462-569) is much shorter. He addresses him three times, each time more curtly. The first time Proteus speaks to him, Menelaos introduces his reply with the remark that Proteus has asked him unnecessary questions. This conversation takes place immediately after the fight Proteus has forced on him. This circumstance serves to excuse Menelaos' behavior, his unveiled impatience and indignation. Moreover, Proteus, too, is complimented on his omniscience when Menelaos asks him the same question he put earlier to Eidothea.

In his second reply (485-90) Menelaos concentrates on questioning Proteus at length. Apart from being detailed, this question, unlike his earlier one, has not been suggested by Eidothea. This time Menelaos thrusts himself forward: his questioning is not necessary, and he has no divine backing for it. In line 486 Menelaos confronts Proteus with these words: 'But come now, tell me this and give me an accurate answer'. This is a formula more fitting for a human confrontation than for an attempt to elicit information from a god. But in truth Menelaos is making a demand rather than a request.

In response to this not altogether necessary question, Proteus takes the trouble to give a detailed and lengthy reply (492-537). The only answer Menelaos vouchsafes is a somewhat crusty 'These

then I know'. Although this abruptness can be explained by the inner turmoil he experiences at hearing of the fates of his former comrades, it nevertheless gives him an unintentional air of arrogance toward Proteus. Since this remark introduces his next question, this question too acquires the character of a somewhat haughty demand.

The difference in the degrees of respect with which Menelaos treats these two deities reflects the difference in the poet's purposes in bringing these gods on the stage. Eidothea is the actual rescuer; despite his divinity, Proteus has been captured by a human being. Proteus has thus lost any right he might otherwise have to the deference of this mortal.

Menelaos' exigency and impatience after Proteus' detailed account help to make his behavior even more directly personal than his conduct toward Eidothea. In the *Iliad* he treats Zeus impersonally but respectfully; his way of dealing with the insignificant goddess, while still respectful, is more personal. The least respectful and at the same time the most personal treatment is shown in Menelaos' confrontation with Proteus. Proteus' divinity is a borderline case. The poet calls him 'the old man of the sea'. The only one who acknowledges his divinity explicitly is Menelaos himself, in his global statement about the omniscience of the gods. But Proteus is not allowed to share in the youthfulness typical of the gods, and a goddess enables a mortal to capture him.

Telemachos can draw his conclusion now: the lower the status of a god, the more personal—according to Menelaos—can one's behavior toward him be. To put it another way, restraint in one's personal approach to a god is a sign of homage. Now we can understand why Menelaos, while enjoying the special protection of Athena, is never shown even so much as addressing her.[14]

4. *Menelaos' Behavior in Correcting the Conduct of Others*

Lines δ 31-32, where Menelaos criticizes his servant, have already been mentioned.[15] A little later he again adopts a critical attitude. This time it is the young guests themselves—who have meanwhile been invited into Menelaos' house and admitted to the festive dinner—who in his eyes have made a mistake.

In δ 71-75 they whisper about the luxurious appointments of Menelaos' house. Telemachos surmises that Zeus' home must look

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[14] See Barck, *Menelaos bei Homer*, p. 19.

[15] See Chapter II, section 1b.

much like this. Despite the whispering, Menelaos overhears the remark, and he replies: 'Dear children, there is no mortal who could rival Zeus'. (78) This is the introduction to a lengthy speech in which Menelaos points out that the riches Telemachos has admired must be viewed in their proper perspective: there may or may not be a mortal who can rival him in possessions, it does not matter; Menelaos does not enjoy his riches, for they remind him too much of all the misery he has endured (80-112).

Menelaos has trouble accepting a compliment. Still, although his clumsiness is a product of genuine modesty,[16] the fact remains that he criticizes his young guests. Having done the same sort of thing more sharply to a servant at δ 31-36, Menelaos has twice within fifty lines grasped the opportunity to display his piety, and to embarrass a servant and a couple of youths who have had the misfortune to commit a slight faux pas with the best of intentions.

In itself, it is hardly a faux pas to express admiration for worldly things or beings by comparing them to the divine. Using a flattering term such as θεοείκελε or describing a person admiringly as θεοειδής was generally expected—in such cases a certain amount of exaggeration was expected. After frequent usage, exaggerations lose their force. and after this weakening process their use comes to be considered merely a sign of good manners or even elegance. But when a comparison with the divine is whispered where nobody can—or is supposed to—hear it, flattery or any other practical purpose is no longer at issue. In such a case the reference to the divine is exposed as an exaggeration in the highest degree and is consequently experienced as not altogether fitting.

Menelaos' correction of the two young people is not really done sharply; but then, the behavior criticized is no serious trespass. Indeed, inasmuch as the fault in question is merely a good trait overdone rather than maliciousness, the fact that Menelaos sees a reason to find fault with it—no matter the friendliness of his manner—gives an impression of misplaced pedantry. The first line of his speech shows his disapproval at its clearest. The introductory

[16] Van de Wijnpersse, p. 280, alleges: 'There he is the swanky millionaire saying that after Zeus he is the richest'. Menelaos does not say this; as a consequence he cannot be said to be flaunting his wealth. Homer's portrayal of Menelaos does not stir much sympathy for him. Menelaos is not the only hero thus subjected to distortion. The image of Paris has suffered even more in later times, on the basis of the opinions of Hektor and Helen rather than upon Paris' own words and deeds.

qualification τέκνα φίλα may be viewed as reassurance in advance and as proof that he is well disposed toward the young men. At the same time, however, it can be regarded as a sign that Menelaos thinks they are not acting their age. Surely he strikes the same protective attitude that Priamos—for more urgent and convincing reasons—assumes toward Helen in Γ 162 when he addresses her with φίλον τέκος. If that assumption is correct, Menelaos' reproof contains more than mere criticism of the comparison that Telemachos made. From Menelaos' viewpoint, the situation looks like this: He is just having a formal family dinner in celebration of the wedding of two of his children. Strangers arrive. He is kind enough to take the interruption in stride and to admit the uninvited guests to his dinner. The strangers accept his welcome matter-of-factly, although they must realize that they are intruding on the family's privacy. Undoubtedly it was a matter of convention to invite them, although it must be remembered that a seasoned old servant was apparently able to hit upon a different idea (δ 26-29), and that Menelaos' reaction to his servant's intervention (30-36) was vehement enough to make one suspect that he needed to subdue a contrary impulse himself. Whatever the truth may be, the strangers are allowed to join the party. Even if their presence does not create a disturbance of any consequence, they cannot help attracting attention. And they have hardly taken their seats at dinner when they start a whispered conversation. Their host's irritation at the whispering appears from the fact that he directs his reproof not only to Telemachos, who has made the comparison with Zeus, but to both of the guests.

The epics offer hardly any indication as to whether whispering in company was held to be objectionable or not. Whispering does not occur at all in the *Iliad*; in the *Odyssey* it occurs only three times. After this passage it occurs again in ρ 592-97, where the whispering contributes to the atmosphere of conspiracy. There Eumaios gives Telemachos, in leaving, a last, whispered incitement, warning against and cursing those who are not supposed to hear his words. Thus the basis for an unwritten social ban was in existence, since any whispering could be taken as a sign of veiled hostility toward people present. Similar conditions are found in α 158-77, where Telemachos in the presence of the suitors whispers a hostile remark about them into the ear of Athena-Mentes, and where their physical distance from the suitors is prompted by distrust and

enmity (see α 132-35). Those affected consider themselves improperly treated, as we can see in the critical questions by Eurymachos (α 405-11).

Two of the three times it occurs, whispering is loaded with hostility. The evidence, while hardly overwhelming, tends to support the assumption that Menelaos is already irritated by the mere fact of the whispering. But if he is, why does he express his annoyance deviously, by criticizing the comparison of his possessions to those of Zeus, rather than by criticizing the whispering itself? Telemachos and Peisistratos are guests. Menelaos can no more attack his guests directly on this point than can Eurymachos in Book α. Whatever he can do within the range of hospitable behavior, however, he does: he listens sharply in the hope of catching a remark he can disagree with in order to provoke an open discussion. First, his interjection does put an end to the whispering. Second, his tactic remains a hint—so veiled that no guests' feelings can really be hurt—that something is indeed wrong with their behavior. An important circumstance should be kept in view here: if Menelaos had not succeeded in overhearing something that could be made the subject of a rebuke, the whispering would have met with as little resistance as Eumaios' in ρ 592-97. It is to be remembered that lack of courtesy is generally accepted in the epics as long as no protest against the specific act or words is possible.[17] Protests concern another's deeds or words, not the way in which they are said or done. Eurymachos, who is a special case in that matters of etiquette seem to be a hobby with him, provides the exception; [18] so, to some degree, does Paris (Γ 60 and Z 518-19).[19]

Menelaos is in luck: the opportunity is given to him to stay within the bounds of elegance. His criticism affects people who are socially his inferiors. Any protest he might have uttered against an equal would have been an act of aggression. Unlike Paris, Menelaos is not skilled in the art of being aggressive and elegant at the same time. But with Telemachos and Peisistratos, his reaction can assume the form of a mild and friendly reprimand.

In H 96-102 he does indeed correct his equals. When no one dares to accept Hektor's challenge to single combat, Menelaos erupts in fury. He abuses his fellow combatants, speaks of infamy, throws a

[17] See the discussion of E 349 in Chapter II, section 3.
[18] See the discussion of π 442-48 in Chapter IV.
[19] See Chapter I, section 3.

curse on them, and calls them names, all by way of introduction to a declaration that he himself is ready to accept Hektor's challenge. (101) To put it mildly, this is a striking kind of introduction. His intention to accept the challenge would have appeared more serious without it. This way, it rather looks as though the introduction is no introduction, but rather the main theme of the speech. If it is, we are dealing here with one of the most fierce *hortationes* in the epic. Although in that case his announced readiness to enter into the duel may be little more than a poignant, partly rhetorical conclusion to his speech, he nonetheless prepares himself seriously enough to put his announcement into action. He offers one qualifying thought, though. Menelaos realizes that he may be taken at his word, that the Greeks may indulge his presumed wish to enter into an action that seems no more desirable to him than it does to them. And so he adds a remark intended to made clear to the Greeks the responsibility they will assume and how serious the consequences may be. He covertly asserts that after the duel they will be stuck with a dead Menelaos. The most obvious reason for recovering Helen—in other words, their best excuse for making war on Troy—will be eliminated. He adds, 'Out of our hands, in the gods' hands ... ultimate power over victory lies'. (102) That he makes this contention in this particular context could be understood as a sign that he does not trust the gods.[20] But he does not even trade upon lack of trust in the gods on the part of the Greeks. His words do imply the following line of thought: 'Hektor is—as is well known—so much stronger than I that I shall survive a duel with him only with the help of divine intervention. If you make me fight with him, you will have to depend on a miracle. This is an improper way to act toward the gods. You will be guilty of the catastrophe'.

Menelaos likes to correct others. In this endeavor he controls a range of expression extending from the mildest indirection to direct scorn. δ 78-112 and H 96-102 are quoted here as extremes. Intermediate forms are used in his confrontations with Antilochos and Eteoneus in passages mentioned earlier;[21] more will follow. Altogether, Menelaos' performances create the impression that he enjoys regulating the behavior of other people. He is indignant if he is hindered in his attempts to do so (consider, for example his,

[20] See van de Wijnpersse, p. 274.
[21] See Chapter II, section 1b.

exchange with Proteus). In each case Menelaos' manners are well-nigh irreproachable. Still, he frequently finds fault with other people's demeanour and displays his displeasure with a degree of self-possession that must strike one as out of proportion to the offense committed.

According to today's conceptions of good manners, something was surely wrong with Menelaos' deportment; but in the epics no one is irritated. His reproofs are accepted without rancor, even with some humility, not only by the ill-starred culprits but by everyone else present. Obviously the poet has allotted to him the function of turning deviators back into the proper channels, in great as well as in trifling matters. The way in which Menelaos discharges this function is not held against him by those with whom the poet surrounded him.[22]

5. *Menelaos' Tact (with an excursion into the subject of discussing others in their presence)*

In the *Odyssey*, δ 113-22, a stranger visiting Menelaos holds his cloak with both hands to his eyes and weeps upon hearing the name of Odysseus. At this behavior Menelaos does not speak, nor does he take any kind of action. He takes his time deliberating whether he ought to leave his guest alone with his troubles or induce him to speak up and explain himself. Since Menelaos seems to be unable to decide, the first alternative automatically takes effect until Helen—much in the manner of a *deus ex machina*—makes her entrance. The splendor of her appearance (fourteen lines are devoted to its description) and her frank yet indirect question (138-39: 'Do we know ... who these men announce themselves as being?') force the guest to return to the business at hand. But even though Helen actually provides the solution to Menelaos' dilemma, his own tact has served his guest well, and seems to be indispensable. Yet despite his good intentions, Menelaos appears to be unable to solve the problem that the situation has provided. Admittedly, a stranger who comes in, receives food, and then starts crying after a few innocent remarks provides a painful situation many a host would

[22] This function perhaps is part of the system Barck, p. 11, describes: 'Jeweils bewirken seine [Menelaos'] Gestalt oder Tat ein entscheidendes Weitertreiben des Geschehens, dessen fernerer Verlauf sich dann jedoch unabhängig von seinem Verursacher vollzieht'. On p. 12 he concludes that the figure of Menelaos is positioned on the borderline between influencing the events and withdrawal.

have trouble dealing with. Altogether, throughout the scene the policy he follows may well be viewed as the best possible—and quite by chance, as far as Menelaos is concerned. Yet Menelaos' role in this situation should be paramount, and in reality it amounts to nothing. His good intentions of acting as the perfect host cannot save him from awkwardness and lack of initiative.

In δ 266-89, Menelaos reminds his wife that at the time of the sacking of Troy she attempted to betray the occupants of the wooden horse. His words are spoken as a reaction to Helen's panegyric on Odysseus, in which she refers to the fact that while the war was still in progress, at a time when no one could know who the victor would be, she realized that the Greek cause was more worthy than the Trojan (259-62).

Menelaos begins by expressing his assent to her speech in general. His behavior implies, first, that he is of one mind with her in her appreciation of Odysseus, and, second, that he agrees with her complimentary words about himself. But his assent also implies that he gives credence to her assertion of her innocence during the final stages of the war—something he is unable to do. And so he launches into an extensive treatment of her traitorous action in connection with the wooden horse. In lines 274-75 and 289 he states, 'You will have been moved by some divine spirit ... until ... Athena led you off'.

This scene takes place in the presence of Telemachos and Peisistratos. Up to this point the subject of the conversation has been Odysseus, but Menelaos only formally adopts this subject as his main theme. Helen has treated the question of her former allegiance as a matter of secondary importance. Menelaos makes that point the central issue. And Telemachos and Peisistratos, who wanted only to gather information about Odysseus, are forced to witness Menelaos' flaunting of Helen's dubious past. This is a painful scene for these involuntary witnesses—and not only for them.

In the presence of two young strangers, Helen must listen to a discourse covering sixteen lines (274-89) on the shameful role she has played, though unsuccessfully—or perhaps rather: and unsuccessfully at that [23]—and long after the conversion to which she has just referred. Technically, Menelaos discusses her past in order to disclose the important role played by Odysseus in regard to this

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[23] Cf. A. W. H. Adkins, *Threatening, Abusing and Feeling Angry*, p. 20.

detail in the story of the horse. Nevertheless, both she and the strangers can only too readily concentrate on the reproof to which she is subjected. The fact that these guests, a generation younger, are here collecting their first impressions of high society and the great world makes the reproach all the more humiliating.

From this point of view there is ample reason to accuse Menelaos of bad manners toward his wife and, in lesser degree, toward Telemachos and Peisistratos as well; to be part of this scene is no pleasure. Yet Menelaos' goodwill toward the other three participants in the conversation is beyond doubt. We are led to suspect, then, that his tactlessness is due only to akwwardness. It was the poet's design to establish an opportunity to tell a story within a story. The volubility, the manner in which Menelaos expresses himself, lending his narrative dramatic power, and the obvious pleasure with which he relates this episode can be explained by this circumstance. Yet the fact remains that of all the situations the poet could have devised for a discussion of this business, this is the one he chose. The presence of these two principals and these two witnesses turn this story, for all its intrinsic interest, into a painful affair.

The way the situation develops serves to confirm this perception of Menelaos' behavior as a matter of tactlessness. The poet, too, considered the Atride's manner tactless, and realized that a disruption of the conversation was now to be described or at least hinted at. Helen has been addressed, but she can give no answer. Yet the situation needs to be balanced in some way before the exchange can be ended. The most prominent of the two guests, Telemachos, serves this purpose. His speech covers five lines (291-95). In the first he expresses his regard for Menelaos. The next two lines contain a melancholy reference to Odysseus, who, after all, has been the subject of the conversation in the first place; and in the last two lines he proposes that everyone retire for the night.[24] His speech is short without being curt. He displays his tact by avoiding the subject of Helen. With admirable self-possession he puts an end to this session without hurting Menelaos' feelings by returning to the original theme and bringing it to a conclusion. In line 290 he is, accordingly, given the epithet πεπνυμένος.

Menelaos' reaction to Helen's words may be viewed in several

[24] Cf. Ameis-Hentze *ad loc.*: 'Der Wunsch kommt zur rechten Zeit, da das Gespräch eine peinliche Wendung zu nehmen drohte'.

ways. His manner may be considered to reflect the maladroitness of naiveté. In that case, the mention of Odysseus brings to his mind a story that, to everyone's misfortune, casts doubt on Helen's integrity, and in telling it he inadvertently denounces her as a liar; and he is so lacking in tact that he cannot help telling this story. L. A. Post believes that Menelaos, while speaking, notices his slip of the tongue and 'gallantly apologizes by asserting that some *daimon* must have commanded her to act so'.[25] Yet it is possible that Menelaos has the situation very well under control and that he is thoroughly aware of the consequences of telling the story. If that is true, his words can be understood as sarcasm, more or less along these lines: 'Yes, you certainly are right. And in that later business, long after your conversion—right?—you of all people were not responsible for what you did. So let's say it was a demon that made you do it'.

Neither of these suggestions is altogether acceptable. To be sure, Menelaos can be maladroit. We can see his ineptness in δ 116-20, and other passages that bear witness to that trait will be dealt with later. But he is not a simpleton, and his remark about the demon and Athena is more than an awkward but well-meant attempt to make up for a diplomatic lapse. As for the second view, nowhere in the epics does Menelaos' attitude toward Helen spring from hostility. Moreover, a remark about a demon intended as sarcasm would imply that Menelaos hardly believed in the existence of demons (and of Athena). But in approximately half of the passages in which he speaks, he either mentions a god or gods or addresses them. One may safely assume, then, that in his ideology the gods are firmly set in their proper places. Menelaos is in earnest; he searches for an explanation for an act that Helen would logically not have committed on the basis of both her insight and her emotions, and to which her condition as a kidnap victim, however voluntary, did not force her.

With a strong sense of justice and responsibility, he sees that if he is to accept Helen, he must accept the burden of her past as well. That affair of the wooden horse is no secret. Menelaos has to consider that Telemachos and Peisistratos either are already acquainted with the part Helen played in it or will hear of it sooner or later from others. He grasps the opportunity to submit her

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[25] *The Moral Pattern*, p. 167.

behavior to them as something deserving of a serious attempt at understanding.[26] Without denying her responsibility he refers to the existence of powers beyond her control. If Helen's conduct is excusable, it is mainly so because in the end she allowed Athena to be free to win.

In this way he defends her against an accusation that he has every reason to expect will be leveled against her by the world of which he is a part. He views and treats Telemachos and Peisistratos as representatives of that world. His guests, however, have not uttered this accusation, nor has the idea even occurred to them. Their interest is focused primarily not on Helen but on Odysseus. It would be easy for Menelaos to avoid the subject entirely. Unprompted, he introduces the subject of the wooden horse, and in defending his wife he inevitably draws attention to her guilt. Moreover, he does so in the presence of two very young people, making the situation all the more humiliating for Helen. He could easily have agreed with Helen's words without defending her. In praising Odysseus for the sake of his guests, he could have mentioned some other example of Odysseus' great and morally good influence—some story in which Helen played no part, or in which she at least did not figure as Odysseus' diabolical antagonist. But even though such a story would have enabled him to avoid this awkward situation, it would have done so only for the moment. In the long run, Helen's reputation—and therefore Menelaos' as well—are better served by as accurate and full a disclosure of her past as possible, so as to leave minimal room for imagination and gossip. This task is in better hands with Menelaos than with anyone else. No one else is so intimately involved with Helen; others would inevitably be much less interested in making the effort to get at the exact truth as long as the potential loss of Helen's reputation implied no loss of their own.

In short, this affair has many facets. Menelaos remains outwardly sympathetic; he suggests extenuating circumstances surrounding Helen's collaboration with the enemy. Further, although his words

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[26] In having Menelaos act this way, the poet used the figure of Menelaos to serve as a representative of himself in the *Odyssey*. Cf. Bruno Snell, 'Was die Alten von der schönen Helena dachten', in: *Über Literatur und Geschichte. Festschrift für Gerhard Storz* (ed. Bernd Hüppauf/Dolf Sternberger; Athenäum, s.a.), p. 8: '[Homer] müht sich, da sie nicht einfach nur edel und groß ist, mehr als bei irgendeiner anderen Figur darum, sie verständlich zu machen'.

are intended to tell his guests something about Odysseus and even about Helen, he bestows on her the honor of a personal address. At the same time, however, the form he chooses makes a clumsy impression, for the very fervor with which he tells in her presence a story that constitutes an accusation against her can be understood as a sign of hostility. If one views Menelaos' behavior in this light, and considers how thoroughly the implication of her guilt is commingled with the sympathy he displays, his praise of Odysseus begins to look like a cover for an attack upon his wife.

But Menelaos' words must be seen against the background of his search—and that of the poet and his society—for insight into the relationship between force majeure and human responsibility and the proper weight to give to each.[27] For Menelaos this problem is connected with the practical matter of the impact of public opinion on his and Helen's social position and themselves. For the sake of clearing Helen's name—for the sake, indeed, of insight and justice—it is not at all difficult for him to risk the appearance of bad manners and to care nothing about the disruption of the conversation provoked by his indiscreet remarks.

In Γ 97-110 Menelaos directs a speech to Greeks and Trojans alike. He intends to accept Paris' suggestion that the outcome of the war be decided by a duel, as Hektor has proposed. Menelaos strikes just the right conciliatory note. He addresses the two parties as if they were one homogenous group, 'You've borne so many hardships, taking part with me in the quarrel'. (99-100) Barck states justly, 'The stature of Menelaos is determined by responsibility. He knows that his honor underlies the misery of the Trojan war, that he is the immediate cause of the many sufferings of the soldiers. It shows his respect for the plight of the 'common' soldier'.[28] The greatness of this gesture, especially courteous to the extent that his Trojan enemies are included, becomes somewhat doubtful when one considers that in establishing this policy Menelaos is by no means thinking independently. In principle, a similar gesture has already been made by Hektor and Paris. Like Paris in lines 71-72, Hektor concludes the Trojan proposal with the words 'The winner is to take the treasure home, and take the woman'. (92-93) The duel is to be fought by Paris and Menelaos (69-70); if Paris is the winner, there is no need to take the treasure home—it

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[27] Cf. Z 344-58 and the discussion of that passage in Chapter I, section 3.
[28] *Menelaos bei Homer*, p. 12 (paraphrased).

is already there; he will not have to assume power over the woman —she is in his possession already. Thus Paris and Hektor imply their prognosis that Menelaos will win. Paris' suggestion that he may be the loser is made in front of a Trojan audience; it is not courteous modesty that makes him imply that his adversary will win, just realism. But it is quite another matter for Hektor to agree with him, and to say so in front of the enemy. To the Greeks, and especially to Menelaos himself, this must sound like uncommon courtesy, close to treachery to Hektor's own party. The urbanity of Menelaos' response, his equal treatment of friends and enemies, is evoked and largely determined by the Trojan's example.

Menelaos' way of relating to Hektor in the lines 102-107 contrasts his conciliatory approach to the Trojans and Hektor's own courteous attitude toward Menelaos himself. He declares his acceptance of the proposal, but in doing so he overlooks Hektor, and not only in the figurative sense: he ignores him, although Hektor is standing directly before him, and directs his conciliatory words to the Trojans at some distance behind Hektor. He even discusses Hektor in the third person, at least implicitly, when he refers to the sons of Priamos, whom he calls reckless and untrustworthy (106). Of course, the prime target of this acid remark is Paris, not Hektor or any of Priamos' other sons.[29] But Menelaos' request that Priamos be sent for to conclude the treaty in place of one of his sons alludes to the undesirability of Hektor for that function, for Hektor has been the prime mover in the negotiations until that moment. Even if Menelaos does not mean to reject the son of Priamos who is standing right before him, it seems hard for Hektor to avoid taking the qualification ὑπερφίαλοι καὶ ἄπιστοι as a personal snub. To some extent Menelaos makes up for it by adding that treaties should be concluded by older men, but this afterthought cannot obliterate the tactlessness.

No one censures Menelaos for this way of dealing with Hektor. On the contrary, all those present on both sides react with great joy. They react only to Menelaos' decision to accept the Trojan offer; seemingly no one is interested in the way he communicated his decision. He is, of course, at war with the Trojans, and he is

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[29] The insulting force of Menelaos' manner of speaking at Γ 106 results from the combination of three devices: his judgment is uninvited, he uses the generalizing plural, and he uses the third person instead of the second. See also Ameis-Hentze, comm. on Γ 106 and N 620-27.

the first to have suffered an insult and by, of all people, one of Priamos' sons. Besides, Menelaos' speech serves as a prelude to the breach of contract that will prove the Trojans' unreliability. In comparison, the claims of courtesy are of minor interest.

Γ 106 stands nonetheless in strange contrast to the rest of his speech. In line 99 he admits that he realizes how many hardships the Trojans as well as the Greeks have undergone. 'All of you', he says, embracing humanity in a phrase that bespeaks wisdom and courtesy. He makes just and objective remarks. His arguments in support of his preference of an older man to handle an important matter (108-10) are delivered so mildly that the younger men's feelings cannot be hurt. His sudden rudeness in line 106, however, clashes with the rest of his speech and with his behavior elsewhere. He can be clumsy, but showing contempt for his enemies is not characteristic of him.

That clumsiness in dealing with others leaps to the eye at Λ 487-88. With the help of Aias he has rescued Odysseus from the encircling Trojans and escorts him χειρὸς ἔχων to a spot where a servant comes to meet him with his chariot. Menelaos thus gives Odysseus physical support in front of all the combatants, friends and enemies alike. The reason seems sound enough—Odysseus is wounded; in line 437 we read that the lance πάντα δ' ἀπὸ πλευρῶν χρόα ἔργαθεν. That sounds quite dramatic, but when we consider that Odysseus has been able to put someone to flight (446-49), we must wonder how disabling his wound really is. He has kept on fighting despite his injury, and he fought well. But he has lost so much blood that by the time Menelaos and Aias have fought their way through to him, the poet can compare him to an injured deer that at first shows no signs of being overcome, then suddenly collapses (475-84). Later Nestor mentions Odysseus as one of the wounded lying near the ships. It would appear, then, that his condition is serious. But in one respect, as the poet himself suggests, the comparison does not hold. The deer is overpowered and 'carrion jackals ... devour him' (479), whereas Odysseus remains active and defends himself, 'stabbing out and feinting with his spear' (484) even after Aias has reached him. Instantly the Trojans retreat and Odysseus makes his way to the chariot. We may assume that at this moment his loss of blood makes itself felt, his strength ebbs, and he must be supported or at least led by the hand. But it is to be expected that a wounded hero would not permit his wound

to get the better of him before his ride back to camp, with his comrades and his enemies still watching. Odysseus is unlikely to give way to his injury during his walk to the chariot from the spot where only a moment ago he was doing all that stabbing and feinting.

Menelaos gives exaggerated assistance and thus behaves tactlessly, though his intentions are good. He seems to be calling out to everyone on the battlefield, 'Just see how admirably I rescued this man and how well I am taking care of him!' Yet the actions that might have been expected of him instead are hardly the stuff of epic poetry: accompanying Odysseus a few paces in the direction of the chariot, perhaps, without touching him, gradually falling behind and, after making sure from a distance that Odysseus has safely reached the chariot, turn and join Aias. During Menelaos' show, after all, Aias has tackled alone the work that has proved too difficult for Odysseus alone. Menelaos feels responsible for Odysseus, but his exaggerated behavior prevents this good trait from being exposed convincingly. He has made a show of it.

From the viewpoint of tact, a speaker runs a risk when he discusses a third person in that third person's presence. Menelaos is entangled in a situation of that kind in δ 148-54. Helen has asked whether it is known who their visitors are. She has voiced her assumption that one of them is Telemachos, because he looks like Odysseus (141-44). This remark leads Menelaos into a discussion of Telemachos' appearance. He takes his time about it; he discusses it at length, not omitting such details as Telemachos' hands, his feet, his head, his hair, the way he uses his eyes.[30] He even tells Helen that this visitor kept his cloak in front of his eyes and wept when Odysseus was mentioned—all this in Telemachos' presence.

His words and the minuteness of his details must make the situation exceedingly disagreeable for Telemachos; Menelaos is displaying bad manners. But it is to be noted that Telemachos' companion, Peisistratos, reacts to Menelaos' words with such

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[30] Plamböck, *Erfassen, Gegenwärtigen, Innesein*, p. 49, says about νοέω (δ 148), 'Menelaos erfaßt ihn . . ., denn aus den folgenden Versen geht hervor daß er ihn bereits als den Sohn des Odysseus erkennt'. This does not quite square with reality. Telemachos' likeness to Odysseus does not occur to him until Helen mentions it. In the following lines he elaborates on the likeness, but his arguments do not constitute certainty about Telemachos' identity.

reverence that he compares them to those of a god: αὔτα σέθεν, τοῦ νῶϊ θεοῦ ὣς τερπόμεθ' αὐδῇ (160). It is therefore questionable whether Menelaos is committing a breach of etiquette or displaying lack of tact at all in the eyes of Homer or his contemporaries.

Helen too is speaking about someone in his presence when she remarks that the stranger reminds her of Odysseus. Her question, 'Do we know?' (138) is rhetorical: either she knows or she does not know; in either case the question is superfluous. The fact that she asks it indicates that she is well aware of her visitors' presence. The question further suggests that the poet wanted her to appear as an ideal wife, one who, as soon as something appears to be known by her husband, considers it to be officially known by his house, even if she personally does not yet share in that knowledge.[31] This supposition aside, however, she would not trouble to ask such a question if she did not wish to make a convincingly favorable impression. She wishes, then, to display perfect manners. Also, we should not overlook the fact that she and Menelaos enjoy a higher social rank than their two young guests. This difference permits Menelaos to treat Telemachos in a manner that would seem disrespectful if Telemachos were to use it toward Menelaos.

This element has two parallels in passages where Menelaos plays no part. In θ 537-38 King Alkinoos orders his court singer, Demodokos—using an imperative in the third person—to stop his singing. At this Odysseus praises the bard, also in the third person and in his presence (ι 3). And in Λ 512-15 Idomeneus asks Nestor to conduct the injured Machaon to safety, in Machaon's presence, for the sake of the man's value as a physician (514). In both cases a man is praised less for his personal qualities than for his professional skill, and all three speakers are aware of their superiority: Alkinoos is Demodokos' master; Odysseus is the

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[31] Plamböck states, 'Aber noch ist sich Menelaos nicht schlüssig, ob er seine Kenntnis durch Kundgabe erproben soll, als auch Helena zweifelnd fragt, ob sie nicht schon weiß, wer der Fremde ist' (ibid.). First, as long as what one calls knowledge (*Kenntnis*) still needs to be checked (*erproben*), the item checked on is not knowledge but an impression. Knowledge can occur only after the check has taken place. Second, the expression 'ob sie nicht schon weiß' is misleading. This 'nicht' points to presumption bordering upon certainty. Helen is not certain, nor does she say that she is. With ἴδμεν δή she inquires into the state of affairs. She wishes to know whether the strangers already have introduced themselves in her absence. The presumption suggested by Plamböck would sooner have been expressed by means of οὐ with an optative construction.

honored guest for whom Demodokos has performed; and Idomeneus, unlike Machaon, belongs to the restricted circle of γέροντες in the army. Besides, Machaon is wounded; he is not. His speaking in this manner about Machaon in his presence and organizing his rescue without consulting him may be partly due to Machaon's injury. Probably, however, Idomeneus would not act in this way if Machaon were as prominent a character as, say, Aias or Odysseus. In speaking to Nestor about him, he does not merely request his help for Machaon, although in view of the precariousness of their situation in the battle, (see Λ 504-09) such brevity should have been acceptable to Nestor. His adding a specific reason why Nestor should help him—aside from providing useful information to the poet's audience—is a special tribute to Nestor, the more so because Machaon's value as a physician is not something that Nestor needs to know. However complimentary the added information may be to Nestor, it is considerably less so to Machaon. Machaon's value, the statement seems to imply, is not as a human, as a friend, as a warrior.[32] Had Idomeneus restrained himself from volunteering a reason why, or mentioned also his usefulness in other respects, Machaon's honor would have been more succesfully preserved.

After these words of Idomeneus the act continues smoothly. Machaon proceeds to mount Nestor's chariot (Λ 517-18). We are not told, by the way, that anyone lends him a hand. His injury is apparently not so serious that he would have been incapable of appreciating personal and respectful treatment if Idomeneus had chosen to give it to him. Nestor's reaction is described with the litotes οὐδ' ἀπίθησε (Λ 516), indicating that he complies with Idomeneus' wish not only unconditionally but eagerly.[33] The poet then goes on to unrelated matters without further comment. The smoothness with which the act proceeds tells us that the manner in which Idomeneus chose to deal with Machaon was considered selfunderstood and correct. This view can be based only on an appreciation of the difference in their ranks: a man who pursues a craft ranks below a warrior who does not.

In the case of Alkinoos, Odysseus, and Demodokos at θ 537-42 and ι 3, the differences in their social positions are much more striking. King Alkinoos' exalted rank seems to be the only explanation—though a valid one—of his attitude toward the bard. For

[32] See also Leaf's comm. at Π 27.

[33] Cf. *Lexikon des frühgriechischen Epos*, s.v. ἀπιθήσω.

Odysseus another factor plays a part. Alkinoos orders Demodokos to stop because Odysseus is crying. He wept once before at Demodokos' singing (θ 83-92), and Alkinoos distracted him with sporting games. After that, with a special token of appreciation, Odysseus exhorted the bard to continue (θ 477-98). He could hardly have shown his admiration for Demodokos any more clearly than by his compliment, 'Demodokos, I praise you far beyond all mortals without exception'. (487) The words are pure flattery. When Demodokos resumes his recital and again Odysseus cries, King Alkinoos insists that Odysseus explain his strange reaction to Demodokos' singing after his lavish compliment. Odysseus is thus forced to give Alkinoos an immediate and direct answer, in which he has no choice but to speak about, instead of directly to, Demodokos. Besides, in θ 537-38 Alkinoos has suggested by his own approach—though not deliberately—that he prefers that restraint be used in expressing one's appreciation of a bard.

Neither Machaon nor Demodokos considers himself slighted, and no one despises either of them. But the fact that they are talked about in their presence can be taken as a sign that the speakers regard themselves as superior to these professionals.

In itself, referring to others in their presence need not convey lack of due respect. Such references occur in a wide variety of situations in the epics. Most have already been mentioned. At Ω 773 Helen talks publicly about Priamos in an extremely deferential manner.[34] At Σ 392-409 a conversation develops between Charis and Hephaistos about their visitor Thetis, who necessarily overhears every word of Hephaistos' tribute to her.[35] In some instances the acceptability of this manner of speaking is connected with the religious behavior of Homeric man. These cases have a special character. At υ 80 Penelope discusses Artemis during a prayer to Artemis herself. A few lines later a similar thing occurs when Odysseus addresses Zeus (υ 101). In T 270-75 the phenomenon occurs twice over: in a public speech to Zeus, Achilleus discusses his antagonist Agamemnon (without in the least mitigating his respect for Agamemnon) by saying that the cause of their quarrel can be traced back to Zeus; then he turns to the Greeks and speaks about Zeus to them. Presumably these words are no less audible to

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[34] See Chapter III, section 2.

[35] See Chapter IV, discussion of Σ 392-409.

Zeus than the immediately preceding lines that were addressed to him. In these last lines no trace of disdain or even decrease of respect can be found. The speaker bows to Zeus' power.[36]

Other cases have an altogether different tone. At β 253-56 Leokritos discusses Mentor and Telemachos in their presence without regard for the proprieties, and in lines 236-38 Athena-Mentor herself talks about the suitors in their presence with disapproval. Immediately afterward, she directs her disapproval to the people of Ithaka. But this crowd at least is addressed directly. She shows her contempt for the suitors by saying that she will not waste her energy condemning their misdeeds because their incorrigibility is obvious. Here her indirect approach can be viewed as a means of emphasizing her contempt.[37] A similar use of indirection can be seen in the conduct of Iris at Θ 421-22. Zeus has shown her his annoyance at Athena, and has said he is determined not to be irritated by Hera's attitude any longer, since she thwarts him constantly. Now, having delivered Zeus' actual message to Hera and Athena, Iris also reports these asides. In doing so she sharpens the contempt in Zeus' words about Hera by addressing herself to Athena, although Hera is present and could have received the report herself.[38]

At κ 436-37 the situation has still another tone.[39] The sailor Eurylochos tells his fellow crewmen, in Odysseus' presence, that Odysseus is bold and reckless. His purpose is not to insult Odysseus but to keep the other members of the crew from following his direction. Eurylochos' conduct can be interpreted as avoidance of open aggression toward Odysseus, which these words would have signaled if they had been used in direct address. This avoidance could be interpreted as a form of deference to Odysseus, and it could therefore be an indication of good manners. But by the same token (and with just as little evidence) one could say that, on the contrary, the hostility of his remarks is sharpened by his attempt to avoid open conflict with Odysseus: formally he deprives Odysseus of the opportunity to respond. In that case, either he does not expect a defense because he considers the poor quality of Odysseus' leadership no longer disputable, or he fears an answer from Odysseus

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[36] Cf. section 3 of this chapter.
[37] Cf. Chapter II, section 1a.
[38] Chapter II, section 2.
[39] Cf. Chapter II, section 1a.

but has no fear of a rejoinder from his fellow crewmen. In either case he has attempted to isolate Odysseus.

Similar ambiguity is found in Aias' behavior at I 628-36. Achilleus serves him as an example: at line 617 Achilleus invites Phoinix to stay with him, but adds, οὗτοι δ' ἀγγελέουσι; with οὗτοι he is referring to the two most important participants in the preceding conversation, Aias and Odysseus.[40] In this passage, as in the others under discussion, it cannot be proved that Achilleus' behavior signals contempt. But the impression that it does is supported by the contrast between the curt οὗτοι δ' ἀγγελέουσι, marking the end of his confrontation with Aias and Odysseus, and his generous, solicitous, altogether expansive words to Phoinix, 'Rule with me equally, share half my honor, ... Lodge here in a soft bed, and at first light *we* can decide whether to sail or stay'. (I 616-19) Since the contrast between his abrupt dismissal of Aias and Odysseus and his warmth toward Phoinix occurs almost instantaneously, it cannot be understood as reflecting simply a change of mood or varying circumstances. It reflects contrasting attitudes toward the men with whom he is dealing.

The poet's intention of presenting Achilleus' indirect manner of speaking as an insulting display of lack of concern is further suggested by the circumstance that Aias, one of those insulted, adopts this manner and tries to pay Achilleus back in his own coin. For the space of eight lines he directs his words to Odysseus, pouring out his scorn of Achilleus. As he speaks he becomes so angry that he finally drops the rhetorical device of seeming to address only Odysseus and directs the last part of his speech to Achilleus himself, for whom his words have been intended from the beginning. Another interpretation is possible: at first Aias is still trying not to cast his contempt directly into Achilleus' face because their host-guest relationship is still in effect: for the space of eight lines he does his best to keep from violating the laws of hospitality. In that case, directing his words to a third person is a token of his respect.

Both in the case of the sailor and in that of Aias, there is little probability that the speakers use the indirect approach out of any feeling of goodwill. Their words are by no means friendly. It would not be in the immediate interest of either of them to try to deprive

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[40] See also Chapter II, section 2, and Chapter III, section 2.

their antagonistic words of their force by using a mitigating form. Eurylochos sees his life about to be endangered if the group decides to follow Odysseus. This is not the moment for him to be considerate. Nor do we find in his words any indication that he is thinking clearly enough to leave a way open to reconciliation by dealing considerately with Odysseus. Finally, Odysseus' initial reaction (he wants to kill him) is not that of a man who believes himself to be considerately dealt with.

The subject of Aias' speech is Achilleus' refusal to fight, but indirectly his words also refer to Achilleus' faux pas at I 617. In lines 644-55 Achilleus makes up for his apparent lack of proper concern with due eagerness. He concedes that Aias is right (645), apologizes with an explanation for his conduct (646-48), and concludes by repeating his dismissal far less bluntly (649-55).

The rhetorical character of Menelaos' speech in P 19-32 is striking. His answer to Euphorbos' threat is announced by the poet's words τὸν δὲ μέγ' ὀχθήσας προσέφη—yet the opening words are 'Father Zeus!' and he speaks in the third person about the man who has aroused his anger, and about the man's brother. He shows Euphorbos his scorn and indignation by using this indirect way.[41]

The element of contempt appears even more distinctly at Z 363-64. There Hektor chooses not to speak directly even in agreement, as Menelaos at least does in the last four lines of his answer to Euphorbos. Moreover, Hektor's words concern a person who is standing directly in front of him.[42] In his case the playing of a rhetorical game cannot be proven; it is not even altogether certain. Menelaos' antagonist, however, can draw comfort from the thought that Menelaos only seemingly refuses to address him.

Formally, the manner in which Iros conducts his argument with Odysseus (σ 10-24) is comparable to the tactic Menelaos employs at P 19-32. Iros, too, speaks initially about rather than to the person for whom his words are meant, and ends up by speaking to him directly. Likewise, his speech is introduced by the poet's statement that Iros addresses his opponent (in other words, no one else). The impression of contempt created by Menelaos' answer is strengthened in the case of Iros by his abusive language (he calls Odysseus μολοβρός) and the sarcasm of his rhetorical question πῶς δ' ἂν σὺ νεωτέρῳ ἀνδρὶ μάχοιο.

[41] Cf. Leaf's comm. *ad loc.*
[42] Cf. Chapter I, section 1.

As we have seen, discussing others in their presence is not always a sign of lack of respect. But in a situation loaded with hostility, it can be used deliberately to convey contempt. Even in a friendly atmosphere, however, this manner of speaking serves as a reminder of its adverse intent in hostile situations. Its use is therefore irreproachable only if a striking contrast in social rank exists between the people concerned, as in the case of King Alkinoos and the bard. When a lesser degree of social disparity exists (Idomeneus and Machaon at Λ 512, Menelaos and Telemachos at δ 148-154), such conduct subjects a person to the charge of maladroitness, since it reminds the one thus treated of his social inferiority, even though the speaker may not intend this effect.

When Menelaos discusses Telemachos in his presence at δ 148-154, he banishes him from the conversation. At least, he reinforces the withdrawal Telemachos has himself effected by covering his face with his cloak and weeping. Telemachos' friend Peisistratos is even drawn into talking about him patronizingly: ἀλλὰ σαόφρων ἐστί ... (158-64) This conversation among Helena, Menelaos, and Peisistratos certainly seems to stay within the bounds of good manners. Yet the image it conveys of Menelaos' sense of tact remains questionable, especially when he goes so far as to discuss the similarities of Odysseus' and Telemachos' physical peculiarities. As the epics offer no parallel to this situation, it is not possible to determine whether these speakers go too far according to Homeric standards of propriety. In any case, this passage tends to confirm the impression that whenever Menelaos is in danger of committing a breach of decorum his point of weakness is lack of tact.

6. *Menelaos' Hospitality*

Several scenes in Books δ and ο help to clarify the rules of conduct Menelaos follows as a host. In Book ο Telemachos wishes to terminate his stay at Menelaos' palace and asks him ἤδη νῦν μ' ἀπόπεμπε (65). In his answer, Menelaos assumes the role of an authority who introduces a law for hosts: 'It is equally bad when one speeds on the guest unwilling to go, and when he holds back one who is hastening'. (72-73)

Other passages in which Menelaos implicitly refers to the importance of good manners, particularly for the benefit of young people and servants, have been mentioned earlier.[43] Both in these

[43] Cf., e.g., the Antilochos scene in Book Ψ, esp. lines 570-85 and 602-11, discussed in Chapter II, section 1b, and δ 31-32, ibid.

and in other cases we must wonder to what extent he is motivated by an urge to teach a lesson unasked. However unconsciously this urge is indulged, it tends to disparage the persons addressed and can never be called tactful. One may also consider whether it is Homer himself who wishes to educate his audience.[44] In that case no tactlessness is involved. In the first place, while addressing his audience Homer is not facing a group of inferiors who could feel belittled. Second, unlike Telemachos and his companions in this distress, individual members of the poet's audience (among whom the twentieth-century reader need not be forgotten) are always at liberty to stop listening (or reading) if the unsolicited moralizing fails to please them. Finally, they have never had to take the lesson personally. On the contrary, as A. B. Lord has pointed out, older men have been among the most faithful and attentive listeners to bards: 'While the older women serve the people, the young men dance ... and sing with the girls; and the older men sit about, talk in true heroic fashion, and perhaps listen to a singer of epic songs'.[45] Moralizing was apt to please the very people who were in an ideal position to observe bad manners and to suffer the most from them. In this respect, the poet could act as their spokesman and secure his popularity.

The poet's didactic intentions cannot be doubted, and it is interesting to see in whose mouth he puts his didactic remarks. Whenever the lessons he feels should be taught deal with morality or good manners, he puts them more often than not in the mouth and the conduct of Menelaos. The poet has and seems to use two options: on the one hand, Menelaos' words directly express the rule that the poet wants to impress upon his audience, or his conduct serves as an example of it. On the other hand, by favoring poor Menelaos for that purpose, the poet also seems to use Menelaos' conduct as a negative example. By presenting Menelaos as teacher and example, he seems to demonstrate to his audience how irritating the habit of moralizing can be for others, and that anyone who

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[44] Cf. W. J. Verdenius, 'Homer, the Educator of the Greeks', in *Mededelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, afd. Letterkunde*, N.R. 33 (1970), p. 228, 'It perfectly agrees with Homer's practice of inserting didactic remarks in his poems'.

[45] A. B. Lord, *Homer and Huso I: The singer's rests in Greek and South slavic Heroic Songs*, TAPA 67 (1936), p. 108, quoted in James A. Notopoulos, '*Continuity and Interconnection in Homeric Oral Composition*', TAPA 83 (1951), p. 83.

slips into this habit is thereby in danger of displaying bad 'inner' manners.

In Book o Menelaos is again confronted with a younger person, and he certainly takes his time in presenting his lesson: 'I would disapprove of another hospitable man who was excessive in friendship, as of one excessive in hate. In all things balance is better. It is equally bad when one speeds on the guest unwilling to go, and when he ...' and so on and so forth (69-74). All that Telemachos' ἤδη νῦν μ' ἀπόπεμπε called for was a simple answer: 'Of course' or 'Certainly, but stay till we have had a last meal together'. If the poet's intention had been merely to show by Menelaos' conduct that etiquette required one not to delay a guest, such an answer would have been adequate. But the poet had at least three more things in mind and managed to combine them all. First, here was a chance to have Menelaos parade his sensibility with a lengthy speech full of unnecessary repetitions of just one idea. He was to be boring in his impressiveness, irritatingly hammering home the correctness of his analysis of the host-guest relationship. Second, there is a reason for this endless elaboration. Menelaos tries to base his argument on the axiom that balance is better than excess in either direction. The axiom is unexceptionable, but Menelaos' argument is flawed by the fact that it does not quite fit the premise. Certainly, to urge a guest to leave before he is ready to go is generally regarded as inhospitable, with allowances made for special circumstances. But on the other side of Menelaos' balance, the 'hospitable man who was excessive in friendship' would be difficult to fault. To try to keep a guest who seems ready to leave—as King Alkinoos does when he offers Odysseus a bride as an alternative to his departure—is a good host's way of showing his appreciation of the visit. Only in extreme cases, when such conduct approaches imprisonment (as in the case of Polyphemos), can it be condemned. The minuteness of detail in Menelaos' speech serves to blur the fact that his zeal has run away with his logic.

In the third place, Menelaos in fact intends to delay Telemachos for a while, despite his professed principles. He therefore feels he needs an introduction to explain that he does not mean to impair Telemachos' freedom, though he knows that Telemachos will indeed feel a loss of freedom when he realizes his host's intention. Also, since he means to delay him only long enough to give him a last meal and some gifts, he could just as well be regarded as not

limiting Telemachos' freedom at all. From the point of view of the poet this circumstance calls for an explanation if even the slightest impression that Menelaos may be lacking in hospitality is to be avoided.

In all, these lines fully expose Menelaos' wish to do the right thing as host. Yet Menelaos does not refrain from casting his explanation in the form of a gratuitous lesson. He thus for no compelling reason gives Telemachos once again a reminder of his youthfulness and inexperience, meanwhile casting himself in the role of a sage whose counsel is due reverent attention.

After his lengthy disquisition, Menelaos announces his intention of observing the final duties of a host: he will present Telemachos with gifts and a farewell dinner. Here too his conduct is not determined by modesty. He proclaims the good deeds he is about to do, and with them his hospitality. In doing so he uses abundant emphasis and offers to join Telemachos on a trip through Greece to help him collect more gifts. His own farewell gifts will be 'fine ... and you can look at them with your eyes'. (ο 75-76) This sounds like feigned modesty. Similar clumsiness appears in his offer to travel with Telemachos all over the country to gather many more gifts. Such an offer seems to presuppose Telemachos' greed. All in all, his speech does not display delicacy of manners, though from a strictly formal point of view they may be irreproachable. It is hard to imagine that Helen and Nestor, for example, would have behaved in that manner. Nevertheless, it is obvious that Menelaos is making an effort to be on his best behavior. Each line of this passage gives evidence of his good intentions.

The same cordial yet awkward outspokenness appears in δ 33-35. Strangers have arrived, and the question is raised whether they should be admitted or not. Menelaos is in favor of welcoming them on the grounds that he himself has frequently enjoyed hospitality on his way home from the war—ξεινήϊα πολλὰ φαγόντες. These words suggest that he has initially tried to find a better expression; after all, ξεινήϊα do not necessarily have to be articles of food. As it turns out, he does not speak elegantly about 'being treated with kindness' or 'being invited to stay'. He simply asserts that he has been amply fed by other people. Moreover, his offering any explanation why he should be hospitalble is redundant. Delicacy is foreign to him; if he attempts it, the goal remains elusive.

His words in δ 60-62 demonstrate also how his attempt at cour-

teous behavior is blocked by his insistence on being outspoken about it and explaining the rules of the game. In receiving unknown guests, he wishes to follow the correct procedure. But instead of welcoming them, offering them a meal, and worrying about their identity later, he announces this as a program in a spate of words: 'Help yourselves to the food ..., and then afterward ... we shall ask you who ... you are'.

This convention of not asking a guest his name until after he has eaten follows clearly enough from the wish to make a stranger feel at ease. On the one hand, one avoids the appearance of distrust; on the other, asking a stranger his identity immediately upon his arrival, before his physical needs have been attended to, leads to a short answer that yields a name and little more. Delaying the question until after dinner opens the door to an interesting story that both host and guest can enjoy at their ease. Not to deprive the stranger of this chance to please his host with full information, simultaneously providing a break from the daily routine, is a courteous custom that has its practical aspects. By announcing his intention of following this custom at the moment of their first encounter, however, Menelaos is something of a spoil-sport. He appears to be thinking only of the practical value of bearing the suspense, ignoring the equally practical value of the courtesy game of dissimulation.[46] One cannot announce an inquiry and convincingly pretend lack of interest at the same time. Menelaos' words 'then we shall ask' indicate active interest; they are not equivalent to a rather uninterested 'we can get to that later'.

Various interpretations of Menelaos' behavior at this point are possible. We may suppose, for instance, that he knows this custom only formally without fully understanding its meaning. Alternatively, he may be trying to improve his acquaintance with the custom by using this occasion to memorize it like a lesson. His actions, then, are as self-centered as his unconvincing attempt at communication with Zeus at Γ 365-68. In δ 60-62, his intention not to fail in practice is laudable but abortive, though he must be credited with partial success in his attempt to fight his curiosity about his guest's identity.

We might also assume that Menelaos, with his inclination to teach a lesson, seizes this chance to instruct his young guests and

[46] The only individual in the epics who seems to have his manners under perfect control in this respect is Nestor (see γ 69-70).

indirectly his entire audience—a considerable party celebrating a wedding—on the proper way to proceed when strangers arrive. Addressing a large audience indirectly is not an unknown tactic to Menelaos. We have already seen that it is quite normal for him to address a god, for example, when his words are really intended for his fellow humans. His clumsiness does not exclude a certain amount of strategy. And there is a further possibility: seeing how young these strangers are, he fears they may not know the proper procedure and intercedes before they can volunteer their story prematurely, both for their sake—to keep them from making an unfavorable impression—and for his own, so as not to forfeit full information and entertainment.

These hypotheses are mere speculations. Whatever the case may be, in his eagerness to do the right thing, Menelaos commits a breach of the very social custom he has expounded, first by the very act of putting it into words, then by the way in which he does so. Eumaios falls into comparable maladroitness when he welcomes Odysseus in ξ 45-47: 'So that you first may be filled to contentment with food and wine, then tell me too where you come from, and about the sorrows you have been suffering'. Eumaios, however, arouses none of the irritation we may feel at Menelaos. Menelaos is a prominent man and as such an example for many people; Eumaios is not. Besides, Eumaios does not act with the self-possession of Menelaos. Menelaos gives orders and regulates his guests' behavior ('First you will eat and then you will answer my question'), Eumaios' offer of food is an act of true compassion: he has revealed his own position and his troubles, now he declares that he does not expect Odysseus to reciprocate immediately. But he does take care to let Odysseus know that he is sure he has had his share of troubles too, and that he will be a compassionate listener. Menelaos seems to think first of the proper procedure. Eumaios of the other person. The prosaic way in which Menelaos approaches the rules of conduct leads here, as on other occasions, to lack of tact.

In the next line Menelaos makes up to a considerable extent for his undue frankness: 'For the stock of your parents can be no lost one, but you are of the race of men who are kings ... no mean men could have sons such as you are'. This explanatory assertion corresponds to such passages as Λ 648-54 and Z 360-68, discussed in Chapter I. In all three cases an apology is implied in the attempt

to explain one's conduct. Menelaos' line of thought can be construed as: 'It is not likely from your looks that you would have reason to be ashamed of your backgrounds. Therefore I am confident that you will not mind my impatience to learn more about you'. What he really expresses is a tribute to their ancestors, ending in a direct compliment (τοιούσδε) to Telemachos and Peisistratos themselves. His tribute is threefold, but free from undue excess: the second part, 'you are of the race of kings', serves to specify the first, whereas the third part explains the second.

The reference to their looks leads Menelaos to the brink of embarrassing personal remarks. But his apologetic explanation for his rash allusion to the question of their identity is offered with brilliancy and unexpected elegance.

CONCLUSION

In numerous passages the epic heroes follow their own inclinations rather than the rules of etiquette (θ 408, for instance, and K 88, and in general most of the passages quoted in part A of this book). Thus, Snell's theory that 'all of public life is closely connected with rigid conventional rites and forms' (see Preface) has to be approached with some caution. Etiquette does exist and has an important function in the epics. In Chapters I and IV I have discussed two models of formal etiquette that are sometimes followed by Homeric heroes, sometimes not. When choosing between the various degrees of courtesy and formality that they can use in social traffic, they seldom discriminate according to the social rank of the other person—save when they discuss individuals in their presence.

The social conduct of the epic heroes on the whole is not directed toward a goal of 'correct' manners or the display of 'refined' forms. Lack of courtesy is not scorned. Only lack of truthfulness can elicit indignation, not lack of friendliness or discourtesy. At an insult, the end seems to justify the means. Adkins justly points out that Homeric man lives in a 'results culture'. Since good manners are concerned more with the way in which things are done or said than with the content of actions or statements, they are of secondary importance in the epics.

Yet important they are. From most of the passages quoted, it appears that the poet allots functions to good and poor manners in the development of events—unto the smallest details—and in establishing the various degrees of attractiveness of his heroes. But seldom does he allow matters of etiquette to be the main theme of a conversation.

Straßburger's finding of 'composure and selfdiscipline emanating from external and internal manners alike' and Snell's theory that 'the discrepancy between ... disposition and gesture has not yet erupted' presuppose a unity of the internal and external in the Homeric world (see Preface). Internal and external manners, however, are separate entities in the epics. Paris excels in external manners, and excellence in external manners also largely determines Helen's and Agamemnon's conduct, whereas Hektor seems

to represent the poet's ideal in regard to internal manners. Through the actions of Nestor and Diomedes, the poet contrasts external and internal manners, alluding to the fact that these two heroes base their actions on good internal manners despite appearances to the contrary.

Homer gives us examples of good internal manners combined with some lack of external polish (Hephaistos) and examples of the reverse. When Agamemnon offers an apology, for instance, he is guided more by a wish for reconciliation than by remorse. When an apology is due, he offers it only when pressured; otherwise he avoids it if he can. From the point of view of external manners, however, his behavior is correct.

Altogether, in the variety of ways his heroes relate to one another, the poet displays their internal and external manners in many combinations, and in the many degrees of respectability they thus attain. Among them, Menelaos occupies a position in the middle: while he excels in neither external nor internal manners, he displays good qualities in both. Fränkel's description of the human in the Iliad (see Preface) fits Paris, Helen, and Patroklos, but not Odysseus or Hektor.

As far as internal manners are concerned, today's standards seems to differ little from those of Homer's day; they are based in the same humanity. There have always been people who risk making an unfavorable impression in order to spare the feelings of those they pity and help (Aineias) and who freely express their appreciation of others while exercising restraint in delivering unasked-for criticism (Menelaos, when he tells about his νόστος, δ 333-592).

In regard to the extent to which Homeric man behaves according to his principles, in some cases one can agree with Fränkel's evaluation, 'The human of the Iliad has refined manners', in others one cannot. Homer attempts to instruct his audience in matters of etiquette, demonstrating his values through the way his heroes behave. He seldom uses the direct approach; but when he does—through the mouth of Menelaos—he suggests indirectly that in his opinion direct instruction in etiquette betrays a deficiency in manners.

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